Chapter 1 is a substantially revised and expanded version of the following article: Michael Otsuka, 'Self-Ownership and Equality: A Lockean Reconciliation', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 27/1 (winter 1998): 65-92. Copyright 1998, and reprinted in revised form with permission of, Princeton University Press. The version published here differs from the original article in the following respects: The main thesis regarding the reconciliation of self-ownership and equality, as stated in the introductory remarks and in Section IV , has been reformulated. In Section III I offer a revised formulation and an expanded defence and elaboration of the egalitarian version of the Lockean proviso. In Section V I now offer a proviso-based argument against bequests and argue for the compatibility of self-ownership with the strict egalitarian regulation of the non-market transfer and sharing of resources among members of the same generation. The other sections have been revised to only a minor degree.
Chapter 2 is a revised version of the following article: Michael Otsuka, 'Making the Unjust Provide for the Least Well Off', Journal of Ethics, 2/3 (1998): 247-59. Copyright 1998, and reprinted with kind permission of, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chapter 3 Section II draws on material originally published in the following article: Michael Otsuka, 'Quinn on Punishment and Using Persons as Means', Law and Philosophy, 15/2 (1996): 201-8. Copyright 1996, and reprinted with kind permission of, Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Chapter 4 is a very slightly revised version of the following article: Michael Otsuka, 'Killing the Innocent in Self-Defense', Philosophy and Public Affairs, 23/1 (winter 1994): 74-94. Copyright 1994, and reprinted with permission of, Princeton University Press.
Chapters 5-7 consist entirely of previously unpublished material.
In addition to those whom I thank in the originally published versions of the above articles, I would like to acknowledge the following debts: Revised versions of Chapter 1 were presented at King's College, Cambridge, and Yale University. Versions of Chapters 5-6 were presented at the Law and Philosophy Discussion Group in Los Angeles, the University of Exeter, University College London, the University