The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union, 1937-1939

By Louise Grace Shaw | Go to book overview

1

The Cabinet and Communism

On 28 May 1937, Neville Chamberlain replaced Stanley Baldwin as Prime Minister of Great Britain. Anglo-Soviet relations were not foremost on his foreign-policy agenda. Indeed, throughout 1937, the only diplomatic contact maintained with the Soviet government concerned its role in the Spanish Civil War. Furthermore, during the first eight months of 1938, the British government deliberately excluded the Soviet Union from talks held and decisions taken regarding the crisis in the Czechoslovakian Sudetenland. The reason for this lay in the prejudices of the British government and not in the military, financial and political constraints that were said to have existed and determined policy.

The new Prime Minister's first Cabinet consisted of Sir John Simon as Chancellor of the Exchequer, Leslie Hore-Belisha as Secretary of State for War, Duff Cooper as First Lord of the Admiralty, and Samuel Hoare as Secretary of State for Home Affairs. Anthony Eden remained Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and was assisted by the Lord President of the Council, Lord Halifax. The foreign policy of the new government was twofold: 'limited liability' regarding Europe and the Far East, and determined appeasement of Germany and Italy. 1 Thus, in his 1937 report, the Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip, laid down Britain's new strategic priorities: first, to protect the British Isles; second, to protect the trading routes that led to Britain; third, to safeguard the British empire; and fourth, to assist allies, but only in the last resort. 2 Consequently, the British government took no significant action regarding Japan's renewed war against China and maintained a policy of non-intervention concerning the escalating Spanish Civil War.

The Spanish Civil War had begun in July 1936 following the failed attempt at a coup d'état by the Nationalists, led by General Franco, against the elected Popular Front government. The British and French governments had declared a policy of non-intervention in August 1936, establishing the Non-Intervention Committee (NIC) a

-5-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The British Political Elite and the Soviet Union, 1937-1939
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Foreword ix
  • Series Editor's Preface xi
  • Acknowledgements xiii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1 - The Cabinet and Communism 5
  • 2 - Building Bridges 31
  • 3 - The Foreign Office and the Soviet Union, 1937-38 51
  • 4 - The Anti-Appeasers 75
  • 5 - Poland or the Soviet Union? 101
  • 6 - The Loss of an Ally 117
  • 7 - Germany and the Soviet Union: Allies or Enemies? 149
  • 8 - United in Opposition 169
  • Conclusion 185
  • Bibliography 191
  • Index 206
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 210

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.