Deceiving the Participant: Are We Creating the Reputational Spillover Effect?
Blatchley, Barbara, O'Brien, Katharine R., North American Journal of Psychology
Deception has been a useful tool in the study of human behavior, and for that reason has been employed frequently in psychological research. However, a number of authors have suggested that the long term use of deception in psychological research might be creating a negative attitude toward the discipline in the participant pool. Attitude toward the use of deception as a method in psychological research was assessed in both experienced and naive participants. The results indicated that experienced participants were significantly less likely to be willing to volunteer for a subsequent study than were naive participants and that college students were more likely than any other age-group surveyed to be unwilling to participate again. These findings suggest that the long-term use of deception in the discipline might be creating the "reputational spillover effect" described by Ortmann and Hertwig (1997).
Deception has a long history of use in social science research. The first psychology study reporting the deliberate use of deception of study participants was published in 1925 (Cason, 1925; Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997). By the 1960's, 66% of the published studies in a leading social psychology journal involved the use of deception (Sieber, Iannuzzo, & Rodriquez, 1995). The use of deception in research peaked in the 1970's and remained a commonly used technique through the 1980's and 1990's, with roughly 50% of published studies in social and personality journals using deception in their designs (Nicks, Korn, & Mainieri, 1997).
The advent of the use of deception, and the popularity of its use in social psychology has been attributed to a shift away from field studies and towards the laboratory, and the introduction of scientific control in the experimental setting (Nicks, Korn & Maineier, 1997; Seeman, 1969).
Deceiving the research participant was justified as necessary in keeping the participant unaware of the true nature of the experiment to minimize bias. Often, as Diane Baumrind (1971) points out, the decision to use deception in research is discussed in terms of the long-term benefits to science and the greater good for society that knowledge obtained from the study would provide. The worthy goals are often seen to outweigh the potential for harm to an individual that deception might cause.
Concern over the ethics and consequences of the use of deception in research began with its introduction to the methodological toolbox. For example, Baumrind (1964) expressed great concern that deceptive practices like the ones used in the Milgram obedience studies (Milgram, 1963) violated the trust that should exist between experimenter and participant and risked damaging the public image of psychologists. Kelman (1967) suggested that the extensive use of deception risked creating the reputation of psychologists, as a group, as deceitful. Seeman (1969) suggested that the continued use of deception in research would mean that a growing segment of the pool of participants for future studies would now have a potentially biased expectation of experiments and experimenters. Experimental psychology might find itself at the point where "we no longer have naive subjects, but only naive experimenters" (p. 1026).
Holmes & Applebaum (1970) found that experience as a participant in previous research settings significantly influenced attitude toward future participation. Negative past experiences created negative attitudes toward participation but did not affect perceived effort in subsequent experiments. In addition, past experience, either positive or negative, did not influence willingness to participate in a future experiment.
Several authors have asserted that deception has allowed psychology to investigate aspects of human behavior that would not be accessible to the experimenter without deceit (Broder, 1998; Kimmel, 1998; Korn, 1998). Others point out that deception can be unethical, even immoral, if used to deprive the research participant of his/her right to refuse participation in the experiment, or if that deception violates the implied social contract between experimenter and participant (Baumrind, 1971; 1972; 1985). Ortmann and Hertwig (1997) called for an outright ban on the use of deception, in any form, in social science research. They argued that deception violated the trust between researcher and participant, and that "Psychological laboratories are likely to be affected by reputational spillover effects as a consequence" of its use (p. 747). Other studies have shown that the use of deception in research can and does produce this "spill-over" onto the discipline as a whole, resulting in decreased trust in psychologists (Stevens & Richardson, 1983).
