Deterrence, Arms Control, and Disarmament: Toward a Synthesis in National Security Policy

By J. David Singer | Go to book overview
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Subject Index/
Acceptable damage, 31-32, 58
Accidental war, 45-46, 92 n, 89-107, 118, 120
Aircraft: nuclear powered, 54, 112 n; manned bombers, 33-42, 54, 66; fighter planes, 33-34, 48- 49, 65 n
Ambiguity in deterrence, 63-64
American Friends Service Committee, 181
Anti-missile missile, 35-38, 131, 141- 42, 195; anti-ICBM, 37
Argentina, 140
Armaments-tension dilemma, 168- 91, 242-43
Arms control, 12, 14, 108-63, 242
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 196
Arms-policy continuum, x, 12-15
Artemis, Project, 112 n
Artificial satellites, 39, 39 n, 43, 116-17
Atlas (ICBM), 40, 42, 71, 114 n, 121, 125, 198
Atomic Energy Commission, 73, 152, 155, 156
Australia, 140
Austria, 140
Avoidance-approach, 108
Baruch proposal, 135, 215-17
Belgium, 59, 140
Berlin, 105, 106
"Big hole" (de-coupling), 154-56
Blunting of attack, 48-50
Brazil, 140
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (British), 185
Canada, 140
Capability requirements, 29, 195, 198; delivery systems, 35-55; destruction levels, 30-38; strikeback systems, 39-43, 50-55
Catalytic war, 97-99
CBR (chemical, bacteriological, radiological) weapons, 14, 16
CEP (circular error, probable), 42 n, 70 n
China, 190, 212
Civil defense, 32, 77-86, 247; in Soviet Union, 82-85
Clean weapons, 97, 144-45
Conference of Experts (Nuclear Test Ban), 149-51, 153, 156
Conference of Experts (Surprise Attack), 125
Conventional weapons, 16
Corporal rocket, 37 n
Counter-city (counter-economy) strategy, 37, 37-38 n, 69-73, 76, 119, 146194, 240-41
Counter-force strategy, 37, 37-38 n, 39, 59 n, 69-73, 76, 115, 141, 146, 195, 240-41
Countermeasures and jamming, 46, 47 n
Cowboy, Project, 154
Credibility of threat, 35, 41 n, 57- 68, 82, 210-11
Credible first-strike capability, 76- 77, 81, 106, 195, 240
Cultural exchange, 173-76
Czechoslovakia, 212

-271-

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