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Transforming Army Intelligence

By: Kimmons, John F. | Military Review, November-December 2006 | Article details

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Transforming Army Intelligence


Kimmons, John F., Military Review


THE U.S. ARMED FORCES face a changed paradigm of warfare. Ongoing counterterrorism (CT) and counterinsurgency (COIN) operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere reflect the tough challenges inherent in countering savage, extremist enemies in highly complex environments. We are fighting smart, adaptive, ruthless opponents who leverage globalization, employ asymmetric tactics, and conduct deliberately brutal, indiscriminate attacks on an unprecedented scale.

As part of the Army's efforts to increase full-spectrum operational capacity at the brigade combat team (BCT) level, Army intelligence is transforming its organization, training, and techniques to provide fused, all-source, "actionable" intelligence along tactically useful timelines to Soldiers and commanders. Four components are key to this transformation:

* Increasing military intelligence (MI) capacity and skills balance.

* Enabling distributed access to an all-source, flat, integrated network.

* Revitalizing Army human intelligence (HUMINT).

* Increasing intelligence readiness.

Increasing MI Capacity and Skills Balance

The complex, dynamic nature of warfare today makes it essential that BCTs have the ability to collect intelligence on all aspects of their environment. Each BCT and subordinate battalion must be able to rapidly detect and positively identify, track, and target enemy activities with minimal assistance from higher-level intelligence centers. Even more important, to understand norms, changes, linkages, and significance in near-real time, each BCT and battalion intelligence section must be able to rapidly fuse and visualize all sources of information, regardless of classification, on common geospatial displays.

The 1990s-era MI structure and skills mix at brigade and battalion levels are inadequate for today's demands, a shortfall painfully highlighted by wartime experiences since the 9/11 attacks. Aggressive efforts are now underway to significantly increase the number of MI collectors, intelligence synchronizers, and analysts at brigade and battalion levels. Maneuver battalion S2 (intelligence) sections have increased from 4 to …

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