"We Don't Want to Be the Jews of Tomorrow": Jews and Turks in Germany after 9/11
Yurdakul, Gokce, Bodemann, Y. Michal, German Politics and Society
This article examines how German Turks employ the German Jewish trope to establish an analogous discourse for their own position in German society. Drawing on the literature on immigrant incorporation, we argue that immigrants take more established minority groups as a model in their incorporation process. Here, we examine how German Turks formulate and enact their own incorporation into German society. They do that, we argue, by employing the master narrative and socio-cultural repertoire of Germany's principal minority, German Jewry. This is accomplished especially in relation to racism and antisemitism, as an organizational model and as a political model in terms of making claims against the German state. We argue that in order to understand immigrant incorporation, it is not sufficient to look at state-immigrant relations only--authors also need to look at immigrant groups' relationships with other minority groups.
Keywords: immigrants; minorities; Turks; German Jews; immigrant incorporation; racism; antisemitism
In its edition of 23 September 2004, the German magazine Stern published a cartoon showing a heavily mustached man crawling through a cat hole in a door named "European Union," trying to gain entry into Europe. Some imitation Arabic writing appears on top of the cat hole, and a suitcase with a Turkish flag stands next to the man. This cartoon caused an uproar in the German Turkish community. Vural Oger, a prominent German-Turkish businessman and a member of the European Parliament from Germany's Social Democratic Party, wrote an open letter to Stern calling the cartoon defamatory, obscene and welcome material for neo-Nazi propaganda. Oger closed his letter as follows:
A young Turkish man with a German passport, not only born but also raised here had heard about Hitler's beginnings in history class and said that this drawing was just like ones in (the Nazi paper) Der Sturmer. Except that the Jews would have received different noses. Here in the Stern, the nose was replaced by the mustache. But everything else is the same racist garbage. (1)
In this article, (2) we attempt to show how interethnic relations play themselves out between Turks and Jews in Germany. We will explore how the numerically largest and most recent immigrant group, the Turks, take the small Jewish minority in Germany, pivotal because of its long history in Germany as well as the recent past, as a model for their own future insertion in German society.
Oger's reaction to the cartoon in Stern, demonstrates that German Turks are not only knowledgeable about the German-Jewish narrative, but also that they have learned to use it adeptly for their own purposes. Accusing Germans of anti-Turkish racism per se is only partly effective. Rhetorically far more effective is to associate Turkish concerns with those of the Jews. This strategy compels Germans to listen to Turkish intellectuals, because on this point, the German environment is vulnerable-it represents a fundamental usage of the Jewish narrative by the Turkish leadership. (3)
We suggest that immigrant leaders refer to historical minorities in order to create a common perception of struggle against discrimination and racism in the receiving country. At the same time, they formulate their claims for membership rights within a historical framework in order to receive political recognition from state authorities. As the above example would suggest, Turkish immigrant leaders draw upon the Jews and Jewish history because in Germany, many Turkish immigrants "take Jews as a concrete example of minority, in terms of history and organization." (4) They build upon a German Jewish model in three main areas. First, they compare the Holocaust and the fire bombings of Turkish houses in Molln in 1992 and Solingen in 1993. Here, leaders in Turkish immigrant associations stress the similarities between the racism against Turks and anti-Semitism. (5) Second, they use the Judische Gemeinde (Jewish Community) and the Zentralrat der Juden (Central Council of Jews) as examples of how to organize as a minority. Lastly, Turkish immigrant associations claim minority rights analogous to those of German Jews whose ritual practices have been officially recognized by German state authorities.
In the following article, we focus on the theoretical background before discussing the history of German Jews as a minority and German Turks as a major immigrant group. We explore how Turkish immigrant associations use Jewish associations as organizational models. Next, we address references made by the executive members of the Turkish immigrant associations regarding the Holocaust and antisemitism, as they organize anti-racist campaigns. We discuss how the Turkish immigrant associations take the Jewish trope as a model to claim group rights. We conclude by addressing the significance of the integration process of immigrants, looking at their interaction with historical minorities.
Immigrants and Minorities
Nation-states draw distinctions between two groups: minorities and immigrants. On the one hand, a minority is the "other" who does not belong to an imagined homogeneous nation-someone who is almost one of "us," but not quite. (6) Minorities become members of the state involuntarily through occupation of land or federation. (7) Immigrants, on the other hand, become members of the state-permanent residents or full citizens-through voluntary immigration. Since they consent to being in a "minority situation" in the receiving country, immigrants are expected to learn the language of the majority, conform to its values and norms, and assimilate into the host society.
Sujit Choudhry refers to Will Kymlicka's assumption that "immigrants have waived their right to live in accordance with their own cultures through the decision to immigrate to a society which they knew that they would constitute a minority." (8) Minorities have not waived that right, because they were involuntarily incorporated into the majority. (9) Therefore, minorities possess shared memories, values, practices and institutions, whereas, according to Kymlicka, immigrants are unable to construct this institutional completeness that the minorities enjoy. (10)
Minority associations make demands for distinctive social, political and cultural rights that recognize their differences. Take, for example, the case of German Jews who receive state-collected taxes for synagogues and welfare organizations, have the right to practice religious slaughtering, and maintain religious schools. Through such "recognition of difference," (11) they are able to maintain a certain level of institutional completeness that includes their own community organizations, newspapers, bookstores, restaurants and schools. In other words, minorities may possess group rights that allow them to establish and run their own institutions and pursue their own values, norms and lifestyle.
Immigrants associations, however, are assumed to be social services to facilitate the incorporation of immigrants into the broader society. They may provide "cultural events," such as folk dances, language courses for second or third generation, or traditional celebration days. But they are not expected to make claims on the state authorities or to politically mobilize immigrants. In contrast to the situation of minorities, immigrant associations must facilitate incorporation, rather than maintaining institutional separateness. (12) In this context, we argue that the boundaries between immigrants and minorities are not clear-cut. In fact, some immigrant communities consciously choose specific historical minorities as their models. Therefore, in order to understand the process of immigrant incorporation, it is not sufficient to analyze macro structures, in terms of the political structure of the receiving country and majority-minority relations. (13) In fact, it is essential to have a framework that distinguishes between different minorities and explores immigrant and minority relations, to understand what kind of strategies immigrants create to incorporate into the mainstream society.
