Art and Agency: A Reassessment

Layton, Robert, Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute

Resume

Dans son livre Art and Agency, Alfred Gell presente une theorie de l'art qui ne se base ni sur l'esthetique, ni sur la communication visuelle. Il definit l'art par sa fonction distinctive dans l'etablissement de relations sociales, par "l'abduction de l'intentionnalite (agency)". Les objets d'art sont des index de l'intentionnalite de l'artiste ou du modele. Le present article analyse l'utilisation par Gell de l'intentionnalite, notamment dans le cadre de l'art rituel qui constitue un axe central de son raisonnement. En se concentrant sur l'usage par Gell du terme "index" de Peirce (dans la trichotomie index, icone, symbole), l'auteur note que l'approche de Peirce prete moins d'attention a la signification qu'au lien entre les oeuvres d'art et les objets auxquels elles font reference. Il examine ce que Peirce entendait par "abduction" et en conclut que si Gell s'en tire bien sur l'intentionnalite des objets d'art, il n'explique pas de quelle maniere distinctive ceux-ci prolongent l'intentionnalite de leur createur ou de leur utilisateur. Gell n'a pas eu le temps d'apporter des revisions detaillees a son ouvrage avant publication, et l'auteur estime que s'il avait eu davantage de temps, il en aurait peut-etre remanie certaines parties.

It is now five years since the publication of Alfred Gell's highly original, posthumous book, Art and agency (1998). Gell set out to construct a theory of art based neither on aesthetics nor on visual communication. Gell acknowledges the importance of form, balance, and rhythm at various points in his analysis, but argues that they are not to be appreciated in the detached manner implied by the term 'aesthetics'. His rejection of semiotics is more radical. Drawing on Peirce's concepts of index, icon, and symbol, Gell argues that art objects may be icons or indexes, but never symbols. Indeed, he frequently treats icon and index as synonymous. The argument is dense and ingenious, and highlights many aspects of the social role of art objects that have previously been neglected. In the end, however, I consider Gell's argument to be unsustainable. His efforts to exclude Saussurian symbolism have also been criticized by some of the contributors to a recent volume evaluating Gell's achievement (Pinney & Thomas 2001). In this article I propose to recall what Peirce, Saussure, and Mounin wrote on index, icon, sign, and symbol. Peirce and Saussure employed the terms sign and symbol in very different ways, while Mounin (1970) elaborated a theory of visual communication that acknowledged the special qualities of icons and indexes. Armed with some basic definitions, I then critically re-examine Gell's argument in Art and agency. I argue that Gell was correct to reject a specifically linguistic model for visual communication, but that he was wrong to minimize the importance of cultural convention in shaping the reception or 'reading' of art objects.

Gell's approach to the anthropology of art

Gell sets out to provide an anthropological theory of art, rather than one derived from semiotics or art history. His theory is, specifically, a theory based on British social anthropology, that is, on the study of social relationships, rather than on culture (Gell 1998: 7). There are two differences, however, between Gell's anthropology and classic Radcliffe-Brownian structural functionalism. First, the unit of analysis is not status, reproduced as a position in a social structure. Gell's focus is on the agent, and the networks of social relationships constructed through his or her agency. Secondly, ritual is not misguided behaviour that inadvertently has the effect of sustaining the social order, but behaviour to be understood in terms of the participants' own theory of agency.

Art is defined by the distinctive role it plays in advancing social relationships constructed through agency. Not all objects function as art objects. 'Agency can be ascribed to "things" without this giving rise to anything particularly recalling the production and circulation of "art"' (1998: 23). Art objects can often be recognized intuitively: 'most of the art objects I shall actually discuss are well-known ones that we have no difficulty in identifying as "art"; for instance, the Mona Lisa' (7). However, art objects have three diagnostic features. They are usually made so as to be seen (24). Secondly, art objects are indexes of social agency. Smoke is not art, because it is a natural index of fire, unless the fire has been artificially lit, in which case smoke becomes an artefactual index (15). Art objects are further distinguished by being both difficult and captivating: 'they are difficult to make, difficult to "think", difficult to transact. They fascinate, compel, and entrap as well as delight the spectator' (23). 'Where indexes are very recognizably works of art, [they are] made with technical expertise and imagination of a high order, which exploit the intrinsic mechanisms of visual cognition with subtle psychological insight' (68). Anthropology is characterized by its interest in unfamiliar modes of thought. The anthropologist's task is to describe forms of thought which are not particularly sound from a philosophical perspective, but which are none the less socially and cognitively practicable (17). Art objects that function as agents in social relations constructed through ritual and magic are therefore particularly instructive for the anthropological study of art.

Existing work on the anthropology of art

Gell contends that the task of an anthropology of art is not, as Price (1989), Coote (1992; 1996), Morphy (1994; 1996), and others suppose, to define the characteristics of each culture's aesthetic. He acknowledges interesting work by Thomas (1991) and Steiner (1994) on the reception of non-Western art in the West, but argues that this is not a genuine anthropology of art, since it does not study art functioning in the context for which it was created (Gell 1998: 8).

Gell rejects Morphy's definition of art, which is that art objects have either semantic or aesthetic properties, or both, which are used for presentational or representational purposes (Morphy 1994: 655). Gell entirely rejects the notion of art as a visual code, arguing that nothing 'except language itself, has "meaning" in the intended sense' (Gell 1998: 6). He further argues that aesthetic properties can be assessed only in terms of the intended effect of an art object in its context of use. Gell commends the studies of decorative art by Kaeppler (1978), Price and Price (1980), and Hanson (1983) as among 'the more interesting studies which have been produced by anthropologists' (Gell 1998: 73). However, Gell rejects the idea that decoration is valued for its own sake. Decorated artefacts are aspects of their owners' personhood. Hanson is criticized for failing to identify a specific correlation between Maori art style and the Maori exchange networks through which personal identity is negotiated (Gell 1998: 160).

Gell sets out his vision of the anthropology of art as follows. A programme of elucidating non-Western aesthetics is exclusively cultural, whereas anthropology is a social science not a humanist discipline. The anthropology of art should focus on the social context of art production, circulation, and reception, not on the evaluation of particular works. From its inception, anthropology has been concerned with things which appear as, or 'do duty as', persons. Tylor's work on animism initiated this approach, and it continued with Mauss's work on the gift. There is thus a solid basis in anthropological theory for treating art objects in the same way. 'I view art as a system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it' (Gell 1998: 6).

What is wrong with existing work

Aesthetics

Gell's rejection of aesthetics is less radical than his rejection of art as a visual language. He does not deny that works of art are sometimes intended and received as objects of aesthetic appreciation (Gell 1998: 66), but reminds the reader that 'the "aesthetic attitude" is a specific historical product of the religious crisis of the Enlightenment and the rise of Western science ... [that brought about] the separation between the beautiful and the holy' (97). Gell argues that aesthetic values vary from culture to culture and are always embedded in a social framework. The anthropology of art should be interested in how aesthetic principles are mobilized in the course of social interaction. 'Melanesian aesthetics is about efficacy, the capacity to accomplish tasks, not "beauty"' (94). …

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Publication information: Article title: Art and Agency: A Reassessment. Contributors: Layton, Robert - Author. Journal title: Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute. Volume: 9. Issue: 3 Publication date: September 2003. Page number: 447+. © 1999 Royal Anthropological Institute. COPYRIGHT 2003 Gale Group.

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