Cited page

Citations are available only to our active members. Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

X X

Cited page

Display options
Reset

Extreme Monetary Regime Change: Evidence from Currency Board Introduction in Bulgaria

By: Nenovsky, Nikolay; Rizopoulos, Yorgos | Journal of Economic Issues, December 2003 | Article details

Look up
Saved work (0)

matching results for page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?
While we understand printed pages are helpful to our users, this limitation is necessary to help protect our publishers' copyrighted material and prevent its unlawful distribution. We are sorry for any inconvenience.

Extreme Monetary Regime Change: Evidence from Currency Board Introduction in Bulgaria


Nenovsky, Nikolay, Rizopoulos, Yorgos, Journal of Economic Issues


The introduction of the Currency Board in Bulgaria in July 1997 may be viewed as an extreme institutional change of the monetary regime and as its discrete interruption. Bulgaria switched from a regime of discretionary and subjective money supply management and floating exchange rate to an extremely passive and static form of monetary rule. Indeed, under the Currency Board regime the monetary base is covered 100 percent and above with foreign reserves, the exchange rate is fixed by law, and no monetary policy is carried out. There is an automatically balancing mechanism according to which the dynamics of the monetary base (and indirectly of the money supply) follow the dynamics of the country's balance of payments. (1)

The Currency Board in Bulgaria was introduced after the dramatic financial crisis at the close of 1996 and the beginning of 1997, when the national currency completely lost its major functions, almost one third of the banks failed, the foreign exchange reserves were almost entirely depleted, and inflation reached 240 percent in February 1997. (2) The financial crisis was accompanied by social protests and a political crisis, which led to the dissolution of Parliament and to early elections (two years prior to term). On February 17, 1997, the major political forces signed an agreement for the introduction of a currency board. The elections in April were won by a right-wing party, and the currency board was introduced on July 1.

Institutionally, the Bulgarian Currency Board differs from its orthodox forms, which are typical of the colonial system. It retains some possibilities for discretion (such as changing the minimum reserve requirement) and intervention in events of systemic risk (such as a restricted lender-of-last-resort function). Organizationally, the Bulgarian National Bank was divided into two departments, with the first one (Issue Department) comprising the most liquid assets and liabilities, and in effect performing the role of a currency board, and the second (Banking Department) retaining certain discretionary functions. The two departments are linked by the means of the Banking Department's deposit in the liability of the Issue Department, which is the net value of the Currency Board and allows for refinancing of banks in cases of systemic crisis (see table 1). (3) A third department was also established-the Banking Supervision Department-which imposes much more stringent (compared with international norms) requirements for the bank capital adequacy and bank liquidity ratios.

The analysis of currency board introduction in Bulgaria may serve as a starting point for a number of theoretical and empirical conclusions on institutional change in general and in transition economies in particular.

First, monetary regime change has been rarely analyzed using the instruments of institutional economics and political economy (generally it is treated conventionally within the framework of mainstream macroeconomic theory). (4) Considering monetary regime change as institutional change provides opportunity for seeking common ground between monetary theory and institutional analysis.

Second, although the need to incorporate institutions in the study of the transition process has been increasingly discussed, this has not been done so far in the realm of money where, generally, the paradigm of neoclassical economics is transferred mechanically. (5) Indeed, the few empirical studies of the role of institutions in transition economies (Havrylyshyn and Rooden 2000; Raiser, Di Tommaso, and Weeks 2001) have not incorporated any variable for monetary regime. Furthermore, the monetary regime change is related to one of the most essential problems of post-socialism-the overcoming of soft budget constraints. (6) Soft budget constraints in transition economies are genetic (inherited from the administrated economy) and systemic (encompassing to a different extent the relations among all agents). Hardening the soft budget constraints is part of the initial accumulation process and social redistribution of wealth. (7)

