Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

By Thomas Graham Jr.; Keith A. Hansen | Go to book overview

5 Intelligence on Iraqi WMD
Programs and Policy Reactions

The road leading up to the US decision to use military force against Saddam Hussein in March 2003 was complex and multifaceted. Intelligence had only limited influence on that decision. To understand what transpired, particularly the role that intelligence played, we must break the episode into discrete parts: first, the US Intelligence Community's beliefs about the facts on the ground in Iraq, particularly on the status of Saddam's clandestine WMD programs; second, policymakers' preferences and how they chose to receive and use the intelligence information given to them; and third, the international community's beliefs, including what UN and IAEA inspectors had uncovered, or not uncovered, and their conclusions about Iraq's WMD programs. Finally, one must treat nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons individually, even while public discourse often confuses them. As we stated in the Introduction, important distinctions among these weapons must be kept in mind when reviewing the Iraqi or, indeed, any other case.


Efforts to Monitor Saddam's WMD Programs

As mentioned briefly in Chapter 3, the Intelligence Community had been following Saddam's efforts to acquire WMD capabilities for two decades. But its effort to achieve an accurate understanding of the status of Iraq's WMD programs in late 2002 was hindered by a variety of factors. Everyone knew that Saddam had previously used chemical weapons against Iran and on his own Kurdish population; his regime had a long history of using concealment and deception to spoof national and international efforts to monitor his clandestine programs; contrary to UN Security Council resolutions, he refused to resume inspections by international experts in 1998 following the temporary withdrawal of inspectors for a planned US-UK bombing campaign; and his

-106-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Preventing Catastrophe: The Use and Misuse of Intelligence in Efforts to Halt the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 300

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.