There is evidence from other laboratories that suspicion about the researcher might be increasing. MacCoun and Kerr (1987) found that an unexpected and genuine emergency, which occurred in the middle of an experiment, generated immediate suspicion in the participants that the emergency was all just a part of the study. The only participant who was not immediately suspicious of the authenticity of the emergency had no prior experience in psychology either in course work or as a research participant. Sharpe, Adair, and Roese (1992) compared responses to a survey of attitudes towards psychological research from a group of students recruited in 1970 with a group recruited 19 to 20 years later in 1989 and 1990. They found that the 1990 participants were significantly less willing to volunteer for experiments and that they tended to see less value in the majority of the experiments done. Taylor and Shepperd (1996) serendipitously discovered that all of the 7 participants in their study were suspicious that deception was being used in their study. When, during debriefing, these same participants were asked if they had been suspicious of what was happening in the study, none of them were willing to admit that they harbored any suspicions, and none admitted that they had accidentally had their suspicions about the use of deceptions confirmed. Finally, Martin Orne (1962) reports that the attempt to conceal the true purpose of the experiment from the subject is "... a maneuver on the part of psychologists ... so widely known in the college population that even if the psychologist is honest with the subject, more often than not he will be distrusted. As one subject pithily put it 'Psychologists always lie'" (p. 779).
In the present study, we attempted to determine the reactions of both experienced and naive research participants to the use of deception in psychological research. We assessed the expectation of deceit in psychological research and the perceived frequency of the use of deception in psychological studies, as well as perceived willingness to participate in a future research project. We also examined the factors, including age, educational background, background in the social sciences, and role at the college, that might influence the perception and expectation of deceit.
Participants for this study were recruited from a small, all-female, liberal arts college in the Southeast. Students, faculty, and staff from the college were solicited through a campus-wide e-mail asking them to complete an online survey. In order to be solicited for the study, participants had to have a working college e-mail address and be able to read English. After the initial advertisement was sent to the campus community, researchers encouraged students, faculty, and staff to participate in the study by word of mouth and other outside advertising, such as follow-up e-mails and college-specific internet posting.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were asked to complete an online survey. At the beginning of the survey, a short explanation of the study and a modified consent form were included. Participants were informed that they could end the survey at any time by closing the survey window. We offered no material incentives to solicit participation and alerted respondents that the research could be viewed at an upcoming research symposium.
The survey began with questions about the role each participant played at the college (e.g., faculty, staff, or student), age, education level, undergraduate and graduate majors, class year, and country of origin. A logic function imbedded in the survey gave each group, as determined by college role, specific demographic questions.
The second section of the survey asked participants to indicate whether or not they had been in a previous psychological research study. Again, imbedded logic in the online survey separated the participants into those who had been in research before and those who had not, with questions tailored specifically to their classification. Individuals with prior experience as research participants saw eleven questions, including "Do you think that any of these experiments involved deception?" and "Did you expect to be deceived during the experiment?" Participants who indicated that they had not been in psychological research were directed to a set of questions similar to the one asked of experienced participants but modified for their status. Questions in this section included "What would deception in a psychological experiment involve?" and "If you were a participant in a psychological experiment and you found out deception was used, would that experiment change your willingness to participate in another experiment?" After completing the appropriate section of the survey, respondents were asked to indicate if they thought deception had been used in our survey and were given a chance to comment. The respondents were thanked for their participation and again asked to visit our research exhibit.
Of the more than 1100 people on campus, 343 individuals participated in the survey, giving an overall response rate of 31.2%. Based on the demographics of the school, it appears that although more students answered the survey than any other group (n = 254 or 74.05%), their participation rate was lower than for any other group on campus. Within the overall participant pool, the majority of participants were from the United States (92.3%). Demographic information for the participants that were connected to our hypotheses is summarized in Table 1.
The typical participant in this research was young (M = 26.62 years, SD = 12.324 years). Broken out by cohort decades, 25.7% were nineteen years of age or younger (the youngest was 17 years old), almost half were in their twenties (49.4%), 6.6% were in their 30's, 7.2% were in their 40's and 6.9% were in their 50's. Only 2.5% of the participants were in their 60's (the oldest participant was 67 years of age). The skewed distribution of the age variable is due to the large number of students who took our survey as compared to the typically older faculty and staff.
