Existence and the Human Situation
THE philosophy of Heidegger is replete with terms that are specifically human. In the midst of ontological discussions there occur terms like fear, dread, death and care. If Heidegger's philosophic concern were ethical in purpose, even if that ethical concern were directed towards ontological ends, then the prevalence of these specifically human terms would not be surprising. But such is not the case. Heidegger disclaims any ethical interest and time and again he makes clear that his use of such ethical-sounding terms is not to be taken in any but an ontological sense. Under these circumstances it is clear that Heidegger's orientation towards the human situation is closely related to his ontology. The problem concerns the nature of this relationship and the way in which his ontology reflects or determines his view of that situation.
Heidegger maintains that his use of a term like Care (Sorge) is not experiential. In giving his definition of Care he adds: 'Left out of the meaning is every ontically meant being-tendency such as being worried (Besorgnis) or being carefree.'1 Care in this sense is ontologically prior to any____________________