Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council

By Karl F. Inderfurth; Loch K. Johnson | Go to book overview

25
CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS

Eric Moskowitz and Jeffrey S. Lantis

This selection by two political scientists examines the role of the National Security Coun-
cil in the planning and coordination of America's involvement in the war in Kosovo dur-
ing the Clinton years.


INTRODUCTION: THE CHALLENGE
OF KOSOVO

The crisis in Kosovo represented a major challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the post-cold war era. The Clinton administration was faced with mounting evidence of systematic killings of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo at the hands of Serb paramilitary groups in 1998 and 1999. On the heels of the war in Bosnia, President Clinton and his advisers faced a brewing humanitarian tragedy in which ethnic Albanians sought independence from Serbia while the Serbs struggled to retain control of the province. Clinton administration officials could agree that Kosovo represented a special challenge for the United States and raised important questions about humanitarian intervention, but for almost a year the president's advisers could not agree on what to do.

After months of internal disagreements over the best course of action for the United States and its allies, the Clinton administration first chose to conduct coercive diplomacy in the fall of 1998—pressuring Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic to negotiate a limited autonomy deal for Kosovo while at the same time threatening the use of military force to stop the killings. In the face of Serb resistance to independence for Kosovo, Clinton then chose to pursue a temporary diplomatic solution in October 1998. Sadly, the situation in Kosovo rapidly deteriorated through the winter months that followed, as Serb paramilitary units and Kosovars stepped up their raids and reprisals against one another.

Media coverage of massacres in Kosovo in early 1999 brought the crisis into stark relief for western governments. The Clinton administration pursued several rounds of new diplomatic overtures, including the Rambouillet conference that began in February 1999, but Milosevic remained steadfast in his refusal to negotiate autonomy for Kosovo. U.S. officials finally felt compelled to act militarily. On March 24, 1999, Clinton announced his decision to launch massive air attacks against Serbia in cooperation with NATO allies. He claimed that ending the tragedy was "a moral imperative" and important to the U.S. national interest. Operation Allied Force was the largest military assault in Europe since World War II and led to the introduction of 50,000 NATO peacekeepers into Kosovo. This case study reviews these significant foreign policy decisions and considers the pressures and constraints faced by the Clinton administration in responding to a humanitarian tragedy.


BACKGROUND: CRISES IN THE BALKANS

The Kosovo crisis of 1998–1999 was an extension of close to a century of upheaval in the Balkans. In 1914, the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of the Austro-Hungarian Empire by a Serbian nationalist in the streets of Sarajevo effectively ignited the fires of World War I. After the war, the Kingdom of the Serbs,

From Eric Moskowitz and Jeffrey S. Lantis, "The War in Kosovo: Coercive Diplomacy," in Ralph G. Carter, ed., Contemporary Cases
in Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade (Washington, D.C.: CQ, 2002), 59–87.

Professors Moskowitz and Lantis teach political science at The College of Wooster in Ohio.

-253-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Fateful Decisions: Inside the National Security Council
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 378

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.