Seventy-four percent of the participants in the sample were currently enrolled in college, 18.4% were staff and 7.6% were faculty. Of those participants who were not current students, most had at least some graduate education (51%), and most of those who had been to graduate school had their Ph.D. (50%). Only 8% (8 out of 98) of the sample of adults no longer enrolled in college had less than a college degree.
Thirty-two percent of the participants majored in the social sciences (and so were very likely to have either been involved as a participant in human research or to have read about the methodologies used in human research) as undergraduates. Twenty-seven point seven percent majored in the humanities, 14% in the natural sciences and 6.4% in the fine arts. Eight and one-half percent had a college degree in something other than the liberal arts and 11.1% did not list an undergraduate major. Staff members indicated their undergraduate major field to be almost evenly split between Natural Science, Social Science, and Humanities (27.27%, 27.27%, and 31.82% respectively). Most faculty members stated their undergraduate major was in either the Humanities or Social Sciences (both were 29.83%).
Almost two-thirds of the students indicated that they had participated in previous research (60.66%). In addition, most staff members had been in a research study before (68.2%). However, most faculty participants had not participated in research before (58.07%). More than half of the participants in our study had experience as a human research subject in a psychological experiment prior to filling out our survey (55.1%). The remaining 40.5% were naive participants. Experienced participants were almost evenly split on the question of whether they had been deceived in their prior experience as a research participant. Thirty-three point nine percent said that they had been deceived while 31.2 % said that they had not been deceived. The remaining experienced participants declined to answer this question.
When asked when deception in a psychological experiment became inappropriate, the two groups (naive and experienced participants) differed in their responses. When those individuals who had served as participants prior to the present study were asked, the majority reported that keeping the participant unaware of his/her status as a subject in a study was inappropriately deceptive (68.8%). Being given false information about oneself was deemed inappropriate by 54.5% of the experienced participants, whereas being given false information about others was seen as an inappropriate use of deception by 33.3% of these participants. Being misled by a confederate was least likely to be seen as inappropriately deceptive in a study (14.8%).
Naive participants tended to define deception as an outright lie told by the researcher (64%), or the researcher concealing pertinent information from the participant (64.7%). The absence of self-determination was labeled as deception by only 10.8% of the naive participants in our study.
In general, the participants in our survey did not expect to be deceived in psychological experiments with more than half (65.2%) of the participants reporting that they did not expect deception. Expectation of deception was independent of experience as a research participant, age, role at the college, and undergraduate major. Those participants who had never been a part of a research study were just as likely as those who had been in a study to report that they did not expect deception, regardless of age, their status as student, staff, or faculty, or their major as an undergraduate. Expectation of deceit was also not correlated with previous experience with deception in an experiment.
Most participants (56.3%) reported that psychology experiments sometimes used deception. Very few reported that experimenters usually or always used deception (23.32%) and even fewer reported that they believed psychologists almost never used deception (5.2%). No one reported that psychology experiments never use deception. Role at the college (faculty, student or staff) and undergraduate major were independent of opinion about how often deception was used in psychological research. Perceived frequency of use of deception was significantly dependent on experience as a research participant and age.
Both the college-aged and middle-aged adult participants deviated the most from expected frequencies, [chi square] (15, N =286) =30.487, p = .01. Thirty-one point seven percent of the participants 17-29 years of age (cohorts 1 and 2) reported that they believed psychology experiments usually or always used deception while percentages for the other 3 cohorts were less than 2% for this answer. Almost all of the participants between the ages of 30 and 49 reported that deception was only sometimes used in research (78.95%). Participants in these two age cohorts almost never reported anything other than "sometimes" in response to this question.
