Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971-1991) and Their Impact on Federalism
Kostov, Chris, American Review of Canadian Studies
In the period 1971-1991, Quebec was the province that constantly pressed and negotiated with the federal government for more provincial rights in the field of immigration. The province signed four immigration agreements with the federal government in the immigration sphere: the Lang-Cloutier Agreement of 1971, the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement of 1975, the Cullen-Couture Agreement of 1978, and the McDougall-Gagnon-Tremblay Agreement, known as the Canada-Quebec Accord of 1991, which is still in effect today. Each new agreement gave the province additional powers and autonomy in this field. The role that the provincial government of Quebec acquired in the selection, recruitment, reception, and settlement processes of new immigrants over those two decades is enormous--well beyond that which any other Canadian province has aspired or managed to accomplish. The main argument used by Quebec to justify its demands has always been that the province is a distinct society and, therefore, needs a special status and autonomy to determine who settles in the province. It has to be noted as well that three of the four immigration agreements cited above were initiated by the provincial Liberal Party and only one by the Parti Quebecois. Thus, the immigration policy of the province of Quebec during the period in question was consistent and essentially followed the same direction, regardless of the political party in power in the province.
This essay will argue that the Canada-Quebec immigration agreements had a crucial effect on the Canadian federal system, because they maintained asymmetrical federal-provincial relations in the immigration policy of Canada. Each new agreement enlarged this asymmetry while additionally undermining the role of the Canadian government in the immigration process. This essay will also examine how Quebec used the immigration autonomy that it obtained as a foundation and incentive for its independence movement. Finally, this essay will analyze the impact that this policy might have had (or might continue to have) on the other Canadian provinces and on the immigrants destined for Quebec, and discuss whether these agreements infringed on the mobility rights of the new permanent residents, as defined by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 6.
Asymmetrical Federalism and the Distribution of Powers in the Immigration Policy
A number of Canadian political scientists consider "asymmetry" the term of choice to replace "special status" rhetoric, which is more or less discredited in the ears of many Canadians, particularly those from western Canada. Asymmetrical federalism is "a form of federalism in which one or more constituent units have differing powers and responsibilities." (1) The ideally symmetrical federal system would be a system in which all units are "equal" to each other in regard to factors such as territory, jurisdiction, culture, and history, whereas the ideally asymmetrical system would be a model in which every unit has a unique feature. (2) This is a theoretical definition, of course; in practice, one or a few units need asymmetry in any given federal system. In the Canadian federal system, however, there is only one province--Quebec--which strongly demands asymmetry, and it does so in various areas, including asymmetry in the authority over immigration. There are two extremely different views regarding Quebec's demands. Supporters of such asymmetry argue that it is the best way to retain Quebec in the federation and to satisfy Quebec's needs as a province with a different culture than the rest of Canada. The opponents, however, argue that an asymmetrical system is just a strategy of the provincial government of Quebec in a move toward complete independence. (3)
The alignment of roles between the federal and the provincial governments in the field of immigration is predetermined by the Constitution:
* Section 95 of the British North America (BNA) Act of 1867 defines both the federal and provincial authority over immigration policy. It states clearly that even though the provincial governments can make laws related to immigration, the federal government and the Canadian Parliament have the ultimate authority to impose immigration laws and regulations. Furthermore, federal legislation takes priority over provincial legislation, regardless of which one is enacted first. (4)
* Section 91 (25) of the BNA Act gives the federal government exclusive powers over the naturalization of foreign nationals. According to this clause, the federal government has the sole authority to grant and determine the conditions for citizenship and to impose admission criteria for new immigrants to Canada. (5)
* Section 132 grants the federal government exclusive authority over external relations. (6) Although the word "immigration" is not used, this section is clearly relevant to this study, because the selection system of immigrants takes place in immigration offices located around the world, which have to select candidates who are quite naturally citizens of other countries.
