powers dealing with so-called low intensity conflicts. Outside of Europe, U.S. and NATO intelligence is mostly targeted against non-Western cultures, petty tyrannies of all descriptions, and terrorist desperados at war
on behalf of statist and nonstatist agendas. Until now, Western intelligence
failures in these milieus have not redounded in loss of control over a
process of escalation that then spilled over into war in Europe. No one can
guarantee that the past will be prologue for the future in this regard. The
deception capabilities of non-European states may increase along with the
lethality of their high-technology weapons, and so, therefore, may their
capacity to create global wars out of regional conflicts.
Carl Von Clausewitz, in On War,
Michael Howard and
Peter Paret, eds. and trans.
( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
Eliot Cohen, "The No-Fault View of Intelligence", Intelligence Requirements
for the 1990s, ed.
Roy Godson ( Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1989), 71-96,
citation p. 72.
Leslie H. Gelb with
Richard K. Betts, The Irony of Vietnam: The System Worked
( Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1979), 117.
Ernest R. May, "Capabilities and Proclivities", in Knowing One's Enemies:
Intelligence Assessment before the Two World Wars,
Ernest R. May, ed., ( Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 503-42, citation pp. 520-21.
12 Ibid. One can do no better to appreciate the context of war on the western front
during World War I than to read John Keegan's account of the Somme, in
John Keegan, The Face of Battle ( New York: Viking Press, 1976), Ch. 4. 13
Richard K. Betts, Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning ( Washington,
D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), Ch. 8.
Graham T. Allison,
Albert Camesale, and
Joseph S. Nye Jr., Hawks, Doves and
Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War ( New York: W. W. Norton, 1985).
Joseph S. Nye Jr.,
Graham T. Allison, and
Albert Carnesale, "Analytic Conclusions: Hawks, Doves, and Owls", Hawks, Doves and Owls, eds.
Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile
Crisis ( Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
Allison, Essence of Decision, 138.
The U-2 was reported to have been on a "routine air-sampling mission" when it
went off course. See
Allison, Essence of Decision, 141.
Questia, a part of Gale, Cengage Learning. www.questia.com
Book title: Strategy after Deterrence.
Contributors: Stephen J. Cimbala - Author.
Publisher: Praeger Publishers.
Place of publication: New York.
Publication year: 1991.
Page number: 170.
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