THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr.
In October 1962, the Soviet Union placed ballistic missiles in Cuba, ninety miles from
the United States, with a range capable of striking most major American cities. In
response to this potential danger, President John F. Kennedy convened an Executive Com-
mittee of the National Security Council. The superpowers teetered on the brink of a
nuclear war. This selection, written by one of America's most prominent historians,
reveals the NSC in one of its most difficult—and successful—moments.
About 8:30 that evening "October 14" the CIA informed Bundy of the incredible discovery. Bundy reflected on whether to inform the President immediately, but he knew that Kennedy would demand the photographs and supporting interpretation in order to be sure the report was right and knew also it would take all night to prepare the evidence in proper form. Furthermore, an immediate meeting would collect officials from dinner parties all over town, signal Washington that something was up and end any hope of secrecy. It was better, Bundy thought, to let the President have a night's sleep in preparation for the ordeal ahead.
The President was having breakfast in his dressing gown at eight forty-five on Tuesday morning when Bundy brought the news. Kennedy asked at once about the nature of the evidence. As soon as he was convinced that it was conclusive, he said that the United States must bring the threat to an end: one way or another the missiles would have to be removed. He then directed Bundy to institute low-level photographic flights and to set up a meeting of top officials. Privately he was furious: if Khrushchev could pull this after all his protestations and denials, how could he ever be trusted on anything?
The meeting, beginning at eleven forty-five that morning, went on with intermissions for the rest of the week. The group soon became known as the Executive Committee, presumably of the National Security Council; the press later dubbed it familiarly ExCom, though one never heard that phrase at the time. It carried on its work with the most exacting secrecy: nothing could be worse than to alert the Russians before the United States had decided on its own course. For this reason its members—the President, the Vice-President, Rusk, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, General Taylor, McCone, Dillon, Adlai Stevenson, Bundy, Sorensen, Ball, Gilpatric, Llewellyn Thompson, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, and others brought in on occasion, among them Dean Acheson and Robert Lovett—had to attend their regular meetings, keep as many appointments as possible and preserve the normalities of life. Fortunately the press corps, absorbed in the congressional campaign, was hardly disposed or situated to notice odd comings and goings. And so the President himself went off that night to dinner at Joseph Alsop's as if nothing had happened. After dinner the talk turned to the contingencies of history, the odds for or against any particular event taking place. The President was silent for a time. Then he said, "Of course, if you simply consider mathematical chances,
From Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 801–806.
Professor Schlesinger is a Pulitzer Prize winner and teaches history at the City University of New York.
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Publication information: Book title: Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council. Contributors: Karl F. Inderfurth - Editor, Loch K. Johnson - Editor. Publisher: Oxford University Press. Place of publication: New York. Publication year: 2004. Page number: 233.
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