* Section 6 (2) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (added to the Constitution in 1982) grants not only to all Canadian citizens, but also to all permanent residents (who were formerly referred to as landed immigrants), the right to move and to settle in any province they wish. (7) This is an important provision, because it guarantees that once foreign nationals are approved as immigrants, neither the federal nor the provincial government can limit their right of mobility within Canada, and it virtually excludes the possibility of any denial of entry by any province to permanent residents once admitted to Canada.
All the constitutional regulations mentioned above allow some level of asymmetry within the area of immigration, but they were meant to prevent the usurping of power by any province in the field of immigration. Such usurpation could paralyze the federal government and its plans to regulate the various aspects of immigration. We turn now to an examination of the four immigration agreements between Canada and the province of Quebec to see how each one complies with the constitutional prescriptions and to evaluate the dangers each may pose to the Canadian federal system.
Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements and the Shifting Roles in the Immigration Process
After the Confederation and until the 1960s, the province of Quebec was not interested in attracting new immigrants. As the political scientist Joseph Carens notes, the immigrants were viewed as a threat to the local culture and traditions. In the 1960s, however, the provincial government began to perceive the immigration flow as a way to counteract the declining birthrate and to strengthen the economic vitality of the province. (8) This new interest was indicated on an institutional level with the establishment of the provincial department of immigration in 1968. (9)
In May 1971, the ministers of immigration of Canada and the province of Quebec, respectively Otto Lang and Marcel Cloutier, signed the first federal-provincial immigration agreement, which allowed Quebec immigration counselors to be placed in certain federal offices abroad. (10) The Lang-Cloutier Agreement determined that Quebec could post an "orientation officer and a secretary-clerk-interpreter [...] within federal immigration offices in Athens, Beirut, Brussels, Lisbon, and Rome, as well as any other federal immigration office where a similar Quebec presence might be requested and deemed possible." (11) However, the federal government, concerned not to disrupt Canada's relations with other countries, included a provision that allowed Canada not to accommodate Quebec representatives if the host country government opposed such a measure. (12)
Furthermore, the role of the Quebec counselors was very restricted: referred to as "orientation officers," they could only inform potential immigrants about various aspects of life in Quebec. (13) While these orientation officers could meet people who sought information about the living and working conditions in Quebec, their main activities of orientation had to be with immigrants--i.e., those who had already received their immigrant visas, having been formally approved by the federal immigration officers. (14) The orientation officers did not have the authority to participate in any recruitment activities. They could offer the federal immigration officers an evaluation of prospective applicants, but the federal officials were not obliged to comply with this opinion. The final decision for each applicant's admissibility was to be taken by federal officers "in light of the Canadian immigration laws, regulations and criteria." (15) Probably because the federal government was aware that other provinces could challenge this agreement and criticize the central government for giving more authority to one province than the others, the following provision was included:
[A] Quebec presence in a federal office does not have as its objective or effect to place the Quebec government in a privileged position in the field of immigration recruitment and selection, as compared to other provinces, but to enable a Quebec orientation officer to receive and advise, counsel and assist an immigrant who has chosen Quebec as his place of settlement [...]. (16)
The above section indicates that the federal government preserved all its powers in the various stages of the immigration process, giving the provincial government of Quebec only the role of immigration consultants in countries where there were prospective Francophone immigrants or countries with languages similar to French, such as Portugal and Italy. This agreement, however, was used by the provincial government of Quebec as a foundation, a first step toward future agreements that would give them greater powers and autonomy in the immigration sphere.
Only four years after the concluded agreement, the government of Quebec initiated a new round of negotiations with the federal government and in 1975 managed to sign a much more favorable agreement for the interests of Quebec. The new agreement of 1975 was called the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement, again after the names of the federal and provincial ministers of immigration. Under section 2(b) of the new agreement, Quebec could have immigration rather than information officers in any city of a particular country in which Canada had federal immigration offices. The provincial officials could be placed in either federal offices or Quebec residences. (17) This provision set a precedent, because even though the federal government could oversee the activities of the provincial officials, placing them either at the same office or at least in the same city with the federal office, the government of Quebec could have its own officials abroad, presenting primarily the province of Quebec and not Canada. Para-diplomacy, however, is practiced by many other Canadian provinces, as well as by sub-national units in other federal countries--e.g., the Flemish and Walloon communities of Belgium.