Ideally, liberal states introduce clear-cut policies for immigrants and minorities according to the principle of "consent in incorporation." (14) However, the difference between these two groups is not always obvious. All immigrants do not always incorporate into the host society in the same unilinear and developmental fashion. In some cases, the second- and third-generation children of immigrants still consider themselves foreigners. Similarly, ghettoizing immigrants into residential clusters can be seen as aiding in the construction of a minority. Moreover, immigrants associate themselves with minorities and claim that discrimination against immigrants is an extension of historical racism against the minorities in that country. Accordingly, immigrant associations hope to achieve social, cultural and political recognition by drawing parallels to the minority associations. For example, Turkish immigrant associations emphasize the relationship between "anti-Semitism and racism;" they state that they want "minority rights instead of immigrant rights," and they say "no to assimilation." Their campaigns and projects aim to set up "non-discriminatory schools and workplaces, and generally a nonracist social structure." (15)
The fact that immigrant associations interact with minorities does not imply their solidarity. In fact, many immigrant groups and minorities are in conflict with each other. (16) The historical minorities may hold some political and economic power that they have earned as privileges in the past-the lack of these rights and privileges may cause resentment among immigrants. Nevertheless, all these differences and rivalries show that there is an important relationship between minorities and immigrants that is overlooked in the literature. In order to bring these into discussion, we briefly introduce the Jewish and the Turkish communities in Germany.
German Jews versus German Turks
Since the introduction of a new citizenship law (Staatsangehorigkeitsgesetz), the German state has partially discarded the idea of ius sanguinis (law based on ancestral origin), and has started naturalizing the migrant population. (17) According to the citizenship law, immigrant children born in Germany after the year 2000 will be granted German citizenship and their parents' native citizenship. In order to be granted permanent German citizenship, however, a child born in Germany has to give up the citizenship of his/her parents' native country between the ages of sixteen to twenty three. (18) According to December 2002 estimates, 7.34 million migrants live in Germany, and Turks represent the largest group, at 1.998 million. (19) According to 2003 estimates, there were 565, 766 Turks with German citizenship in Germany, (20) approximately one fourth of the whole Turkish immigrant population.
Obtaining German citizenship is not as complicated for many Jews. German law facilitates the acquisition of citizenship for former German citizens (and their descendants)-Jews mostly, who were persecuted during the Nazi period-irrespective of which other citizenships they may hold. (21) Moreover, on account of the Holocaust, special conditions have been set up to encourage Jewish immigration to Germany. These new Jewish immigrants are eligible to apply for expedited citizenship. It is estimated that there are 5, 000 Jews who are thought to be of German origin in Germany. (22)
Germany, the argument went, is the last country in which Jews would want to live. (23) Over the past decades, Germany has been turned into a land of memorials, including numerous larger and smaller memorials referring to the Holocaust. Among these, the aforementioned Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe in Berlin occupies a site the size of two football fields across from the Brandenburg Gate and is surely one of the most valuable pieces, symbolically and materially, of real estate in Germany. Another site of memory, the Jewish Museum in Berlin, opened to the public in 2001. The building, designed by Jewish architect Daniel Libeskind, is attached to what was to become the Berlin Museum, with almost organic passages, thereby symbolically implying that Jewish history is embedded in the history of Berlin. (24) The small population of Jews in Germany notwithstanding, the Jewish past exists primarily as museums and monuments in Germany today, albeit often under police protection and sometimes surrounded by barbed wire. (25)
Today, however, German Jews are no longer "sitting on packed suitcases" and especially for Russian Jews, Germany has become an attractive country in which to live. Obviously, the welfare system that provides generous healthcare privileges can be counted as a major reason that Russian Jews along with all other immigrants are attracted to Germany. With the arrival of Russian Jews to Germany, Jewish life in Germany became livelier. National Jewish organizations are thriving; such as the Zentralrat der Juden or the Zentral-wohlfahrtsstelle (Jewish social services) and their own local Jewish congregations (Judische Gemeinden), community organizations and cultural centers in Berlin and elsewhere (for example the Judische Kulturverein), newspapers (e.g., Judische Allgemeine), bookstores, synagogues, restaurants, cemeteries and museums. Their congregations have the church tax collected by the state from Jewish community members in order to finance the communities. The Zentralrat der Juden, some Rabbis and community leaders enjoy national political recognition, and the Judische Kulturverein in Berlin and other Jewish groups organize numerous Jewish cultural events. Moreover, Jews are entitled to practice shechita, the religious slaughtering of animals and have their own religious schools. As they maintain a certain level of institutional separateness, however, it is questionable how or whether they feel at home in Germany, and some of the discussions in Berlin's Judischer Kulturverein debate whether a Jew should also call him/herself a German. (26)
Seventeen years after the Jews had been exterminated in the concentration camps, Turks started to migrate to Germany. (27) After the Second World War, when the Federal Republic needed a labor force to rebuild the country, the government decided to import labor from nearby countries like Turkey-so-called guest-workers. (28) Turkish migrant workers were usually unskilled or semi-skilled peasants who were running away from the lack of choice, scarcity of land, unemployment and limited social services at home. (29) Some of them managed to reunite with their families after the Family Reunification Law of 1972, while others decided to stay permanently in Germany, leaving their families behind in Turkey. (30) By 1980, there were approximately 115,000 Turkish people living in Berlin alone. (31)
With the collapse of the Berlin Wall, a chaotic social environment and cheap labor from East Germany led to mass unemployment in the Western part of Berlin. (32) As the federal subsidy for industry in West Berlin was phased out and plants dismantled, many Turks who worked in these factories lost their jobs. Thus, after 1989, those who came to Germany as workers in the 1960s and 1970s became increasingly dependent on welfare. The mass job dismissals have had long term effects. According to 1997 statistics, it was estimated that 18 percent of the Turks in Berlin are unemployed. (33) This number is even worse in the areas that have a Turkish majority: 26.2 percent in Kreuzberg. (34) In February 2000, the Federal Commissioner for Foreigners, Marieluise Beck, stated: "the unemployment rate among migrants remains at almost 20 percent, demonstrating that foreigners continue to be subject to unemployment twice as often as Germans." (35) The problem of unemployment is exacerbated by discrimination against immigrant children in the education system. Second and third generation German citizens of Turkish background and Turkish immigrant children complain that they are not given equal opportunity in the education system: (36) "while only 8 percent of German young people and adults remain without vocational training, the rate of unskilled Turkish young people is five times higher, at about 40 percent." (37)
Racism and Antisemitism: Fallout from 9/11
As elsewhere in the Western world, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Virginia on 11 September, 2001 cast a dark shadow on all Muslims in Germany and at the same time, paradoxically perhaps, intensified antisemitism. Interethnic relations in general became affected. On the one hand, many Muslims, Turkish Muslims included, accused Jews as being responsible for 9/ll. Just after the attack, many adopted a widely held conspiracy theory that the Jews working in the World Trade Center were informed beforehand about planes crashing into the towers, and therefore, they did not come to work on that day. (38) German Turks, just as Turks in Turkey, however, are a diverse group. Many Western-oriented Turkish Muslims have been supporters of Jews, whereas others have sided with Arabs against the Jews on account of Israeli policies against Palestinians. For example, a statement by Oger is an evidence of how Turks want to distance themselves from Arabs: "the actors of political Islam are not Turks. Jihad is not Turks' business. Palestine is not the problem of Turks." (39) In this sense, many Turks distanced themselves from Arab immigrants who feel strongly about the Israel-Palestine conflict.
