THE higher reaches of apperception in conception, judgment, and thought give rise also to characteristic emotional states. The fundamental act of attention as relating function gives most general coloring to this class of feelings, and from it they also derive their name, relational feelings.

At the outset three very distinct kinds of emotional experience may be distinguished: intellectual or logical feelings, moral or feelings of right and wrong, and æsthetic or feelings of the beautiful. The latter two may be further classed as conceptual feelings.


By distinguishing the more fundamental emotions of relation as logical, we intend to point out those to which the coefficient of thought-belief attaches: those which attend upon the various acts of judgment. First, we find a class of feelings arising from bare relationship as itself the object of consciousness, i. e., feelings of reasonableness and unreasonableness, of contradiction, of logical satisfaction, of tendencies of thought, of ignorance, of the unknown, the mysterious, the inscrutible, feelings of the inconclusiveness of argument, of the hypothetical, of the inconclusive, etc. These feelings are in close affinity with the great classfeelings already described as doubt and belief.

Connected with time relations we have what may be called time-emotions, i. e., anticipation, prophecy, presentiment, hope, attaching to the conception of future times;

Cf. Handbook of Psychology, vol. ii. chap. ix.


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Elements of Psychology


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