Section 6 authorized the Quebec representatives to review and comment on all immigration applications "from candidates destined to Quebec or who, in the opinion of the Canadian official, are apt to settle there." (18) The agreement confirmed, however, that the final decision on each applicant would be made by a federal immigration counselor. (19)
According to Robert Vineberg, former director of federal-provincial relations for Immigration Canada, this agreement allowed Quebec to perform a limited consultative role in the selection process but left the federal government in complete control of the point system used to evaluate potential immigrants and of making the final determination for all applicants. (20) However, the new agreement, having granted Quebec much more weight in the immigration process than it had with the previous agreement, increased the appetite of the province for even more power. Merely a year after the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement went into effect, the new provincial minister of immigration, Jacques Couture, announced to the media his government's goal of negotiating a new immigration agreement with the federal government--one that would further increase the role of his province in the immigration process. Couture revealed also that his government planned to post provincial immigration officers in provincial rather than federal offices abroad, in order to ensure that newcomers would know that Quebec was a predominantly French society. (21)
In 1977, Couture became even bolder in his expression of Quebec ambitions. He announced to the press that his province wanted complete control over both the selection and the settlement of all immigrants destined for Quebec, because, he claimed, the federal selection process was not able to "take into account the economic, cultural and demographic disparities of the provinces." (22) In the course of negotiations with the federal government, the demands of the provincial representatives significantly increased. Quebec intended to stop teaching English as a second language in its provincial language centers, called Centres d'Orientation et de Formation des Immigrants, or COFI. The Quebec government also insisted that provincial rather than federal officials should select immigrants for the language courses. (23) Thus, Quebec could prevent many new immigrants from learning English and therefore constrain their labor mobility within Quebec. The new policy could also push Anglophone immigrants to study French.
The model that Quebec aspired to build was reminiscent of the Belgian model on the surface: according to the Belgian constitution, the three linguistic communities in Belgium have exclusive domination over linguistic issues in their respective areas. A closer comparison between Flanders and Quebec, however, indicates that the Belgian Francophone inhabitants of Flanders have significantly more rights than do their English-speaking counterparts in Quebec. For example, the Flanders legislature--a Flemish-speaking body--allows the use of French and other languages in business and advertising. In fact, Flanders does not pose any restrictions on the language of advertisements. (24) In contrast, chapter 7 of the Quebec Charte de la langue franfaise [Charter of the French Language] states quite explicitly that the only language allowed in Quebec for business and advertisements, including brochures, booklets, and flyers, is French. (25)
The federal minister of immigration, Bud Cullen, was ready to give Quebec the responsibility of selecting immigrants for its language courses, but he insisted that the provincial COFI schools should provide courses in English as well as French. Eventually, the Quebec government agreed to offer English courses, but only to immigrants who, in the opinion of federal employment counselors, needed to be proficient in English to obtain employment. In return, the government of Canada conceded the selection of students for the French classes to the provincial government of Quebec. (26) These proposals made the chances for new immigrants to go to English classes very slim. This was the original intention of the province of Quebec, of course, but it is regrettable that the government of Canada allowed it. After all, both English and French are official languages of Canada, and the federal government constantly proclaims its goal of preserving and promoting both languages nationwide.