While Arabs and Turks are both Muslim peoples, Turkey, on account of Kemalist modernization, has wanted to he considered as a part of the West. The policies of recent Turkish governments (40) have been cautiously pro-Israel and tendentially anti-Arab. Turks have collaborated with Israel on many occasions, including the 1999 capture of the Kurdish leader Ocalan in Kenya. (41) Anti-Arab sentiments in Turkey were exacerbated by the 2003 synagogue bombings in Istanbul. (42) In order to protest the Istanbul bombings, at the anniversary of the Molln pogrom on November 22, a group of immigrants in Berlin, organized a Migrants' Initiative against Antisemitism (Migrantische Initiative gegen Antisemitismus). Emphasising that the Jews were not alone in their struggle against antisemitism, initiative leaders organized a demonstration to show their solidarity with Jews in Germany. (43)
The spokesperson of the TBB, Safter Cinar, sent a note to Judisches Berlin, (the monthly bulletin of the Jewish Community in Berlin), saying that Turks were in solidarity with the members of Berlin's Jewish community. (44) Indeed, the next issue of the Judisches Berlin published interviews and articles of Turks and Turkish Jews, as well as photographs from a joint Chanukah party that was organized by the Judischer Kulturverein. (45) The articles and interviews refer to the days of the Ottoman Empire, when the millet system provided for the Turkish majority to coexist with Jews and other ethnic and religious minorities. It further emphasized that Jews who fled Germany after 1933, and after 1492 from the Spanish Inquisition, found shelter as refugees in the Ottoman Empire. Thus, Judisches Berlin condemned the synagogue bombings in Istanbul and provided public space for Turks to show their solidarity with Jews. (46)
Fallout from 9/11, posed a twofold challenge to Turkish leaders in Germany: they had to attempt not to be painted with the antiArab/anti-Muslim brush, and, at the same time, they had to combat antisemitism in their own ranks, which had assumed a new intensity among both Turkish immigrants and the radical Right. Within the Right, the increased antisemitism accompanied increased racism against Muslims. Neo-Nazi graffiti such as "what the Jews have behind them is what is still to come for the Turks" (47) virtually forces Turkish-German leaders into an alliance with Jews, according to the theorem, "the enemies of my enemies are my friends." Accordingly, a photo, taken during a street protest in Berlin, and displayed at the Jewish Museum in Berlin during a short-term exhibit on Jewish history in Germany, responded to this slogan: a group of Turkish immigrants carries a banner that reads, "we don't want to be the Jews of tomorrow." (48) In other words, the neo-Nazis use the Jewish narrative negatively and the immigrants respond by employing the cultural repertoire of German-Jewish relations positively, for their own objectives. (49)
The Turkische Bund Berlin-Brandenburg (Turkish Federation of Berlin-Brandenburg, TBB), the secular and social-democratically oriented immigrant association, applies the German Jewish trope as a master narrative to show that racism in Germany today is an extension of antisemitic history. On 22 November 2002, the TBB (50) organized a commemoration in Berlin for the 10th anniversary of the Molln pogrom, one of several racially motivated fire bombings in Germany to occur after the fall of the Berlin Wall. On the night of 23 November, 1992, Nazi skinheads firebombed a house in the northern German town of Molln. In the fire, three members of a Turkish family were burned to death: a fifty-one-year-old woman, her ten-year-old grandchild and her fourteen-year-old nephew. This attack and others in Solingen, Rostock and elsewhere brought about a broadly based movement of protest in Germany, drawing attention to the increasing number of racist attacks against immigrants. In 1993, Turkish shop owners in Berlin closed down their shops for an hour. Hung in their windows, banners demanded safety and equal rights for immigrants in Germany.
The parallels to the commemoration of Kristallnacht, the Nazi pogroms of November 1938, were apparent. (51) The Molln commemoration began with the laying of a bouquet of flowers at the Memorial for the Victims of War and Tyranny (Mahnmal fur die Opfer von Krieg und Gewaltherrschaft), the central German national memorial in the Neue Wache on the Unter den Linden in Berlin-this memorial commemorates an array of victims ranging from fallen German soldiers and the anti-Nazi resistance to murdered Jews. It continued with speeches at Berlin City Hall. Guests included the Minister of Health, Dr. Heidi Knake-Werner for the Land of Berlin, Leah Rosh, chair of the Supporting Committee for the Establishment of a Memorial for the Murdered Jews of Europe (Forderkreis zur Errichtung eines Denkmals fur die ermordeten Juden Europas), as well as the President of the Berlin Senate and the former mayor of Berlin, Walter Momper. Leaders of the Jewish Community and the Jewish Cultural Association were in the front rows. As the spokesman of the TBB, Safter Cinar, began his talk, it was apparent that the presence of people from the Jewish community was not coincidental.