Third, notwithstanding achievements in constructing a theoretical basis of institutional change analysis, the empirical methodology has not been developed yet (Alston 1996). (8) The study of a specific case of a radical monetary regime change would give a starting point for new theoretical and empirical approaches and the opportunity to construct quantitative indicators for institutional change. The introduction of the Currency Board in Bulgaria (9) could serve as a "laboratory" for the analysis of institutional change, which features two types of logic-one being visible and conventional, and the other deeper and more difficult to perceive, yet determining the first one. The visible logic is associated with the dynamics of traditional monetary variables, while the invisible one relates to the conflicts of interest between the various groups of agents. In both cases the ultimate point of analysis is the same-the financial crisis. These two approaches are mutually nonexclusive, and they supplement each other. The present study concentrates on the "clash of interests" in introducing the Currency Board in Bulgaria. The traditional approach is described elsewhere (see, for example, Berlemann et al. 2002).

Indeed, we attempt to answer a number of questions in the context of the specific situation in Bulgaria: (1) What provokes the monetary regime change (= institutional change)? (2) Which are the driving forces and their interests? (3) How is institutional change effected, that is, what are its dynamics? Without pressing the matter, we will test our main hypothesis, namely whether and to what extent institutional change is the result of economics actors' interests and strategies. Furthermore, the Currency Board introduction can be viewed as an attempt to impose hard budget constraints on the central bank as an initial impulse for hard budget constraints first on the fiscal system and then along the entire chain of debtor-creditor relations. In this sense, it represents a change in the distribution of power between debtors and creditors in favor of creditors.

The methodology and ideas of the paper draw on a number of studies. The importance of power configurations in the institutional change analysis is pointed out in Marx 1894, Perroux 1973, and Galbraith 1976 and 1984 and fits well with John R. Commons' definition of institutions as "collective action in control, liberation, and expansion of individual action" (1931) and his interest in "strategic transactions" aiming to control and influence the process of institutional change. (10) Mancur Olson (1966, 1995, 2000) and Douglass North (1990, 1994, 1997) underlined also the role of organized groups of interest for a change, while Yorgos Rizopoulos and Lyazid Kichou (2001) suggested that institutional change can be analyzed as a political interaction process between organizations diffusing institutional rules and organizations consuming institutional rules. (11) Furthermore, recent research on the political economy of transition in general (Kornai 2000; Roland 2001 and 2002) and the financial/monetary system in particular (Berglof and Bolton 2002; Shleifer and Treisman 2001) has been taken into consideration.

Treating the monetary regime change as a conflict between debtors and creditors originates from Marx and is elaborated by contemporary authors like Michel Aglietta and Andrd Orldan (1984). Previous political and economic analysis of international monetary regimes and financial institutions was very useful (Keohane 1982; Vaubel 1991; Kdbabdjian 1999; Cohen 2000; Cooper 2000; Gilpin 2001; Willet 2001), as well as some insights from monetary history concerning the evolution of monetary regimes (Bordo and Jonung 1990; Redish 1990; Friedman 1992; Weatherford 1998; White 1999). Finally, our paper has some points of contact with the theory of endogenous money supply, where money creation is viewed as a result of the interaction between the real sector, the state, and the commercial banks, rather than as a result of the autonomous decision of the central bank (Moore 1988; Dow and Dow 1989; Beyer 1993) (12) and with the idea of the determining role of the state in the creation of money (Wray 1998; Bell 2001).

Overall, our approach may be defined as positive as we attempt to describe and analyze the change of the monetary regime, not to judge whether this change is efficient or not.

The body of this paper is structured as follows: The first section presents working definitions and formulates our basic theoretical statements. The second section deals with the typology of major players, their interests, and their positions before and after the Currency Board introduction in Bulgaria. The next section summarizes and theoretically retells (13) the extreme monetary change dynamics during 1996-1997. The concluding section discusses the results of the study and the implications for future research.

The Monetary Regime Change as a Conflict between Creditors and Debtors

Adapting some institutional approaches to monetary subject matter, we provide the following definitions.

