Greenspan on Out-of-Control Money and the Future of U.S. Capitalism

By Burkett, Paul | Monthly Review, May 1994 | Go to article overview

Greenspan on Out-of-Control Money and the Future of U.S. Capitalism


Burkett, Paul, Monthly Review


Federal Reserve pronouncements usually yield little insight into the real functions and limitations of monetary policy or into ruling-class thinking on the prospects for U.S. capitalism. During financial crises, the Fed may affirm its "readiness as a source of liquidity to support the economic and financial system," as Chairman Alan Greenspan put it following the October 1987 crash. But even such emergency bulletins are more designed to allay public fears and boost market confidence than to inform citizens about the inner workings of the system and Fed policy. They are somewhat akin to the assurances of "no danger to the public" routinely churned out by the authorities after nuclear-reactor accidents. In more normal times, Fed statements utilize the jargons of market analysts and neoclassical economists which have grown increasingly similar in the recent years of exploding finance and stagnating productive activity. This reinforces the aura of elite expertise and control separating Fed personnel and operations from the general public.

In this setting, it is not surprising that Greenspan's announcement last fall of a new long-run guideline for Fed policy, while duly noted by the business press and hardcore Fed-watchers in academia and economic consulting firms, caused little if any public stir. ["Statement to the Congress (July 20, 1993)," Federal Reserve Bulletin, September 1993, pp.849-855.] In one sense, this was as it should have been. Greenspan's statement did not follow on the heels of a major short-term financial crisis, and its practical implications for the Fed's day-to-day operations were minimal. Yet on a different level it revealed a great deal about the long-run socioeconomic crisis we are facing and the type of mainstream response likely to become more common in the near future as ruling-class spokespeople redefine the reality of crisis in line with the changing requirements of capitalist ideology.

The first theme that jumps out of Greenspan's statement is his admission that: (1) the Fed cannot control the quantity of money in the economy; (2) there is no stable or predictable relation between the quantity of money and the economic variables which are supposed to be the ultimate targets of Fed policy. According to Greenspan, the "monetary aggregates" have been showing "persistent and sizable deviations . . . from expectations," and the "historical relationships between money and income and between money and the price level have largely broken down, depriving the aggregates of much of their usefulness as guides to policy." Greenspan's frank conclusion that money must be "downgraded as a reliable indicator of financial conditions" is notable because the Fed, supported by most mainstream economists, has long thought and taught that it influences economic conditions primarily by controlling the money supply.

If money is no longer a reliable indicator, what should replace it as a policy guide? This brings us to Greenspan's second main theme:

In these circumstances, it is especially prudent to focus on longer-term policy guides. One important guidepost is real interest rates. . . . In assessing real rates the central issue is their relationship to an equilibrium interest rate, specifically the real level that, if maintained, would keep the economy at its production potential over time. . . . Maintaining the real rate around its equilibrium level should have a stabilizing effect on the economy, directing production toward its long-term potential.

Even before delving further into the equilibrium interest rate, we can see that the significance of this new approach depends on how Greenspan relates the economy's long-term potential to current circumstances. Crudely stated, if the new interest rate guidepost is to keep production at its long-term potential, the Fed must pursue some combination of two options: (1) move current circumstances, i.e. the actual performance of the economy, closer to the system's potential (however defined); (2) redefine long-term potential to make it conform more closely to current circumstances.

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Greenspan on Out-of-Control Money and the Future of U.S. Capitalism
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.