Those subjects who had experience as a participant prior to filling out our survey were more likely to report that they believed psychology experiments sometimes (34.1%) or usually (18%) used deception, [chi square] (4, N =328) =35.90, p < .001. Those who had never been in an experiment reported that deception was almost never used in psychological experiments (24.4% sometimes, 3.7% almost never)
Most of the subjects in our study reported that they would not participate in a study again if they had experienced deceit. More than half (55.1%) said no, only 19.5% said they would participate again. Willingness to participate in another psychology experiment after having experienced deceit (either real or imagined) was dependent on opinion about how often deceit was used in psychological experimentation, [chi square] (4, N = 256) = 23.458, p < .001. The more frequently deceit was seen to be a part of psychological research methodology the less likely participants were to participate again. Six point six percent of the sample thought that deception was almost never used. Of these, most (64.7%) reported that they would participate again if deceived and 3.5% said they would not. Twenty-seven point seven percent of the sample reported they thought that deception was always used in psychological research, and 88% of them reported they would not participate again if deceived. Only 11.3% of the participants who perceived deception as a typical component of research said they would participate again.
Willingness to participate again if deceived was dependent on age, [chi square] (3, N =250) = 12.622, p = .006. Again, the youngest age cohort and the middle-aged adult cohort deviated from expected values the most. Seventy-one point two percent of the sample was in the youngest age cohort (ages 17 to 19). Of these, 78.1% said they would not participate again if deceived, and 21.9% said they would. In the middle-aged cohort, willingness to participate again if deceived was almost evenly split between those who would not participate again (52.8%) and those who would (47.2%).
Willingness to participate if deceived was dependent on previous experience as a subject, [chi square] (1, N = 255) = 76.249, p < .001. Those participants who were naive were split almost evenly between yes and no responses to the question of participating again. Fifty-four point one percent said they would participate again given some imaginary deception, and 45.9% said they would not. However, those participants who had been in an experiment before were unambiguous in their response to this question. Almost all of these participants (94.5%) said they would not participate in another experiment if they had been deceived previously. Only 5.5% said they would participate again.
Willingness to participate again after deceit was dependent on undergraduate major, [chi square] (5, N = 255) = 15.257, p = .009, in that those subjects who either did not attend college or who earned a non-liberal arts degree were evenly split on their decision to participate again. Of the 38 participants without a traditional liberal arts degree, 47% said they would participate again if deceived, while 53% said they would not. Of the 217 participants either earning or possessing a liberal arts degree, only 22.6% said they would participate again if deceived, and 77.4%, the overwhelming majority, said they would not.
Willingness to participate again after deceit was dependent on role at the college, [chi square] (2, N = 256) = 9.766, p = .008. Students and faculty were most likely to report that they would not participate again if deceived (77.3% said no, 22.7% said yes). Staff, on the other hand, were almost evenly split in their willingness to participate again (42.2% said yes, 57.8% said no).
Participants in the present study typically reported feeling neutral about deception as a practice in psychological research. Of those who answered this question, 12% were very negative about deception, 22.9% were negative, 52.1% were neutral, 9.4% were positive and 3.6% were very positive. Perception of deception was dependent on previous experience as a research participant, [chi square] (4, N = 192) = 55.277, p < .001, and undergraduate major, [chi square] (20, N = 192) = 35.65, p = .017.
Naive participants were more likely (54%) than experienced participants (8.6%) to report feeling very negative or negative about deception. Experienced participants were significantly more likely to report that deception was either positive or very positive (27%) than were naive participants (2.7%). The majority of experienced participants saw deception as neutral (64.2%) compared to the naive participants (43.2%).
Participants with a background in the sciences (either social or natural) were more likely to see deception as positive or very positive (20.54% and 18.52% respectively) than were participants with backgrounds in the humanities (7.2%) or fine arts (9.09%). Participants who either did not list an undergraduate major or who listed a major outside of the traditional liberal arts never reported seeing deception as other than very negative, negative or neutral.
The final question asked was "Do you think that deception was used in this survey?" The majority of participants in our sample said they did not think we were being deceptive on the survey (70.6%). Twelve point two percent said they did suspect deception and 17.2% did not answer the question. Response to this question was independent of age, role at the college, undergraduate major and prior experience as a research participant.