Monetary Institutions

We define monetary institutions as sets of rules-tacitly accepted as well as explicitly codified-norms, and shared knowledge related to monetary behavior, including the influence, reproduction, and enforcement devices which materialize them. Monetary institutions determine money demand and supply. We presume that formal rules dominate money supply while informal rules and behavior play a more important role in money demand (however, it is possible for informal rules to penetrate deeply in the money creation mechanism). The whole set of monetary institutions form a specific structure and constitute the monetary system.

Monetary Organizations

Generally monetary organizations include collective economic agents pursuing specific goals within a given institutional monetary framework (system) and protecting the interests of the (dominant) individuals in the group (see also Menard 1990). Included are almost all economic organizations in so far as they use money in their activity or influence the money creation and destruction processes. The monetary organizations closely related to money creation and destruction processes are defined as "diffusing institutional rules" (DIR) organizations. The central bank is a typical monetary DIR. To fulfill their functions, DIRs should have economic, financial, political and/or ideological influence on other economic agents. (14) Because of their organizational nature, monetary DIR organizations pursue strategies which are not limited to their institutional properties but are also guided by specific organizational goals in order to promote the interests and maintain the power of their dominant members.

Players using money without being able to impose rules (for example, firms) are considered "consuming institutional rules" (CIR.) monetary organizations. It is worth mentioning that many monetary organizations (finance ministry, financial intermediaries, commercial banks, and even central banks) have a hybrid status: In some cases they are endowed with DIR features, and in others they are simple players following rules (CIR). For example, commercial banks influence the rules of the game concerning enterprise credit and at the same time they refer to the rules fixed by the central bank.

Monetary Regime

The monetary regime covers formal rules as well as their enforcement mechanisms. The monetary regime is most closely related to money creation dynamics, particularly central money creation (central bank money). It involves to a lesser extent money demand (for instance, restrictions on local currency convertibility, restrictions on cash payments, etc.). (15) Another aspect, which is discussed further in the text, enables us to define the monetary regime as a set of formal relations between debtors and creditors. In this sense, the monetary regime provides a specific (always formal) power configuration of different groups of debtors and creditors. At the same time, the monetary regime directly impacts the informal side of debtor-creditor relationship, inhibiting or stimulating different informal models of monetary behavior.

The monetary regime change means the transition to a new formal institutional framework, imposing new formal rules for the relationship between creditors and debtors. (16) We consider that monetary regime change is endogenously determined and of asymmetric nature. One of its major driving motives is economic agents' desire to have a broader access to resources in the process of appropriation and redistribution of common wealth. It is driven by the perceived interests and the conflict between different groups of national and international debtors and creditors (monetary organizations and individuals). (17) When the asymmetry of positions in the existing monetary regime passes a certain critical threshold, the perceived interests of the losing side materialize into a desire for change and can shift to a new institutional framework. As a shift from one monetary regime to another occurs, we could therefore speak of a transition to a new debtor-creditor equilibrium. (18) In order for monetary regime change to be accomplished, at least one initiating organization is needed which has various levers at its disposal (19) The probability for materialization of the institutional change is enhanced by either (1) the possibility for complete economical, political, and ideological victory of one group or (2) the promise and later the possibility of compensating (partially) the losers from the institutional change. (20)

Organizations diffusing institutional rules and those consuming institutional rules could be associated with both creditors and debtors. Mixed configurations are also possible when some creditors enter into coalition with some debtors to establish a monetary regime from which the coalition would benefit.

For the purpose of analysis, monetary regime changes may be classified into (1) external (initiating DIPs are outside the

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Select text to:

Select text to:

  • Highlight
  • Cite a passage
  • Look up a word
Learn more Close
Loading One moment ...
Highlight
Select color
Change color
Delete highlight
Cite this passage
Cite this highlight
View citation

Are you sure you want to delete this highlight?