paign ( 1911), and Armin E. Mruck, "The Role of Railroads in the Atlanta Campaign" ( 1961).
The records of the Office of the Quartermaster General are located in Record Group 92 at the National Archives. Returns and inspection records are found in Record Group 94. Unfiled and uncataloged trimonthly quartermaster returns of the U.S. Army are found in Record Group 393.
The papers of the commissary general are in the Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
For standards on baggage, subsistence, and forage, see Regulations for the Army of the United States ( 1857) and Robert Finley Hunter, Manual for Quartermasters and Commissaries ( 1863).
Finally, see N. S. Dodge, Hints on Army Transportation ( 1863) for a tract that Meigs found so compelling that he ordered it circulated throughout the Union armies. Dodge was the quartermaster of the 119th New York volunteers. In this book, according to Hagerman, he claimed his reorganization would so reduce the wagon train as to add six miles daily to an average five-day march. Such enhancements were motivated by the then-prevailing "flying column" wisdom, modeled after the logistical organization in the French army, as described by Alexis Godillot in a circular from Montgomery Meigs dated January 2, 1862 ( The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, 1880- 1901). But as the wagon and mule supply improved, the foragable supplies diminished, and the need for extreme mobility diminished with the changing strategic conditions in Virginia, the need for a flying column organization diminished; by the time of the Wilderness campaign, it was essentially abandoned by Grant.
There are many potentially rewarding areas for further research. For example, much work remains with respect to the explicit linkage of Southern supply problems to campaign results. How many times have we seen the complaint over "lack of transportation"? Bragg cited it after Chickamauga to explain his inability to flank Rosecrans out of Chattanooga. Longstreet cited it as the cause of his delays to Knoxville. Johnston cited it as the reason for the impracticability of the spring 1864 forward movement. Davis cited it to Longstreet in rejecting his plans for a Kentucky invasion. How real was this lack of transportation? How real was the lack of adequate food? Part of Bragg's rationale for recapturing Knoxville may have been to reopen the railroad to Virginia simply to ensure adequate food supplies. He knew by the end of October that he could not rely on the road from Atlanta. By the time of the Battle of Chattanooga, it is well known that his troops, though the besiegers, were suffering terribly from inadequate food and shelter. How serious was the food shortage for Bragg? What