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Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Evolution and the Psychology of Thinking: The Debate.
Contributors: David E. Over - Editor.
Publisher: Psychology Press.
Place of publication: New York.
Publication year: 2003.
Page number: 167.
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