At the same time, Cinar's speech employed the Jewish trope: the history of Jewish-German relations was evoked in order to assert that German Turks are Germans. Cinar compared the pogrom in Molln to antisemitic events in Germany during Nazism. Reminding the audience of the Holocaust, he emphasized that German Turks, as residents of Germany, should be ready to shoulder this part of German history. Cinar referred to former Chancellor Helmut Kohl's statement that the new generation of Germans is not responsible for the antisemitic German past, because they were not born at the time--his much quoted "grace of late birth" (Gnade der spatten Geburt). Cinar, on the other hand, allying himself with a left-liberal German position, emphasized that neither is there a grace of late birth, nor a grace of foreign birthplace. According to him, if Turks want to be residents of Germany, they are responsible for German history and take upon themselves German national memory:
As residents of this country, we must share responsibility for this past crime. I don't know how to define this share-may be it doesn't need any definition--we must take on our share of responsibility. And we must be ready to carry this responsibility with us. Ladies and gentlemen, I would like to formulate it as follows: There can be no grace of late birth.... and there can be no grace of another birthplace. (52)
After various antisemitic incidents, the TBB has shown solidarity with the Jewish Community in Berlin. One example of the collaboration between these two associations occurred during the 2002 federal elections, when the Free Democratic Party (FDP) party politician, Jamal Karsli, compared Israel's tactics in the West Bank to "Nazi methods." The vice-president of the party, Jurgen Mollemann, went on to offend a leader of the Central Council of Jews, Michel Friedman, by stating that Friedman's behavior inspired antisemitism. With these anti-Israel and antisemitic political tactics, Karsli and Mollemann hoped that their party would gain right-wing German and Muslim votes in Germany. (53) But in response, the TBB joined members of the Jewish community in front of the FDP's party center to protest the antisemitic election campaign. In the European edition of a major Turkish newspaper, Mollemann's anti-Semitic campaign aimed at attracting Muslim votes was severely condemned. (54)
In return for its showing solidarity, the TBB received a positive response from the Jewish Community in Berlin. The aforementioned Molln commemoration is an example of Jewish support--a few Jewish representatives attended the event and brought greetings. Moreover, when the TBB established an antidiscrimination network to influence the preparation process of the new antidiscrimination law and then organized a seminar to inform the public about this law, some members of the Jewish community were present. In this and other similar projects, the TBB has co-operated with the Jewish community of Berlin against discrimination and racism. (55)
Jewish Institutional Structures as Organizational Models
While the TBB, attempts to form an alliance with the Jewish community and employs the Jewish narrative in its substance, the Turkish Community of Berlin (Turkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, henceforth referred as Cemaat, as it is known amongst Turks), one of its Turkish nationalist and religious counterparts, employs Jewishness as a form. It focuses on, and emulates, the Jewish institutional structure in order to receive recognition for Muslim religious rights in Germany. Accordingly, for the first time, (Turkish) Muslims see themselves as a diaspora and are looking for models of diasporic life. The vice-chair of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, for example, recently observed that Muslims are lacking a theology of integration. The old scriptures rarely if ever gave directions how to behave in non-Muslim societies. (56)
Jewish institutional structures are used as models for religious Turkish associations in order to achieve the type of community solidarity and collective unity they believe to be present in the Jewish associations. Although Jewish organizations have different interests and are often in conflict, these conflicts are not readily apparent to the mass media or to outsiders. Unaware of possible contention within Jewish associations, the executive committee member of the Cemaat, Ahmet Yilmaz glorifies their strong fellowship:
I wish from Allah that no other nation would live the difficulties that the Jewish nation had experienced, but [I wish from Allah that he would] provide their solidarity to everyone. There is a Jewish community that speaks for all Jews. My heart wishes that all Turkish organizations will come together under the same roof, and keep equal distance to all [German political] parties. (57)
Although Yilmaz's yearnings have not been realized, his organization has modeled its organizational structure on the Jewish Community in Berlin, in both its hierarchy and its religious orientation. Indeed, the original name of the Cemaat, Turkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, mimics the Jewish Community's official name, Judische Gemeinde zu Berlin. (58)
In the German corporately-oriented democracy, state authorities would welcome a strong representation by Turkish immigrant organizations that could represent their common interest--and discipline the Turkish community. However, Turkish immigrant organizations are far from unified. The controversy around the headscarf is one example. The TBB campaigns strongly against the use of the headscarf in public, whereas the Cemaat on the other hand supports it--not by holding public campaigns but by providing social services for women with headscarves or assisting them with employment. As a result of this Turkish fragmentation, German state authorities play down the role of immigrant organizations as their interlocutors.
Some political leaders of the Turkish immigrant communities, such as the foreigner's commissioner of the Tempelhof-Schoneberg borough in Berlin, Emine Demirbuken, resent political disunity among Turkish immigrant associations. She draws parallels between the Jewish community and the young Turks and stresses that it is essential to demonstrate the economic and intellectual potential of Turks to German society:
The Jewish community combines its members' economic power with their brain power. Turks also have economic power here. We have many people who are bilingual, who can speak perfect German and Turkish. Why can't we combine our economic power with our brain power? Why don't we show our power to the Germans? Why can't we force them to take us seriously? If we don't do this, then they will always stereotype us as members of a society who do not want to learn German, whose women are battered by their husbands, and whose daughters are locked up at home. (59)
Demirbuken argues that a consolidation of its organizational structures would lead to a change in the Turkish guest-worker stereotype. Despite their economic achievements, many Turks in Germany still believe in traditional practices such as conservative child rearing habits. Moreover, many Turkish immigrants, forcibly and voluntarily, are isolated from German society and do not speak German, a problem Germans today decry as the "parallel society" (Parallelge-sellschaft). However, young Turks are better educated, have better language abilities and social skills than their immigrant parents, and according to Demirbtiken, Germans will take the Turkish community more seriously when they have to deal with young German Turks as their counterparts in the immigrant associations. Just as in the Jewish associations, she looks for economically and socially capable people to be in the Turkish frontline.
Using the Jewish Master Narrative to Claim Group Rights
Some leaders of the Cemaat openly state that they demand religious rights similar to those of Jews. They argue that the German state authorities should recognize the religious and national differences of Sunni Turkish immigrants. (60) The Cemaat and other religious Turkish associations demand permission for ritual slaughtering of animals, for the Islamic call to prayer in public and for provisions enabling burial according to the Islamic rite. (61) One important difference between the Jewish and Muslim associations is fiscal status. While churches and synagogues as statutory corporations (Korperschaften) in public law receive, state-collected taxes (Kirchensteuer) on their behalf, the mosques do not have this right. This issue causes much resentment among Muslims in Germany, especially because their number far exceeds the number of Jews. They are, however, not sufficiently unified to establish political lobbies to demand the status of corporation in public law. (62)
The most striking examples of religious claim-making and the use of the Jewish narrative involve disputes over religious education of Turkish Muslim children, wearing of the headscarf in public places, and over the right to eat religiously processed meat (halal). The religious education of Turkish immigrant children in Germany has been a much-debated problem for years. While Quran reciting courses (63) for children are legally allowed as a community service in many Sunni mosques, some Muslim associations gained the right to teach Islam classes in German schools. For example, in Berlin, the Islamic Federation Berlin has the privilege of teaching Islam courses in secondary schools, albeit in the German language. (64) Jews, however, are allowed to have their own religious education and high schools in Germany.
