Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military

By Derek S. Reveron | Go to book overview

3

Resistance to
Military Engagement

OVER THE LAST TWENTY YEARS, as militaries have shifted from a core responsibility of preparing for and prevailing in major war to more direct foreign policy engagements and training partners' militaries, a natural opposition arose. Security scholars and practitioners have been debating the proper use of the armed forces for decades. While some policymakers call for a conservative approach for the use of military power based upon a careful calculation of national interests reminiscent of the Weinberger Doctrine of the 1980s, others seek to apply the military instrument of power to an increasing range of non-warfighting missions such as civil engineering, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

The debate begins with national strategy, which largely determines how presidents use the military. Because of the timing and character of the Clinton administration (see chapter 2), Clinton's 1990s “shape-respond-prepare” strategy gave rise to the “superpowers don't do windows” counterargument. Some identified diplomatic engagement by generals Wesley Clark, Tony Zinni, or Charles Wilhelm in the 1990s or state-building missions in Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo as apostasy for an organization that is supposed to prepare for and win the nation's wars. The first year of the Bush administration emphasized this— militaries fight wars and do not conduct foreign policies or do peacekeeping. By the last years of the Bush administration, however, things were very different. His two defense secretaries added security assistance as a strategic pillar by institutionalizing stability operations in 2005 and then irregular warfare in 2008. And security assistance had expanded from 49 to 149 countries over eight years. Finally, the military found itself doing state building in several countries, including Iraq and Afghanistan. In spite of the demand for the U.S. military in these areas, resistance to these missions continued throughout the 2000s.

-55-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Exporting Security: International Engagement, Security Cooperation, and the Changing Face of the U.S. Military
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Illustrations ix
  • Preface xi
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • Acronyms and Abbreviations xvii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1: Beyond Warfare 11
  • 2: Military Engagement, Strategy, and Policy 31
  • 3: Resistance to Military Engagement 55
  • 4: Demilitarizing Combatant Commands 79
  • 5: Security Cooperation 101
  • 6: Promoting Maritime Security 123
  • 7: Implications for the Force 145
  • 8: From Confrontation to Cooperation 169
  • Index 185
  • About the Author 205
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 205

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.