Strategy after Deterrence

By Stephen J. Cimbala | Go to book overview
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weapons nor stand-alone conventional forces will provide deterrence of war in Europe, since deterrence is based fundamentally on the fear of unacceptable societal punishment. However, a more conventional balance can make possible the control of escalation growing out of limited wars, should deterrence fail. A more basic question is whether strictly or mostly conventional balances can preclude war. This directs us to consider the issue of military stability in Europe in a postnuclear, if not postdeterrent, condition, a task that is undertaken in the next chapter.


NOTES
1
John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).
3
Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), 56-58.
4
For an expansion, see Stephen J. Cimbala, Strategic Impasse: Offense, Defense and Deterrence Theory and Practice ( Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1989).
5
On dissuasion, see Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace ( Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1987), 190-207.
6
See Leon V. Sigal, Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan, 1945 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988).
7
I am grateful to David Tarr for this insight.
8
Glenn H. Synder, Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security ( Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1961). Excerpts of this appear in Robert J. Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy ( Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 56-75.
9
Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence ( New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966).
10
See Richard K. Betts, "Surprise Attack and Preemption", in Graham T. Allison, Albert Carnesale and Joseph S. Nye Jr., eds., Hawks, Doves and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War ( New York: W. W. Norton, 1985), 54-79.
11
Richard Ned Lebow, Nuclear Crisis Management (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).
12
Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan ( Washington , D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 771.
13
This is documented in Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War ( New York: Macmillan, 1973), 35-56.
14
See Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, Psychology and Deterrence ( Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics ( Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976); "Alexander L. George" and "Richard Smoke", Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice ( New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); and Patrick M. Morgan , Deterrence: A Conceptual Analysis, 2nd ed. (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1983).

-92-

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