Along with the problematic practice of teaching Islam courses in secondary schools, a controversial public debate erupted over whether Muslim women teachers could attend classes wearing the traditional headscarves (known as basortu or turban in Turkish) in public services and schools. (65) In a 2003 decision, the Constitutional Court of Germany left up to the individual Lander (states) to legally enact a ban on wearing the headscarf in schools. Most Lander were in favor of the ban, particularly the states that were governed by the conservative Christian Democrats (CDU-CSU), such as Baden-Wurttemberg. (66) Until recently, it would have been unthinkable to ask a Jewish man, for example, to remove his kippa in Germany. This double standard, tolerating Jewish practices while opposing Turkish ones, is another reason why Turks have associated themselves with Jews, and ask for equal recognition in public space. The secular immigrant organizations, such as the TBB, on the other hand, identifying with the Jacobin character of the Turkish constitution, supported the ban on all religious symbols from the public sphere. (67) Granting halal, ritual slaughtering of animals, has been an important cultural struggle for Turkish immigrants in Germany. Halal slaughtering requires that the animal's throat should be cut with a sharp knife and the blood be drained from the vessels. This contradicts the German regulation that animals should be stunned by electric shock before slaughtering. Although Jews are allowed to practice similar slaughtering practices, known as kashrut, the situation for Turks periodically becomes controversial, especially before the Ramadan Feast that requires a mass sacrifice and ritual slaughtering of certain animals, such as sheep and cattle.
Recently, a Turkish butcher, Rustem Altinkupe, struggled to provide halal meat to his clients during Ramadan. (68) He was supported by various Turkish and Muslim associations and organizations that claimed a right to practice their religion in Germany. After days of public campaign in the media, and bureaucratic struggles with the German state, the Muslim community (i.e., the butcher) gained the right to slaughter animals with cutting objects, however under very strict conditions.
M. Y., the head of the law office of Milli Gorus, a conservative religious immigrant organization that is associated with political Islam, (69) finds it natural to work with the German Jewish community on this and similar subjects. He participated in a discussion in the parliament of North-Rhine Westphalia to defend Muslims' right to slaughter animals according to Islamic ritual:
In one instance, I took part in a discussion in North-Rhine Westfalia [parliament] about slaughtering according to Islamic ritual. I talked to these people for a long time. I presented all the rational arguments: freedom of religion, anti-discrimination laws etc. But they argued very harshly and often emotionally against us. They did not listen to my arguments. Following me, a rabbi spoke. He said, "you have no right to talk like that. In 1933 as well, as an anti-Semitic measure, ritual slaughtering was outlawed. Following these anti-Semitic measures, 6 Million people were murdered." Suddenly, the discussion fell silent. Nobody wanted to speak to that. I think if I was in that situation, I could not accept these drastic arguments and I would leave the discussion. But in this country, following the increasing anti-Semitic politics, six million people were murdered. So no one can simply leave while the rabbi is speaking. That would be a scandal. So they listened to the end. When we left, I told him, "Many thanks. So that is how one has to express oneself. Our situation is different." He said to me, "I know that they keep grudges against me. That is in their genes. The best you can do is to be standing close to us Jews. As minorities we have to fight discrimination together. To us they have to listen, your words will not be listened to." (70)
Obviously, this is not simply about slaughtering animals and eating meat--it is about practicing the laws of one's religion, as do Christians and Jews. While Jews and Muslims are often in opposition to each other, Turkish Muslims point to the parallel with German Jews to claim religious rights from the German state.
Our aim in this article was to show how immigrant associations refer to historical minorities as models to first create a common ground of struggle against discrimination and then make political claims. We have argued that social scientists have rarely looked at the ways in which immigrant groups orient their behavior to those who arrived before them. Both immigrants and minorities orient themselves to other minority or immigrant groups. This is one way in which societal structures are being reproduced and that give ethnic-cultural communities (globalization notwithstanding) their own character within particular nation states. As we have demonstrated, Turkish leaders certainly have taken note of Jewish communal behavior, and Jewish leaders have done the same vis-a-vis the Turks. Turkish leaders in Germany use the German Jewish trope to establish associational ties, organize campaigns against antisemitism and racism, and make claims to German state authorities.
Although Turkish immigrant leaders take the German Jewish trope as a model, there are three major questions that need further research. First, how does the Jewish community in Germany react to immigrant groups who take them as a model? In our preliminary research, we found that the presence of Jews at some Turkish commemorative events is still minimal overall, and, while Jews are an important reference for German Turks, Turks play a minimal role in Jewish debates except by default, as fellow targets of neo-Nazism (71) and as a religious community with occasionally or potentially similar political and legal claims. This pertains especially to seeing the religious needs of the respective communities recognized by the German state. Individual Jews have played, and are playing an important role in the fight against racism, neo-Nazism and in fostering closer relations with the Turkish and/or larger Muslim community. One of these organizations is the Amadeu Antonio Stiftung, a foundation started by Annetta Kahane, following some racially motivated killings by neo-Nazi skinheads; another, the Judische Kulturverein, founded by Irene Runge, caters mostly to Russian immigrants and East German Jews, also in Berlin. It is indicative, however, that--probably on account of their East German Jewish background--both women have remained marginal to the Jewish leadership in Berlin and the Jewish community in Germany at large.
A second question that demands further research is the issue of class differences between Turks and Jews. In both communities, we found that culturally and in terms of class, Turks and Jews inhabit different worlds. Most Jews are solidly middle class, in many if not most cases, with higher secondary degrees and often some university education. A small but significant number of Jews are recognized public intellectuals in Germany. Most Turks, on the other hand, arrived as guest workers and are proletarianized peasants with minimal education; as Navid Kermani has observed. (72) In contrast to Britain and France, virtually no Muslim elites have arrived in Germany and even among most German-born Turks and Muslims at large, class and education are still clearly distinct from that of the Jews. (73) There is, however, a small but significant stratum of educated, middle-class Turks, very much at the level of their Jewish counterparts, even though they still inhabit different worlds and their encounters with Jews are few and far between. The issue of class should be studied in detail to lay out the effect of class differences between Turks and Jews on their interethnic relations. The last question that needs further research is: how typical and cross-nationally valid is the relationship between Turks and Jews? In a way, this relationship is unique because of the Jewish past in Germany. Jews and Turks are marked by a special relationship in Germany, but there may be other cases that may multiply this immigrant/minority relationship. (74)
The main conclusion, however, is that immigrant groups interact with other immigrants and historical minorities in the process of integration, and, in fact, take them as models. Therefore, in order to understand the immigrant incorporation process, it is not sufficient to analyze only the majority-minority relations. Rather, we need to look at how immigrants perceive themselves, and how they draw upon historical issues of the receiving country, specifically with respect to historical minorities.