In May 1977, the Quebec government proposed to the federal government that the two entities jointly apply the point system used to evaluate prospective immigrants headed for Quebec. The province proposed that of the total 100 points under the Canadian selection system, Quebec would be responsible for defining and applying 55 points and the federal government would be responsible for the remaining 45. (27) Initially, Bud Cullen rejected this proposal on behalf of the federal government. (28) A few days later, however, he argued that "the point system wasn't engraved in stone and some flexibility towards Quebec was possible." (29) Soon the federal government again gave in: the result was separate Canadian and provincial Quebec selection point systems. All the results from the bilateral negotiations were incorporated into the new Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreement, called the Cullen-Couture Agreement, which was signed in 1978 and took effect on March 30, 1979. (30) The new agreement surrendered to Quebec a key role in the selection of independent immigrants and refugees from abroad, granting the province both a positive and a negative veto:
* Positive veto. Applicants who met Quebec's standards under its selection criteria would be admitted even if they did not meet the standards under the Canadian federal selection system. (31) This concession to Quebec contradicted the constitutional prescription in section 95 that the federal government should have the ultimate authority in the area of immigration.
* Negative veto. Immigrants who did not meet Quebec's selection criteria would be denied entry to Quebec, even if they were approved under the federal selection system. This concession infringed on the mobility rights of recent permanent residents. Under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 6(2a): "Every citizen of Canada and every person who has the status of a permanent resident of Canada has the right to ... move to and take up residence in any province." (32) Thus, this provision of the Cullen-Couture Agreement restricted one of the fundamental rights of the new immigrants--that of settling in any province they wish. The right to move freely is a freedom so fundamental that it is also present in the United Nations Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (33)
This veto power had significant consequences: Quebec could refuse to admit temporary workers and students to whom the federal government wanted to issue visas, but the federal government could not prevent the admission to Quebec of sponsored relatives who met Quebec's standards, because such applicants were not subject to the federal criteria. (34) And yet if someone who entered Canada under the Quebec provincial immigration program decided to move to another province--one to which he would have been denied entry had he tried to move there directly--he could not be prosecuted, because that action would be a violation of section 6 of the Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms. Thus, when Quebec immigration officers demanded that candidate immigrants sign a declaration that they would settle in Quebec--a declaration that Quebec as well as the federal government hoped they would honor--the provincial officials could rely only on the goodwill of new permanent residents for compliance.
According to political scientist Joseph Garcea:
The federal government felt that if Quebec was the only province with a role in the selection of the independent class of immigrants destined to that province, any resulting administrative problems would be manageable. However, if other provinces were to perform the same roles as Quebec in the selection of immigrants, the entire process would be extremely complicated and potentially chaotic. (35)
Indeed, if the other provinces demanded the same powers in immigration, the Canadian immigration system would fall into complete chaos. On the other hand, even if the other provinces do not demand such powers, the federal government should not give any concessions in this area that are in conflict with the Canadian Constitution and particularly with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. And yet the government of Quebec, by applying persistent pressure, has been able to get the federal government to do just that. Rene Levesque, premier of Quebec in the Cullen-Couture era, summarized the province's intentions: "There is no self-respecting society that knows its best interests and has a self-identity that allows its immigration to be in the hands of others." (36) Jacques Couture, then minister of immigration, went even further, arguing that his government should obtain the power of admission and the right to issue visas. (37) As the Progressive Conservative Party immigration critic Jake Epp argued, the acceptance of Quebec's proposals would be "tantamount to recognizing sovereignty." (38)