There was support for the concern that the frequent use of deception in psychological research might be creating a negative attitude toward the discipline as a whole--the reputational spillover effect described by Ortmann and Hertwig (1997). In our sample, both the experienced participants who said they thought they had been deceived previously and those who did not think that their previous experience had involved deception were unwilling to participate again in the future. In addition, participants with experience were overall significantly less likely than naive participants to volunteer again. Furthermore, the more frequently deceit was seen to be a part of psychological experimentation, the less likely participants were to indicate a willingness to participate again. Finally, the age group most likely to be asked to volunteer for a research study (those of traditional college age) were also the most likely to state that they would not participate again in a future study. These results would suggest that the subject pool typically used in psychological research, the introductory psychology class, might have become more suspicious about the truthfulness of the researcher.
There was an apparent incongruity between reported willingness to participate again and the perception of deception as neutral. One might think the fact that participants who had been deceived in the past, and who reported that the experience had negatively affected their willingness to participate again in the future, might see deception as an inherently negative event. Yet, almost all of the participants, both experienced and naive, reportedly saw deception as neutral.
A neutral reaction to deception is not unusual. Gerdes (1979) found that participants in psychological research had a neutral to positive reaction to deception, even reporting that they would willingly ask a friend to participate in the same deceptive experiment (presumably indicating at least a neutral reaction to the deception). Holmes (1967) found that the more experience a participant had with psychological research, the more likely s/he was to see the experience as scientifically valuable, to cooperate with experimenters more, and to be less likely to try to determine what the experiment was about.
Stevens and Richardson (1983) examined participants' perceptions of their experiences in psychology experiments, focusing on perceptions of harm or benefits that result from participation in the research. Almost half of their sample reported having been deceived in the experiment. However, the majority of participants, deceived and not-deceived, reported that they were unharmed by the experiment, suggesting that deception by itself was not seen as necessarily harmful. In addition, those who had been deceived were also found to have participated more in the experiment, to have seen the experiment as having a greater educational benefit, and to have rated the overall research program as more satisfactory than did participants who had not experienced deception. Farr and Seaver (1975) found that undergraduates tended to rate all but the most egregiously invasive and potentially physically damaging experimental procedures as neutral. They suggest that their participants might have seen the procedures presented to them for evaluation as legitimate as long as they were viewed in the context of a scientific research study. Brody, Gluck, and Aragon (2000) found that 63% of participants in psychological experiments described research in the field in general as well-done and with significant benefits to society. The majority (84%) of respondents held favorable views of psychology as a discipline, citing relevance to their personal lives and helping them to understand themselves and others better as the main reasons for their opinion. This generally positive view of the overall value of psychological research was seen despite the fact that 16% of participants reported the use of deception in research was harmful to the reputation of the discipline.
Orne (1962) suggested that one reason for the apparently neutral perception of deception might be the good subject effect. He proposed that by virtue of the fact that the participant has agreed to be a part of the experiment, s/he has implicitly agreed to play a role that includes tolerating most of what the experimenter proposes to do to him/her, just as the experimenter has agreed implicitly that whatever s/he imposes on the participant is done for good reason. The end result of this social contract is that the participant has a vested interest in the outcome of the study and in making a useful contribution to science. The degree to which the participant feels invested in the experiment might mitigate any feelings of embarrassment or anger at having been fooled by the experimenter, creating if not universal approval of deception as a methodology, at least neutrality. Glinksi, Glinski, and Slatin (1970) found that "nonnaivety" (knowledge or suspicion about the use of deception or the true nature of the hypothesis) in a conformity experiment altered the participants' behavior, making them significantly less conforming than naive participants. The authors discuss this result in light of Orne's (1962) good-subject hypothesis. Glinski, et al., point out that the degree to which a participant feels they need to validate the hypothesis of the study might also depend on the perception of the behavior they are being asked to take part in as either good or bad. Conforming to an obviously implausible judgment, as in the Glinski study, might elicit very different feelings than in the studies on hypnosis used by Orne.
