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Publication information: Book title: The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model. Contributors: Jean-Jacques Laffont - Author, David Martimort - Author. Publisher: Princeton University Press. Place of publication: Princeton, NJ. Publication year: 2002. Page number: 399.
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