The Lost Equilibrium: International Relations in the Post-Soviet Era

By Bettie M. Smolansky; Oles M. Smolansky | Go to book overview

The Logic of NATO Enlargement:
Denationalization, Democratization, Defense
of Human Rights, and Denuclearization

CHRISTOPHER JONES

IN THE LAST ANALYSIS NATO ENLARGEMENT IS THE USE OF MILITARY means to support a broader process of extending a transnational European civil society up to the state borders of Russia. During the cold war, NATO inadvertently encouraged among its members a partial denationalization of defense and a democratization of civilmilitary relations, including the acceptance of human rights standards for individuals and minority groups. NATO enlargement has already extended such norms to its three new members and has encouraged applicant-states to accept identical principles for national security systems. The logic of NATO enlargement in Central Europe has also provided the logic for NATO engagement in the former Yugoslavia: defense of the democratic rights of European citizens and minorities, even at great political and financial cost to NATO governments. This role was so unanticipated that NATO—and especially the United States—lacked the procedures necessary to match NATO’s military means to its unprecedented political objectives. As Robert Hayden has argued, in pursuing its humanitarian objectives in Kosovo, the Clinton administration may have authorized some military actions indictable as war crimes.1

During the cold war, NATO encouraged a denuclearization of national defense except in the United states, the United Kingdom, and France. The unintended consequence of U.S. extended deterrence for Europe was preparing NATO members for their commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968. The ultimate logic of NATO enlargement is the further denuclearization of Alliance security policy in Europe, a development that Russia should welcome. Russia should recognize that NATO enlargement has already solved its principal European security

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