The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader

By JaromÍr NavrÁtil | Go to book overview

DOCUMENT No. 61: "Problems with the Policy of Safeguarding
the Internal and External Security of the State, Their Status at Present,
the Basic Ways to Resolve Them," Czechoslovakia's Plans for Future
Changes in Military and National Security Policies, July 1968 (Excerpts)

Source: TsKhSD, F. 5, O. 60, D. 310, LI. 121–153.

The State-Administrative Department of the CPCz Central Committee, headed by General Václav
Prchlík drafted this report in early July 1968. In its final form, the report would have provided the basis
for changes in military and security policies scheduled to be discussed at the 14th CPCz Congress in
September 1968.

Although the report states that Czechoslovakia "will take as a starting point its allied obligations before
the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact," the Prchlík plan sought to redefine the whole nature of the alliance
as well as Czechoslovakia's place within it. Internally, the report called for changing the "erroneous and
obsolete premises" of Czechoslovak military doctrine, ending direct party control of the armed forces,
and revamping the "illegal and inhumane "internal security apparatus. Externally, restrictions imposed
by the Warsaw Pact, according to the authors, were contributing to the "deformations" and "recurrent
crises" in civil-military relations in Czechoslovakia. These restrictions prevented the Czechoslovak
leadership from developing "any conception of our own military doctrine," which would take full account
of the country's "circumstances and capabilities" and would reject the "unrealistic and dangerous
scenarios" that had long been the inspiration for the Pact's military doctrine.

Among those "scenarios "was nuclear war in Europe which, according to the report, would be "purely
senseless "and would "bring about the total physical destruction of the ČSSR." At the time, the Soviet army
had several secret agreements with Czechoslovakia entitling them to deploy nuclear weapons on Czecho-
slovak territory during an emergency and authorizing the Soviet Union to store nuclear warheads at three
sites in western Czechoslovakia which were under construction at the time of the Prague Spring. The report's
language implied that a military doctrine appropriate for Czechoslovakia would eschew nuclear weapons
and nuclear warfarea challenge to the most sensitive aspect of the Czech-Soviet military relationship.

Shortly before the invasion, a copy of this document was leaked to S. I. Prasolov, a counselor at the Soviet
embassy, on a "highly confidential" basis by "Czechoslovakfriends"presumably from the Czechoslovak
People's Army or State Security. The materials were then transmitted by the Soviet ambassador, S. V.
Chervonenko, to a number of top Soviet officials, including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defense
Minister Andrei Grechko, and the two most senior CPSU CC officials who were directly handling the
crisis, Konstantin Katushev and Konstantin Rusakov. In his cover memorandum, marked "TOP SECRET, "
Chervonenko noted that the main author of the report was the "infamous General Prchlík."

(See also Documents Nos. 68, 69, and 70.)


SECRET

PROBLEMS WITH THE POLICY OF SAFEGUARDING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SECURITY OF THE STATE, THEIR STATUS AT PRESENT, AND THE BASIC WAYS OF RESOLVING THEM

State-Administrative Department90 of the Central Committee of the Czechoslovak Communist Party


1. Direction and Goals

I.1. In this report we examine the contemporary situation and current problems of the party's policy on defense and the protection of security. We seek to define the basic directions and main

90 This was an alternative name for the Eighth Department, which Prchlík headed.

-268-

Notes for this page

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this book

This book has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this book

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this page

Cited page

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited page

Bookmark this page
The Prague Spring 1968: A National Security Archive Documents Reader
Table of contents

Table of contents

Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this book

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen
/ 596

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.