Mao's Last Revolution

By Roderick Macfarquhar; Michael Schoenhals | Go to book overview

18
War Scares

To the rank-and-file delegates to the Ninth Congress, Lin Biao must have seemed the ideal choice as a successor.1 Most important, he had been handpicked by Mao, and who better to stand beside the Chairman than one of the CCP's greatest generals at a time when China was surrounded by hostile superpowers? Indeed, the congress met at a time when war with the Soviet Union seemed a real possibility.

The previous year, Soviet-style revisionism, the cardinal sin that the Cultural Revolution was designed to extirpate in China, took an alarming new turn. In the summer of 1968, the Soviet Union invaded its satellite Czechoslovakia in order to eliminate its revisionism, the "communism with a human face" introduced by First Secretary Alexander Dubcek and his colleagues. The overthrow of the Dubcek regime had subsequently been justified by the "Brezhnev doctrine," which held that Moscow had a right to dispose of any government that betrayed Communist principles. While Beijing in the throes of Cultural Revolution was hardly sympathetic to the "Prague spring," the implications of the Brezhnev doctrine were deeply unsettling for a Chinese regime that Moscow manifestly detested. The Chinese dubbed the Soviet actions and doctrine "social imperialism."2 As Zhou Enlai later put it to a Vietcong delegation, "This has created a precedent that allows a socialist country to intervene in another socialist country's affairs."3

Simultaneously, conventional "imperialism" was a potential threat on China's southern border. Mao had launched the Cultural Revolution on the assumption that the Vietnam War would not spill over into China at a time of internal upheaval.4 Even so, in the mid-1960s he had ordered the transfer of vital industries to the far interior, the so-called Third Front,5 a massively expensive dislocation of the economy—over 200 billion yuan according to a later Chinese estimate6— and at a CC work conference in the autumn of 1965, national defense, including

-308-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
Mao's Last Revolution
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Preface ix
  • Abbreviations xiii
  • Introduction 1
  • 1: The First Salvos 14
  • 2: The Siege of Beijing 32
  • 3: Confusion on Campuses 52
  • 4: The Fifty Days 66
  • 5: Mao's New Successor 86
  • 6: The Red Guards 102
  • 7: Red Terror 117
  • 8: Confusion Nationwide 132
  • 9: Shanghai's [January Storm] 155
  • 10: Seizing Power 170
  • 11: The Last Stand of the Old Guard 184
  • 12: The Wuhan Incident 199
  • 13: The May 16 Conspiracy 221
  • 14: The End of the Red Guards 239
  • 15: Cleansing the Class Ranks 253
  • 16: Dispatching Liu Shaoqi 273
  • 17: The Congress of Victors 285
  • 18: War Scares 308
  • 19: The Defection and Death of Lin Biao 324
  • 20: Mao Becalmed 337
  • 21: Zhou Under Pressure 358
  • 22: Deng Xiaoping Takes Over 379
  • 23: The Gang of Four Emerges 396
  • 24: The Tiananmen Incident of 1976 413
  • 25: The Last Days of Chairman Mao 431
  • Conclusion 450
  • Glossary of Names and Identities 465
  • A Note on Sources 479
  • Notes 483
  • Bibliography 611
  • Illustration Credits 659
  • Index 661
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 694

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.