CHAPTER 2William C. Potter
AN UPDATE ON EFFORTS TO REDUCE
TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS*
THE CURRENT PREDICAMENTIronically, at a time when the Bush administration appears increasingly
enthusiastic about unilateral approaches to nuclear arms control, it has
been noticeably silent about the informal arms control regime on tactical
nuclear weapons (TNWs) created ten years ago on the basis of parallel,
unilateral declarations made by George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev. As a
disarmament measure, these unilateral declarations have resulted in the
elimination of more nuclear charges than all the negotiated agreements
between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia, and also have led
to the redeployment in central storage of thousands of additional weapons.Notwithstanding the significant accomplishments of the 1991/92
declarations, the informal regime suffers from a number of serious
|• ||Unilateral statements are not legally binding. They can be disavowed
without prior notification;|
|• ||The parallel, unilateral declarations do not provide a mechanism for
their mutual modification;|
|• ||The 1991/92 informal regime does not provide for data exchange or
any verification and transparency measures. It, therefore, is impossible
to have confidence in the implementation of the declarations and to
ascertain the status of the remaining TNWs. Russia, for example, has
not provided any new information on its implementation of the 1991
declarations, since its statement at the 2000 NPT Review Conference;|
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Time for Control.
Contributors: Taina Susiluoto - Editor.
Publisher: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.
Place of publication: Geneva.
Publication year: 2002.
Page number: 7.
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