Sociology, Brock University
Y. Michal Bodemann
Sociology, University of Toronto
(1.) Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, European Edition, 2 October 2004.
(2.) An earlier version of this paper was presented by Gokce Yurdakul at the workshop on "Incorporating Minorities in Europe: Nineteenth Century to the Present" at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard University, 16-17 April, 2004; at the Princeton Institute for International and Regional Studies Graduate Student Conference, Princeton University, 8-9 June, 2005 and by Michal Bodemann at the German Studies Association Conference, Milwaukee, October 2005 and as a Bucerius Institute for Research of Contemporary German History and Society Guest Lecture at the University of Haifa, December 2005. The authors would like to thank the participants of the workshop, lecture, and conferences for their feedback; and to Valerie Amiraux, Christian Joppke, Riva Kastoryano and Anna Korteweg for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper.
(3.) By using the term "leaders" in immigrant associations, we would like to refer to the executive committee members of Turkish immigrant associations in Germany. These leaders are usually the secretary general, spokespeople and presidents of immigrant associations. We differentiate between members of immigrant associations and their leaders. The leaders' perspectives do not always reflect those of the members. In other words, as we explain in this article, members in immigrant associations do not always share the views of immigrant leaders who associate Turkish existence in Germany with German Jewish history.
(4.) Riva Kastoryano, Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany (Princeton, 2002), 131.
(5.) Of course, the impact of the Holocaust in Germany can not be compared to any fire bombings. However, we believe that the leaders of the Turkish associations in Germany make this comparison to point out to the similarities between racism and antisemitism.
(6.) Homi K. Bhabha, ed., Nation and Narration (London and New York, 1990).
(7.) Sujit Choudhry, "National Minorities and Ethnic Immigrants: Liberalism's Political Sociology," The Journal of Political Philosophy, 10, no. 1 (2002): 55. We use the word "minority" for the sake of brevity here. Minority should be read as any group which does not fit the ideal of a homogeneous national collectivity, and which has been involuntarily incorporated into the state, such as Jews, Kurds and Arab Israelis.
(8.) Choudhry (see note 7), 60-1.
(9.) Thomas Pogge goes one step further and raises the question of immigrants' children who are assumed to give consent to assimilate, because their grandparents have immigrated and waived their rights to construct a culturally distinct group. Thomas W. Pogge, "Accommodation Rights for Hispanics in the United States," in Language Rights and Political Theory, eds. W. Kymlicka and A. Patten (New York, 2003), 105-122.
(10.) Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (New York, 1995); Choudhry (see note 7).
(11.) Charles Taylor, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition (Princeton, 1994).
(12.) Choudhry (see note 7).
(13.) Although immigrant associations are significant for our understanding of the emergence of immigrants as political actors in the receiving state, there are only a few case studies that focus on this theme. See Adriana Kemp, et al. "Contesting the Limits of Political Participation: Latinos and Black African Workers in Israel," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 23, no. 1 (2000): 94-119; Luin Goldring, "The Gender and Geography of Citizenship in Mexico-US Transnational Spaces," Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 7 (2001): 501-538. Those focusing on the interaction between immigrant associations and minorities are even fewer in number. See Kastoryano (see note 3) and Jeffrey Peck, "Turks and Jews: Comparing Minorities in Germany After the Holocaust," in German Cultures, Foreign Cultures: The Politics of Belonging., ed., Jeffrey Peck, (Washington, 1998), 1-16
(14.) Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (New York, 2001); Kymlicka (see note 10), Choudhry (see note 7).
(15.) Himani Bannerji, The Dark Side of the Nation: Essays on Multiculturalism, Nationalism and Gender (Toronto, 2000), 46.
(16.) Kymlicka (see note 14).
(17.) Christian Joppke, Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States (Oxford, 1998); Christian Joppke, "Multicultural Citizenship in Germany,' in Race and Ethnicity: Comparative and Theoretical Approaches, eds., J. Stone and R. Denis (Oxford, 2003), 359-367.
(18.) See Joppke (see note 17); Dietmar Schirmer, "Closing the Nation: Nationalism and Statism in 19th and 20th Centuries Germany," paper presented at the German Studies Association's Conference, San Diego (2002); Beauftragte der Bun desregierung fur Migration, Fluchtlinge und Integration (2000) Einburgerung: Fair, Gerecht, Tolerant; http://www.einbuergerung.de/.
(19.) Statistisches Bundesamt, Turkischer Bund Berlin Brandenburg, Einburgerungen in Deutschland, (2000, 2003); http://www.tbb-berlin.de.
(20.) Turkischer Bund Berlin (see note 19).
(21.) Article 116 par. 2 of the German Constitution is: "Former German citizens who between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945 were deprived of their citizenship on political, racial, or religious grounds, and their descendants, shall on application have their citizenship restored. They shall be deemed never to have been deprived of their citizenship if they have established their domicile in Germany after May 8, 1945 and have not expressed a contrary intention ... The above mentioned group of people mainly includes German Jews and members of the Communist or Social Democratic Parties." Further information is available at Information on obtaining/reobtaining German citizenship for former German citizens and their descendants who were persecuted on political, racial or religious grounds between January 30, 1933 and May 8, 1945," www.germanyinfo.org/ relaunch/info/consular_services/citizenship/persecuted.html
(22.) On the nature of "problematic counting of Jews" see Calvin Goldscheider, Study-ing the Jewish Future (Seattle and London, 2004).
(23.) Lea Fleischmann, Dies ist nicht mein Land: Eine Judin verlasst die Bundesrepublik (Munich, 1986).
(24.) James E. Young, "Variations of Memory: Berlin to New York after 1989," unpublished conference presentation at the (Re)Visualising National History: Muscology and National Identities in Europe in the New Millennium, University of Toronto, March 2004.
(25.) Y. Michal Bodemann, Gedachtnistheater: Die Judische Gemeinschaft und ihre deutsche Erfindung (Hamburg, 1996); Jerome S. Legge Jr., Jews, Turks and Other Strangers: The Roots of Prejudice in Modern Germany (Madison, 2003).
