From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal

By Roger Hilsman | Go to book overview

Acknowledgments

I originally intended the title of this book to be A Layman's Guide to Nuclear Military Strategy. My idea was to honor the memory of Bernard Brodie, since the first of his many books on strategy, published in the early days of World War II, was entitled A Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy. Although Alfred T. Mahan was the first American to write extensively on strategy, it was Brodie who pioneered the subject as a legitimate concern of university research and teaching and thus a legitimate attempt by scholars to influence strategy. I studied under Brodie at Yale in the period immediately following World War II, and his guidance enabled me to continue an interest in strategy and defense policy originally awakened when I was a cadet at West Point.

That awakening happened on the opening day of a class in military history taught by Colonel Max S. Johnson, later a Major General and head of the Army War College. He was that rare creature, a military intellectual, and he thrilled and delighted me on the opening day by saying, "Gentlemen, welcome to Military History. Until today you have dealt with squads, platoons, and companies. Here you will deal with nothing smaller than a division!"

As it happened, however, as I began to understand what the consequences of the marriage of nuclear weapons and missiles would be, the purpose the book was intended to serve changed dramatically. The result was an entirely different book, requiring an entirely different title.

The book draws on several of my earlier books. It also draws on a number of my articles in periodicals such as Foreign Affairs, World Politics, the Political Science Quarterly, and others.

-xv-

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From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Preface ix
  • Notes xiv
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • Part I - The First Attempts at Nuclear Strategy 1
  • Chapter 1 - The Manhattan Project and Early Strategic Thinking 3
  • Notes 14
  • Chapter 2 - Nuclear Strategy and the Attack on Korea 16
  • Notes 27
  • Chapter 3 - New Look, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response 28
  • Notes 39
  • Chapter 4 - The H-Bomb and the Balance of Terror 40
  • Notes 47
  • Chapter 5 - The Debate on Nuclear Strategy 49
  • Notes 55
  • Part II - The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Case Study of Nuclear Strategy 57
  • Chpter 6 - The Crisis 59
  • Notes 70
  • Chapter 7 - The Significance 71
  • Note 77
  • Chapter 8 - McNamara II, the Schlesinger Doctrine, and Star Wars 81
  • Notes 94
  • Chapter 9 - No First Use, Counterforce, and Mad as a Strategy 95
  • Notes 103
  • Chapter 10 - The Breakup of the Soviet Union and the Bush -- Yeltsin Agreement 105
  • Notes 113
  • Part IV - The World Turned Upside Down 115
  • A Chapter 11 - Developments in Weapons 117
  • Notes 122
  • Chapter 12 - The Members of the Nuclear Club and Their Arms 123
  • Notes 138
  • Chapter 13 - Soviet, Chinese, and European Nuclear Strategy 139
  • Notes 147
  • Chapter 14 - Armageddon: Six Scenarios of Nuclear War 148
  • Notes 163
  • Part V - Arms Control and Disarmament 165
  • Chapter 15 - The History of Arms Control 167
  • Notes 179
  • Chapter 16 - The Prospects for Arms Control 180
  • Notes 186
  • Part VI - Why War? 187
  • Chapter 17 - The Social and Political Functions of War 189
  • Chapter 18 - Nationalism 198
  • Notes 210
  • Chapter 19 - A World Political Process Without World Government? 211
  • Notes 225
  • Chapter 20 - A Curious Creature 227
  • Notes 230
  • Part VII - Conclusions 231
  • Chapter 21 - A Long-Term Solution, a Medium-Term Compromise, and a Short-Term Stopgap 233
  • Chapter 22 - The Lessons of the "Small Wars" Since World War II 238
  • Notes 256
  • Chapter 23 - Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Forces 259
  • Notes 274
  • Chapter 24 - Conventional Forces for the Medium-Term Compromise 278
  • Notes 290
  • Chapter 25 - Nuclear Forces for the Short- Term Stopgap 291
  • Notes 304
  • Index 305
  • About the Author *
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