Menges (1973) examined the types of deception used in the leading social and personality research journals and found that 80% of the 993 studies from 6 journals in 1971 used deception, most often presenting the participants in their studies with incomplete information about the experiment. Menges also points out that 40% of the studies relied on participants recruited under course requirements and that this might engender a "let's get it over with" mentality in the participants (p. 1033). Sieber and Saks (1989) and Brody, Gluck, and Aragon (2000) also report that recruiting from classes, meaning that participation is not completely voluntary, is still a common practice. If students are primarily trying to just get through any experiment where they are required to participate as part of a course, their behavior in the study might not be "naive." In addition, if the students are participating in an experiment perceived as dull, boring, or inherently uninteresting, their cooperation and enthusiasm for the project might well be compromised, along with their willingness to subject themselves to another potentially negative experience in another study.
Almost three quarters of our participants were students, and fully one-third of them were social science majors likely to have been asked to serve as a research participant at some point in their undergraduate careers. Their familiarity with social science research and its methodology, and with the role that deception has played in the study of human behavior, cannot be underestimated. It is quite likely that both students and faculty in our sample tend to see deception as a useful tool in research and that this perception is reflected in their neutral attitude towards deception. Indeed, Korn (1986) found that undergraduates were significantly more likely to rate deception as acceptable in an experiment than were either graduate students or faculty in psychology. In addition, if the participants in our survey had found their involvement in a past study to be dull, boring or tedious, their willingness to participate again and their perception of the value of the research might both suffer.
The question of how the participants uniquely defined deception is an interesting and important one. It is possible that our opinion of what constituted deceptive behavior on the part of the experimenter might not have been shared by our participants. Epstein, Suedfeld, and Silverstein (1973) examined the reactions of participants to the behavior of the experimenters and found that the overwhelming majority of the participants in their study, both experienced and naive, said that they expected not to be told the true purpose of the experiment (70 to 80%)--a form of deception--yet the same participants reported that they generally did not expect to be deceived. Most of the participants in our study reported that they did not expect to be deceived, yet it is quite possible that deceptive practices other than the experimenter telling an outright lie might not have been included in the definition used by our participants and so did not get considered in their reported expectations of deception. The way in which an individual participant defines deception in the context of an experiment might well influence the perceived value of that deception. Our participants were familiar with social science research, and so familiar with the methodological value of deception in that setting. It is quite possible that this knowledge has influenced exactly what is defined as deceptive and well as affecting the perceived value of that practice.
Post-study analysis of our survey showed that the questions we asked of the two main groups in our study (experienced vs. naive) were posed to these groups slightly differently. Experienced participants were asked about when deception becomes inappropriate, while naive participants were asked both what deception in a psychological experiment might involve and when deception becomes inappropriate. Our study would have been stronger had we asked both groups of participants the same set of questions. While this did not affect the hypotheses we tested here, it is possible that greater alignment between the two sets of questions would have allowed for greater breadth and depth in the hypotheses that we might have tested.
The high percentage of students responding created a skewed age distribution. If age is an important factor it was at least partially obscured by the conflation with role at the college. A wider range of potential participants would decrease the skew in the participant pool and make for a stronger study.
The participants in our study were for the most part highly educated, and thus steeped in the traditions and expectations of academe. A larger sample with a larger proportion of participants from a more diverse population in terms of education, SES and occupation would provide a more representative picture of how our potential participants feel about deception. However, we need to remember who researchers typically ask to participate in psychological studies. After all, "approximately 80% of our research is performed on 3% of the population currently enrolled in college" (Schultz, 1969, p. 218). Our typical participant pool is not representative of the larger population in age, intelligence, verbal skill, etc. Although this particular study did not include a diverse pool of participants, they were representative of the typical participants used in psychological research.