Regardless of this critique, Quebec managed to gain substantial control over the selection process of new immigrants, and the federal government succeeded only in keeping under federal control the reception and settlement services for new immigrants. The Trudeau government felt that Quebec's gains could result in "a loss of its profile and legitimacy among new immigrants, ethnic associations and agencies that were involved in providing immigrant settlement services." (39) Quebec, however, continued to perceive its next goal, and during the Meech Lake Accord negotiations, it proposed again that settlement and reception services be transferred, coming to rest solely under Quebec authority. (40) Trudeau ardently opposed this proposal, regarding it as offensive to Canada. In a speech to the Senate on March 30, 1988, he argued: "If immigrants are going to be taught the theory of provincial sovereignty, it will not make for a strong Canada. An immigrant to a province is an immigrant to Canada, and Canada has a moral right not to give up its jurisdiction in that area." (41) And yet, despite the failure of the Meech Lake Accord, Canada signed with the province of Quebec a new immigration agreement in 1991: the Canada-Quebec Accord, which was based on the Meech Lake demands. The new agreement authorized Quebec to perform a key role in determining the proportion of immigrants that it would receive annually. Each year by April 30, Canada had to give Quebec its plan for immigration levels for the following year, and the provincial government had to then return its plan by June 30 to the federal government. (42) The 1991 Accord also gave Quebec the right to select from applicants applying from within Canada on compassionate or humanitarian reasons, a group that included both those who had been refused refugee status by the federal government and those who had not yet received a final determination. (43) That meant that again Quebec, circumventing the Canadian Constitution, could have a final say over the admission of foreign nationals who had been rejected by the federal government. In effect, the only way for the federal government to prevent someone approved by the province of Quebec from entering Canada was to find serious security or medical reasons to veto Quebec's decision. In practice, then, the province of Quebec acquired virtually all the power in selecting independent immigrants. Furthermore, the Accord of 1991, unlike the previous immigration agreement of 1978, authorized Quebec to supplant the federal government in planning and managing all reception and settlement services within the province. (44)
The federal government made this concession despite opposition by Trudeau and the media. As reporter Keith Henderson commented:
If you're an immigrant to the ROC and arrive at the airport, you head to the offices of Immigration Canada, which is adorned with a Canadian flag. If you land in Montreal, you go to the offices of Immigration Quebec. No Canadian flag, thank you. No mention of Canada. You'd think you were in a separate country, and you'd be meant to think that. (45)
What's more, the federal government also committed to compensate the province of Quebec with $332 million for these integration services in the period 1991-1995, under the conditions of the Accord. (46) Despite that compensation, there was no clause in the Accord that obligated Quebec to provide new immigrants (via appropriate integration services) with relevant information about Canada as a whole, as was done in the other provinces. Thus, Quebec used these resources to serve its own separatist interests and to persuade all new immigrants that they came not to Canada, but to Quebec. In fact, in the federal elections of 2006, the Bloc Quebecois included in its lists candidates of Haitian, African, Middle Eastern, and Chinese origin, which is a strong indication that the Quebec separatists want the immigrant votes. (47)
Despite efforts on the part of the provincial government of Quebec to attract new immigrants who would eventually join their distinct society and become proud Quebeckers, Quebec continued to have problems with out-migration. Don J. DeVoretz, a professor of economics at Simon Fraser University, notes that by 1995 half of the business immigrants who originally landed in Quebec had left the province, followed by over 17 percent of the refugees and 17 percent of the independent immigrants selected under the Quebec point system. (48) The government of Quebec also admitted this problem in a 2002 analysis, cited by DeVoretz, stating that "the overall number of immigrant residents in Quebec has declined by nearly 30% since 1991." (49) And yet, as noted earlier, any restrictions on the mobility of Canadian residents would be morally and constitutionally problematic in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the United Nations Charter of Rights and Freedoms. (50) Such a demand from the government of Quebec is not impossible in the future, however, considering the comments of Quebec officials as early as the 1980s, as mentioned above.
Despite the out-migration of recent immigrants, in the span of 20 years between 1971 and 1991, the province of Quebec managed to achieve many of its goals in the area of immigration and to design an asymmetrical system in its relations with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, compared to all other provinces. At the beginning of the period, in 1971, the government of Canada had all the jurisdiction in the area of immigration under its control, and by the end of the period, with the last immigration agreement of 1991, the federal immigration control over Quebec had become symbolic. Every new agreement led to additional powers for Quebec. While the federal government generally preferred to preserve the status quo, it always gave in under the consistent pressure by consecutive Quebec provincial cabinets, regardless of their political colors.
There are very important consequences for the Canadian federal system as a result of the four immigration agreements between Canada and Quebec discussed here. The asymmetrical system formed as a result of these agreements would likely become totally unmanageable for the federal government if one or two additional big provinces were to demand the same powers in the immigration process. In such a scenario, the federal government would have to negotiate annually an agreement on immigration policy among all provinces involved.
