From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal

By Roger Hilsman | Go to book overview

NOTES
1
The major sources for this account are Nuell Pharr Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years ( New York: Random House, 1988); and Richard Rhodes, The Making of the Atomic Bomb ( New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Others are Fletcher Knebel and Charles W. Bailey, No High Ground ( New York: Harper, 1960); Alice Smith, "Behind the Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb: Chicago, 1944-45", Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists ( September 1958); and Michael Amrine , The Great Decision: The Secret History of the Atomic Bomb ( New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1959).
2
Bundy, Danger and Survival, 36. See also Rhodes, Making of the Atomic Bomb.
3
Thomas Powers, Heisenberg's War: The Secret History of the German Bomb ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1993).
4
Werner Heisenberg, "Research in Germany on the Technical Application of Atomic Energy", Nature, 16 August 1947, pp. 211-215.
5
Bundy, Danger and Survival, 20-23.
6
Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer, 240. I have looked at half a dozen or more translations of the Bhagavad-Gita and found that none of them give this exact wording of the line. Most render it in some variation of either, "I am death, the destroyer of worlds," or "I have become death, the destroyer of worlds." On one occasion, a taping for a TV documentary, Oppenheimer also used this more conventional translation. All this leads me to believe that "the shatterer of worlds" was Oppenheimer's own translation.
7
Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer, 247.
8
Ed Cray, General of the Army George C. Marshall, Soldier and Statesman ( New York: W. W. Norton, 1990). See also John J. McCloy's account of the decision to drop the bomb, which is contained in a portion of his unpublished memoirs that was published as an appendix in James Reston, Deadline: A Memoir ( New York: Random House, 1991).
9
The following is drawn from John J. McCloy's account of the decision to drop the bomb in Reston, Deadline.
10
In 1993, a number of documents were made public under the Freedom of Information Act dealing with the interception and decoding of wartime messages -- "Magic" was the American system for decoding Japanese messages and "Ultra" was the British system for decoding German messages. One of the decoded messages was from a German diplomat stationed in Tokyo describing a conversation he had with a high-ranking Japanese Naval officer on May 5, 1945, just three days before Germany surrendered. The message said, "Since the situation is clearly recognized to be hopeless, large sections of the Japanese armed forces would not regard with disfavor an American request for capitulation even if the terms were hard." Although intelligence analysts flagged this piece of information when it was distributed, it was not mentioned in any of the discussions on whether or not to drop the bomb.

When the report became public in 1993, General Andrew Goodpaster, who had been in the Pentagon office responsible for strategic planning during the war, was asked why the message had not had more influence on the American decision to drop the bomb. His answer implied that dropping the bomb seemed to be the only viable alternative to an invasion that would have been extremely costly in terms of American lives and even more costly than dropping the bomb in terms of Japanese lives: "We anticipated that we

-14-

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From Nuclear Military Strategy to a World without War: A History and a Proposal
Table of contents

Table of contents

  • Title Page iii
  • Contents vii
  • Preface ix
  • Notes xiv
  • Acknowledgments xv
  • Part I - The First Attempts at Nuclear Strategy 1
  • Chapter 1 - The Manhattan Project and Early Strategic Thinking 3
  • Notes 14
  • Chapter 2 - Nuclear Strategy and the Attack on Korea 16
  • Notes 27
  • Chapter 3 - New Look, Massive Retaliation, and Flexible Response 28
  • Notes 39
  • Chapter 4 - The H-Bomb and the Balance of Terror 40
  • Notes 47
  • Chapter 5 - The Debate on Nuclear Strategy 49
  • Notes 55
  • Part II - The Cuban Missile Crisis: A Case Study of Nuclear Strategy 57
  • Chpter 6 - The Crisis 59
  • Notes 70
  • Chapter 7 - The Significance 71
  • Note 77
  • Chapter 8 - McNamara II, the Schlesinger Doctrine, and Star Wars 81
  • Notes 94
  • Chapter 9 - No First Use, Counterforce, and Mad as a Strategy 95
  • Notes 103
  • Chapter 10 - The Breakup of the Soviet Union and the Bush -- Yeltsin Agreement 105
  • Notes 113
  • Part IV - The World Turned Upside Down 115
  • A Chapter 11 - Developments in Weapons 117
  • Notes 122
  • Chapter 12 - The Members of the Nuclear Club and Their Arms 123
  • Notes 138
  • Chapter 13 - Soviet, Chinese, and European Nuclear Strategy 139
  • Notes 147
  • Chapter 14 - Armageddon: Six Scenarios of Nuclear War 148
  • Notes 163
  • Part V - Arms Control and Disarmament 165
  • Chapter 15 - The History of Arms Control 167
  • Notes 179
  • Chapter 16 - The Prospects for Arms Control 180
  • Notes 186
  • Part VI - Why War? 187
  • Chapter 17 - The Social and Political Functions of War 189
  • Chapter 18 - Nationalism 198
  • Notes 210
  • Chapter 19 - A World Political Process Without World Government? 211
  • Notes 225
  • Chapter 20 - A Curious Creature 227
  • Notes 230
  • Part VII - Conclusions 231
  • Chapter 21 - A Long-Term Solution, a Medium-Term Compromise, and a Short-Term Stopgap 233
  • Chapter 22 - The Lessons of the "Small Wars" Since World War II 238
  • Notes 256
  • Chapter 23 - Humanitarian and Peacekeeping Forces 259
  • Notes 274
  • Chapter 24 - Conventional Forces for the Medium-Term Compromise 278
  • Notes 290
  • Chapter 25 - Nuclear Forces for the Short- Term Stopgap 291
  • Notes 304
  • Index 305
  • About the Author *
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