APPENDIX Every participant was asked: "Have you ever been a subject in a psychology experiment?" From this answer, the individual was asked only questions from the column corresponding to their answer. Question Yes No 1 How many psychology What has prevented you from experiments have you participating in participated in? psychological experiments in the past? 2 Do you think that any of these What would deception in a experiments used deception? psychological experiment involve? (Check all that apply) * Researcher conceals * pertinent information * Researcher lies * No self-determination * No debriefing * No informing * Invasion of privacy 3 Were you debriefed? (Debriefing is a process that occurs after the study has concluded in which the researcher gives information about the study's purpose, any use of deception, etc.) 4 If you answered "Yes" to the previous question, was the deception explained in the debriefing? 5 If you answered yes to the How do you feel about the previous question, how did you use of deception in feel about the deception? experiments? 6 Did you expect to be deceived Do you expect to be during the experiment? deceived during an experiment? 7 How often do you think Do you think psychology psychology experiments experiments involve involve deception? deception? 8 How often do you think Do you think deception is deception is necessary in necessary in psychology psychology experiments? experiments? 9 When does deception in an When does deception in an experiment become experiment become inappropriate? (Check all that inappropriate? (Check all apply): that apply): Participants are: Participants are: * Given false * Given false information information about the main about the main purpose of purpose of the study. the study. * Given false * Given false information information concerning the concerning the tests used tests used in the study. in the study. * Misled by * Misled by researchers researchers pretending to be pretending to be participants. participants. * Given false feedback * Given false feedback about themselves. about themselves. * Given false feedback * Given false feedback about another person. about another person. * Kept unaware of * Kept unaware of being being subjects in research. subjects in research. * Kept unaware of * Kept unaware of when when the study is in progress. the study is in progress. * Told that two related * Told that two related studies are unrelated. studies are unrelated. 10 If you were a subject in a If you were a subject in a psychological experiment psychological experiment involving deception, did that and you found out that experience change your deception was used, would willingness to participate in that experience change your another experiment? willingness to participate in another experiment? 11 How did deception affect your How would you feel if you willingness to participate in found out deception was other studies? used in a study? 12 Do you think that deception Do you think that deception was used in this survey? was used in this survey? Note: Unless indicated, Likert-type scales were used with ranges labeled as the following: "Very Negative" to "Very Positive" and "Never" to "Always" as appropriate.
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Barbara Blatchley and Katharine R. O'Brien
Agnes Scott College
Author info: Correspondence should be sent to: Dr. Barbara Blatchley, Psychology Dept., Agnes Scott College, 141 E. College Ave., Decatur, GA 30030
TABLE 1 Demographic Information By College Role Cohort Faculty Staff Student 0 0 88 17-19 0.00% 0.00% 36.36% 0 10 148 20-29 0.00% 17.86% 61.16% 9 9 3 30-39 40.90% 16.07% 1.24% 8 14 1 40-49 36.36% 25.00% 0.41% 4 16 2 50-59 18.18% 28.57% 0.83% 1 7 0 60+ 4.55% 12.50% 0.00% Total 22 56 242 Past Participation Faculty Staff Student 15.00 26 148 Yes 68.18% 41.94% 60.66% 7.00 36.00 96 No 31.82% 58.07% 39.34% Total 22 62 244 Area of Study Faculty Staff Student 6 3 40 Natural Science 27.27% 5.26% 17.78% 6 17 86 Social Science 27.27% 29.83% 38.22% 7 17 71 Humanities 31.82% 0.30 31.56% 3 5 14 Art 13.64% 8.77% 6.22% 0 15 14 Other 0.00% 26.32% 6.22% Total 22 57 225 Note: All percentages are based on the allocation by group (i.e. among all students, all faculty, and all staff). "Other" refers to majors not better placed in predefined groupings…
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Publication information: Article title: Deceiving the Participant: Are We Creating the Reputational Spillover Effect?. Contributors: Blatchley, Barbara - Author, O'Brien, Katharine R. - Author. Journal title: North American Journal of Psychology. Volume: 9. Issue: 3 Publication date: December 2007. Page number: 519. © 2009 North American Journal of Psychology. COPYRIGHT 2007 Gale Group.
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