(26.) This is discussed in Y. Michal Bodemann, In den Wogen der Erinnerung. Judische Existenz in Deutschland. Munchen, 2002), 185. The boldest statement, most recently, is by Micha Brumlik, who has spoken most firmly of German Jewish patriotism, in an article entitled, Dies ist mein Land. (This Is My Country). The title alludes to Lea Fleischmann's book title, Dies ist nicht mein Land (1986).; Micha Brumlik, "Dies ist mein Land," Judische Allgemeine, 23 December 2004
(27.) Immigration from Turkey to Germany includes not only Turks, but Kurds and other ethnic and religious minorities, such as Alevites and Yezidis.
(28.) Ayse S. Caglar, German-Turks in Berlin: A Quest for Social Mobility, unpublished PhD Dissertation, McGill University (1994).
(29.) John Berger, The Seventh Man: The Story of a Migrant Worker in Europe (Middlesex, 1975).
(30.) Lenie Brouwer and Marijke Prister, "Living in Between: Turkish Women in Their Homeland and in the Netherlands," in One-Way Ticket: Migration and Female Labour, ed. Anne Phizacklea (London, 1983), 113-130. The family reunification law was a part of development policy towards foreigners in Germany that would facilitate their integration. These development policies were practiced in a few steps, including the introduction of the Action Program for Foreign Labor in June 1973 and changes in child allowances in January 1975. For detailed information in this period, see Ulrich Herbert, A History of Foreign Labor in Germany, 1880-7980: Seasonal Workers, Forced Laborers, Guest Workers (Ann Arbor, 1990).
(31.) Martin Greve, Das Turkische Berlin von A-Z. Die Auslanderbeauftragte des Senats und Turkisch Deutsche Unternehmervereinigung Berlin Brandenburg e.V., TDU. (Berlin, 2001), 30.
(32.) Gokce Yurdakul, "Mobilizing Kreuzberg: Political Representation, Immigrant Incorporation and Turkish Associations in Berlin," unpublished PhD Dissertation. University of Toronto (2006); see also Joppke 2003 (see note 17).
(33.) Landesarbeitsamt, Statistisches Landesamt, Arbeitslosigkeit bei Turken Statistik eigene Berechnungen bei TBB (1997), http://www.tbb-berlin.de.
(34.) Ingeborg Beer and Reinfried Musch, "Soziale Stadt: Berlin-Kreuzberg-Kotbusser Tor," (2000); http://www.sozialestadt.de/en/veroeffentlichungen/ zwischenbilanz/2-berlin-english.shtml#2.
(35.) European Forum for Migration Studies, "Beck presents report on the Situation of Foreigners in Germany," Migration Report: Chronology Of Relevant News And Occurrences In The Area Of The Institute's Work, February 2000; http://www.uni-bamberg.de/~ba6ef3/dfeb00_e.htm.
(36.) Sabine Am Orde, "Turken Fordern Vorschule fur Alle," die Tageszeitung, 21 February 2002.
(37.) The Federal Government's Commissioner for Foreigners' Issues, Facts and Figures on the Situation of Foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany, 19th ed. (Berlin, 2000).
(38.) Barbara Lerner, "Don't call them Arabs," National Review, 30 January 2002.
(39.) Interview with Vural Oger, 4 October 2005, Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, European Edition, Almanya eki, 4 October 2005.
(40.) It is important to note that Turkish governments' pro-Israeli attitude does not necessarily reflect the beliefs and values of Turkish people towards Israelis and Jews. Many Turks are neither supportive of Israeli policies nor sympathetic to Jews.
(41.) Turkish Daily News, Electronic Edition, "Israelis concerned over PKK revenge attacks," 18 February 1999; B. Rubin, "Turkey is Israel's Best Neighbour," Jerusalem Post, 11 July 2001.
(42.) Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, European Edition, 15 November 2003.
(43.) Migrantische Initiative gegen Antisemitismus., "Antisemitizmle Her Yerde Mucadele," Judisches Berlin, 6, no. 59 (2003): 4.
(44.) Safter Cinar, "A Note to Mr. Brenner," Judisches Berlin, 6, no. 59 (2003): 4.
(45.) Judische Kulturverein, "Vorurteile tanzend bekampfen," Judisches Berlin, 7, no. 60 (2004): 15.
(46.) Shulamith B. Tulgan, "Geliebtes Istanbul," Judisches Berlin, 7, no. 60 (2004): 13; Stanford Shaw, The Jews of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (New York, 1991); MehmetYilmaz, "Keine No Go Areas in Kreuzberg," Judisches Berlin 7, no. 60 (2004): 12.
(47.) Kastoryano (see note 3), 132.
(48.) This is a slogan that is written on a banner while Turkish immigrants are at a public demonstration against racism in Germany. The picture is available in a booklet prepared for the Auslanderbeauftragte by Gerdien Jonker, Muslime in Berlin (Berlin, 2002).
(49.) On the idea of the cultural repertoire, following Charles Tilly, see Ann Swidler, "Cultural Repertoires and Cultural Logics: Can They Be Reconciled?," Comparative and Historical Sociology, 1-2 (2002).
(50.) Unless otherwise indicated, "Turkish" shall mean here persons originating from Turkey, regardless of ethnic origin.
(51.) For the history of commemoration of Kristallnacht in Germany, see Y. Michal Bodemann, Jews, Germans, Memory (Ann Arbor, 1996).
(52.) Speech of Safter Cinar, Spokesperson of the TBB, City Hall, Berlin, 23 November 2002. Similarly, Zafer Senocak, has raised this theme as well. See Zafer Senocak, Gefahrliche Verwandtschaft (Munich, 1998).
(53.) The New York Times, 7 June 2002.
(54.) Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, European Edition, "Hesabi Tutmadi," 10 June 2002; D. Cziesche and B. Schmidt, B, "Schlag ins Wasser?: Deutsche Muslime distanzieren sich von Jurgen Mollemann," Der Spiegel. 24 (2002).
(55.) Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, European Edition, "Brenner: Ortak noktalarimiz var," 17 July 2001.
(56.) Mohammed Aman H. Hobohm, Die Welt, 16 November 2004
(57.) Interview with Ahmet Yilmaz, Executive Committee Member of the Turkische Gemeinde zu Berlin, 8 May 2003.
(58.) See Kastoryano (see note 3). The preposition "zu" is somewhat antiquated and rarefied, and it is therefore remarkable that the Cemaat would adopt this form.
(59.) Emine Demirbuken, Foreigner's Commissioner of Tempelhof-Schoneberg, Municipality in Berlin, 04 March 2003.
(60.) This part of the discussion deliberately excludes other religious groups than Sunnite Muslims who migrated from Turkey to Germany, such as Alevites, Yezidis and Assyrians.
(61.) See Islamische Charta, Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland (2002) for a full list of Muslim claims; http://www.islam.de.
