Index
| Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), 6 | |
| academic freedom, 51–2, 157–8 | |
| Ackerman, Bruce, 42 | |
| Amdur, Robert, 96n14 | |
| Atiyah, P. S., 248n16, 253, 268; on promissory liability, 260, 261–2 | |
| autonomy: role in Millian Principle, 2, 14–18, 20, 24, 97–9, 161–3; and legitimacy of government authority, 14–15, 17–19, 24, 95; and preferences, 30; as ability to exercise independent rational judgment, 97–8; and content regulation, 161–3; in preference utilitarianism, 172 | |
| average utility, principle of, 71, 131, 142–5 |
| Baier, Kurt, 32n6, 78n5 | |
| balancing, 7, 21–2, 35, 65–9, 98, 152–3, 160; aggregative vs. personal, 65–8; objective basis for, 67–8; as domain of legislature, 67 | |
| Barnett, R. E., 250n18 | |
| Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), 104n26 | |
| Beitz, Charles, 123n3 | |
| Benson, Peter, 234, 243n9 | |
| Bok, Sissela, 169 | |
| Brandt, Richard, 36n7, 78n5, 128n4, 150n28, 171n3; on well-being, 177–8, 180 | |
| Brouwer, L. E. J., 126, 130 | |
| Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), 103n25, 166n16 |
| campaign finance law, 103–4 | |
| Chafee, Z., 48n4 | |
| Cohen, Joshua, 187 | |
| Cohen, Marshall, 84, 124 | |
| Coleman, J., 258n25 consensus: and criteria of well-being, 70, 76–7, 81–2; and freedom of expression, 87–8; and neutrality of rights, 113, 122; moral significance, 183, 184–5 | |
| consent, 5, 19, 226–9, 249–50 | |
| consequentialism, 3, 4, 81n8; as defense of freedom of expression, 6–7; as justification of rights, 26–7, 35–6; and determination of value, 27–32; and equality, 30–2, 35; and right to life, 39 | |
| content regulation, 151–68; problem of, 159–64; viewpoint-based regulation, 165–6; subject matter restrictions, 166–7 | |
| contracts, 56, 226–9, 234, 249–68; contrasted with promises, 234, 249; and reliance interest, 249–55, 260; specific performance and expectation damages, 253, 256, 257, 259–60; basis for enforcement in absence of reliance, 253–6, 258–62; and coercion, 255; role of consideration, 257; value of assurance, 258–9, 261 | |
| contractualism, 3–4, 124–50, 176–9, 181–6; and moral motivation, 125, 127–8, 130, 132–3, 138–41, 149–50, 182, 184–5; reasonable agreement, 132–4, 138–9, 149, 182–4, 185, 198, 237–8; and well-being, 135–6, 140, 142, 181–6 | |
| Correa Sutil, Jorge, 224n10 | |
| Craswell, Richard, 234, 246n15, 254n23, 258n24, 263n33 | |
| Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967), 102n22 |
| Daniels, Norman, 128n3 | |
| De George, Richard, 216n13 | |
| desire theories, 169–86; and well-being, 170, 171–6, 176–81; actual vs. informed desires, 171–2, 173, 175; and principle of preference autonomy, 172 | |
| Devlin, Patrick, 106n28 | |
| distributive justice, 30–1; and access to means of expression, 22–3; see also fairness, equality, rights | |
| due process, 42–69; and conditions of institutional legitimacy, 43–5, 62; three kinds of due process decisions, 49–50; substantive |
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Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Publication information:
Book title: The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy.
Contributors: T. M. Scanlon - Author.
Publisher: Cambridge University Press.
Place of publication: Cambridge, England.
Publication year: 2003.
Page number: 270.
This material is protected by copyright and, with the exception of fair use, may not be further copied, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means.
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