The Federal Reserve Amendments of 1917: The Beginning of a Seasonal Note Issue Policy
Fishe, Raymond P. H., Journal of Money, Credit & Banking
SEVERAL STUDIES HAVE FOUND that the seasonal behavior of interest rates diminished after 1914, the year the Federal Reserve began operations (for example, Shiller 1980, Miron 1986, and Clark 1986). Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1987), Miron (1988), and Barsky, Mankiw, Miron, and Weil (1988) suggest that the Federal Reserve was responsible for the change in interest rates, while Shiller (1980) and Clark (1986) suggest that the Federal Reserve had little or no effect. Because seasonal movements are believed to reflect real economic activity, the underlying issue in these studies is whether anticipated monetary policy can affect the real sector of the economy. By analyzing what the Federal Reserve actually did during the first few years of operation, I will show that monetary policy between 1914 and 1917 was not seasonal and, in effect, was fairly restrictive. Discount operations were limited relative to the resources of the Federal Reserve, and, when notes were issued, the district banks tended to deposit gold with agents such that new notes were substantially offset by gold deposits. It is argued that gold inflows caused by World War I, not the establishment of the Federal Reserve System, are responsible for smoothing interest rates in the United States between 1914 and 1917. [1] After the passage of the 1917 amendments to the Federal Reserve Act, however, money growth became seasonal and it is possible that Federal Reserve policy influenced the seasonal movement of interest rates.
The 1917 amendments, signed into law on June 21, 1917, by President Woodrow Wilson, greatly increased the note issue power of the Federal Reserve. Under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Federal Serve agents, who represented the Federal Reserve Board, were required to retain eligible commercial paper as collateral equal to 100 percent of the value of notes issued and Federal Reserve district banks were required to maintain an additional 40 percent gold reserve against notes in circulation. In effect, a one dollar Federal Reserve note was backed by a minimum of forty cents of gold and one dollar to eligible commercial paper. In practice, the twelve district banks repurchased commercial paper from their Federal Reserve agents using gold, leaving the agents with gold instead of commercial paper as backing for notes issued. The gold deposited with agents was a constraint on the issuance of new notes because it could only be released to the district banks if a corresponding amount of notes were withdrawn from circulation. The 1917 amendments relaxed the new note issue constraint by allowing district banks to count gold held by agents as part of their 40 percent gold reserve requirement. This simple accounting change had an immediate effect on the gold backing of notes and the amount of notes issued. The gold backing of notes fell from 100.4 percent on June 1, 1917, to 78.2 percent on June 22, 1917. Notes in circulation rose from $464.8 million on June 1, 1917, to $1,246.5 million on December 28, 1917, while they had increased by only $244.9 million for the seven-month period preceding the passage of the 1917 amendments.
The 1917 amendments were passed to help finance U.S. participation in World War I. When the United States entered the war, on April 6, 1917, it was estimated that the first year's expense would be $4 billion, with $2 billion to be raised from bond sales. If the general population failed to support the war effort, the financial burden would fall on the Federal Reserve. The 1917 amendments, along with amendments passed in 1916, permitted the district banks to issue notes that were backed, although indirectly, by government bonds. I suggest that without the 1917 amendments the resources of the twelve Federal Reserve district banks could not have supported a $2 billion bond issue.
The paper first examines the operating behavior of the Federal Reserve between 1914 and 1917. During this period, there were many institutional constraints that had to be relaxed for the Federal Reserve to operate effectively. The analysis then turns to the amendments of 1917, how they increased the note issue power, and how the United States financed its participation in World War I. Following an examination of trade and gold flows during the war, the paper offers some empirical evidence that the 1917 amendments affected the seasonal behavior of notes issued and interest rates.
1. PROBLEMS WITH THE EARLY FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created the Federal Reserve System, which began operations under what may have been the greatest financial crisis ever to face the United States and Europe. In the days immediately preceding the outbreak of World War I on July 31, 1914, disruption of remittances from European clients of English accepting houses to cover maturing bills led to a halt in discounting of foreign bills by London houses. That action interrupted the supply of sterling exchange to New York banks, which then used gold to pay foreign remittances, drawing down their reserves. The volume of foreign remittances soared as European investors sold stock to increase liquidity and avoid losses due to falling asset prices. The resulting financial imblance closed stock exchanges in Europe and the United States for several months. In response, the Secretary of the Treasury, William McAdoo, acting under the Aldrich-Vreeland Act of 1908 and the Senate Emergency Currency Bill of August 4, 1914, authorized the issue of $500 million in emergency currency. National banks found the emergency currency appealing because it met their demand for liquidity, fostered in part by public hoarding, and was a cheap source offunds. Initially, the cost of securing the emergency currency was only 3 percent, whereas the New York clearing house charged 6 percent for clearinghouse certificates. In only a few weeks the Treasury had "sold" over $382 million in emergency currency, which represented about 10.2 percent of the existing money stock (Annual Report, Comptroller of the Currency, 1915, p. 90).
The Federal Reserve was organized for the express purpose of providing currency relief in an emergency. When the operations began on November 16, 1914, however, the Federal Reserve offered only token new liquidity to the economy. Instead of providing inexpensive currency, the various district banks charged between 5.5 percent and 6 percent to discount commercial paper, while market rates for such paper were .5 percent to 1 percent less. (2) As a result, the discount operations of the Federal Reserve were limited to only $10.6 million in 1914, an amount that represented only about 4 percent of the resources of the Federal Reserve (Annual Report, Comptroller of the Currency, 1915, p. 137). The Federal Reserve increased its discounting activities to about 10 percent of assets during 1915, but the largest increases did not come until the second half of 1917 when the Federal Reserve assisted with war-related financing.
The reasons why the Federal Reserve choose not to offer much liquidity during the early stages of World War I are not entirely clear. Generally speaking, though, the Federal reserve did not "hit the ground running" because it lacked adequate operating rules. (3) As the Federal Reserve did evolve and more rules were established it became clear that several clauses of the 1913 Act created problems. The biggest bottlenecks of the Act were the clauses restricting the issue of Federal Reserve notes. (4) Sections 13 and 16 of the 1913 Act state quite clearly that the intent of Congress was …
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Publication information:
Article title: The Federal Reserve Amendments of 1917: The Beginning of a Seasonal Note Issue Policy.
Contributors: Fishe, Raymond P. H. - Author.
Journal title: Journal of Money, Credit & Banking.
Volume: 23.
Issue: 3(1-2)
Publication date: August 1991.
Page number: 308+.
© 1999 Ohio State University Press.
COPYRIGHT 1991 Gale Group.
This material is protected by copyright and, with the exception of fair use, may not be further copied, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means.
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