(62.) KdoR stands for Korperschaft des offentlichen Rechts. See Yurdakul (see note 32).
(63.) These courses entail reading and memorizing Quran verses in Arabic language.
(64.) See "Milli Gorus'e John Destegi," Sabah, 10 July 1999; "Geld fur Islam-Unterricht," Berliner Morgenpost, 21 September 2002; Ulf Haussler, "Muslim Dress Codes in German State Schools," European Journal of Migration and Law 3 (2001): 457-474. In the school year 2002/2003, 1, 607 students in Berlin (852 girls, 805 boys) took Islam as a religion course in Berlin; 74 percent of them were of Turkish nationality; 21 percent were Arabs. See Islamische Foderation in Berlin, "Aktuelle Daten uber den IRU fur das Schuljahr," (2004); http://www.islamische-foederation.de/IRU.htm; "Die Kopftuch Schule," Die Tageszeitung, 24 June 2004.
(65.) At issue was the following: A German schoolteacher of Afghan origin, Feresteh Ludin, insisted on wearing the hijab in the school. She was let go of her teaching job and subsequently complained that she was being discriminated against on the grounds of her religious beliefs. When her case was brought before the Bundesverfassungsgericht (the constitutional court of Germany,) it ruled that "Germany's constitutional law did not explicitly forbid the wearing of headscarves in the classroom in state-run schools." Deutsche Welle, "German States Move To Enact Headscarf Bans," 25 September 2003. The court then left it up to the indi vidual Lander to legally enact a ban on wearing the headscarf in schools. Some of the Lander have now outlawed the headscarf.
(66.) Deutsche Welle (see note 65).
(67.) Y. Michal Bodemann, "Unter Verdacht. Parallelgesellschaften und Anti-Islamismus," Suddeutsche Zeitung, 20 November 2004; Gokce Yurdakul, "Secular versus Islamist: The Headscarf Debate in Germany" in Politics of Visibility: Young Muslims in European Public Spaces, eds., Gerdien Jonker and Valerie Amiraux (Bielefeld, 2006).
(68.) Evrensel Daily Newspaper, European Edition, "Yuksek mahkemeden kurbana vize cikti," 16 January 2002; Islamische Gemeinde Milli Gorus, "Brandanschlag auf muslimischen Schlachtbetrieb," 26 Novewmber 2004; http://www.igmg.de.
(69.) The name Milli Gorus refers to the political ideology created by the Milli Nizam Partisi (the National Order Party) in Turkey during the 1970s. Because of its religious activities that threaten public order, political parties that are associated with Milli Gorus ideology were banned by the Constitutional Court in Turkey. Milli Gorus appeared as a diasporic network of Turkish Muslims in Europe, specifically in Germany. However, it has a big disadvantage: it is listed with the Bundesverfassungsschutz (the intelligence agency of Germany) as a "threat" to German democracy. They are considered as part of political Islam which prevents immigrants from achieving full integration into German society,. See Werner Schiffauer, "Das Recht, anders zu sein," Die Zeit, 18 November 2004. The report states that Milli Gorus pursues anti integrative efforts, specifically on Islamic education of children. Moreover, the report provides many examples from the statements of the Milli Gorus publications, specifically anti-German and antisemitic statements in the Milli Gazete. The label of "threat" to German democracy largely restricts Milli Gorus activities and campaigns, and puts Milli Gorus members under suspicion. See also Bodemann (see note 67).
(70.) Interview with M.Y. legal adviser to Milli Gorus, 27 July 2004.
(71.) Nevertheless, the anti-Turkish pogroms have resonated with Jews individually. Bodemann reports such an incident where a young Jewish man was severely shaken by the M611n pogrom. Y. Michal Bodemann, A Jewish Family in Germany Today. An Intimate Portrait (Durham, 2005), 22
(72.) See Navid Kermani, "Distanzierungszwang und Opferrolle," Die Zeit, 18 November 2004.
(73.) In fact, Kermani's observation is not totally true. There are a significant number of Turkish engineers and economists who came to study in German universities and have worked in German factories throughout the years; Necmettin Erbakan, the founder of the Milli Gorus movement is one of them. These people may not be "intellectuals" in the sense that Kermani would like, however they are considered technocrat-intellectuals in Turkey. See Nilufer Gole, Muhendisler ve Ideoloji (Istanbul, 1986). Moreover, many Turkish intellectuals came to Germany to run away from the 1980s military coup in Turkey. However, Kermani is right at one point. France and the UK had the opportunity to establish schools in its colonies that educate the colonized population in French or English language. In turn, they received intellectuals from their colonies who can communicate perfectly in these languages. Since Germany did not have colonies in this sense, they received fewer intellectuals.
(74.) See some research that has been done by Nancy Foner, "Immigrants and African Americans: Comparative Perspectives on the New York Experience across Time and Space," in Host Societies and the Reception of Immigrants, ed., Jeffrey G. Reitz (La Jolla, 2003), 45-71. Hurriyet Daily Newspaper, European Edition, 2 October 2004.
Gokce Yurdakul is an Assistant Professor of Sociology at Brock University. She received her Ph.D. from the University of Toronto, Department of Sociology (2006). Her dissertation, Mobilizing Kreuzberg: Political Representation, Immigrant Incorporation and Turkish Associations in Berlin, compares five immigrant associations and their claims for political representation in Germany. Her teaching and research interests include migration, citizenship, race and ethnicity, gender, and women. She is the co-editor of Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos (New York, 2006). She has published and has forthcoming articles in edited books and academic journals, such as Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, Soziale Welt and Violence against Women.
Y. Michal Bodemann is Professor of Sociology and is affiliated with the Joint Initiative of German and European Studies at the University of Toronto. His areas of interest and teaching include race and ethnic relations, classical sociological theory, qualitative methods, Jewish studies, and especially German-Jewish relations and memory. He has published numerous articles and books on Jews in Germany. His most recent books are A Jewish Family in Germany Today: An Intimate Portrait (Durham, 2004) and Migration, Citizenship, Ethnos (New York, 2006, with Gokce Yurdakul).…
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Publication information: Article title: "We Don't Want to Be the Jews of Tomorrow": Jews and Turks in Germany after 9/11. Contributors: Yurdakul, Gokce - Author, Bodemann, Y. Michal - Author. Journal title: German Politics and Society. Volume: 24. Issue: 2 Publication date: Summer 2006. Page number: 44+. © 2001 Berghahn Books, Inc. COPYRIGHT 2006 Gale Group.