The government of Canada disregarded the prescriptions of sections 91(25) and 95 of the Constitution Act and virtually lost its control over the acceptance of immigrants to Quebec. The federal government retained only the right to reject those Quebec-bound immigrants who were a threat to the national security or health. This is a very symbolic authority, considering all the power that Quebec acquired in the entire immigration process.
The transfer of all reception and settlement services for new Quebec immigrants from federal to provincial responsibility discredits Canada. Quebec is presented by the provincial government as a separate country, and not merely as a province, to its new immigrants. Furthermore, the fact that the government of Canada cannot promote in Quebec one of the official languages in Canada--English--makes it more difficult to ensure that Quebec immigrants are provided with the same quality of services as immigrants in the rest of Canada.
The last two immigration agreements, enacted in 1978 and 1991, infringe upon one of the fundamental rights of every permanent resident and citizen of Canada: the right of free mobility. Even though, once admitted to Quebec, all immigrants can move freely to other provinces, if an immigrant is approved by the federal government but denied by Quebec, he/she cannot land directly in Quebec, which de facto infringes upon the mobility rights of that new permanent resident of Canada.
If Quebec manages to restrict further the mobility rights of new immigrants, the province will, in effect, become a distinctively separate entity, formally attached to the Canadian Confederation. Quebec has acquired enormous power in the immigration process and in the control of foreign nationals on its territory, including foreign students and temporary workers. Further concessions will widen the gap between Canada and the province of Quebec.
1. Richard Simeon and Mary Janigan, eds., Toolkits and Building Blocks: Constructing a New Canada (Toronto: C. D. Howe Institute, 1991), 130.
2. Charles D. Tarlton, "Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation," in J. Peter Meekison, ed., Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1968), 31-32.
3. Simeon and Janigan, eds., Toolkits and Building Blocks, 130.
4. British North America Act, section 95.
5. British North America Act, section 91(25).
6. British North America Act, section 132.
7. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 6(2).
8. Joseph H. Carens, "Immigration, Political Community, and the Transformation of Identity: Quebec's Immigration Policies in Critical Perspective," in Joseph H. Carens, ed., Is Quebec Nationalism Just? Perspectives from Anglophone Canada (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995), 20-21.
9. Federal-Provincial/Territorial Agreements, http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/policy/fed-prov/can-que-guide.html.
11. Lang-Cloutier Immigration Agreement of 1971, section 2.
12. Ibid., section 3.
13. Ibid., section 10a.
14. Ibid., section 10b.
15. Ibid., section 11.
16. Ibid., section 10c.
17. Section 2(b) of the Andras-Bienvenue Agreement, 1975.
18. Ibid., section 6.
19. Ibid., section 2d of Addendum 1.
20. Robert A. Vineberg, "Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration," Canadian Public Administration 30, no. 2 (Summer 1987): 305.
21. Alex Radmanovich, "New Minister Says PQ Wants Key Role in Immigrant Policy," The Montreal Gazette, 11 December 1976.
22. "Immigration Power Sought," Montreal Star, 15 March 1977, A1.
23. "Language Pact Sought," Ottawa Citizen, 29 January 1977, 5.
24. Barbara De Cock, "Flemish Language Policy in an Era of Globalization," Revista de Sociolinguistica, Fall-Winter 2006. http://www6.gencat.net/llengcat/noves/hm06tardor-hivern/decock2_2.htm.
25. Charte de la langue francaise, chapter VII.
26. "Quebec Wants Greater Control Over Immigration," Vancouver Sun, 26 March 1977, 18.
27. "Immigration Deal for Quebec," The Toronto Star, 24 January 1978.
28. Ron Collister, "Quebec's Immigration Ultimatums Rejected," Toronto Sun, 19 May 1977.
29. "Government Softens Stance on Immigration Control," Winnipeg Free Press, 26 May 1977, 6.
30. "Immigration: The Canada-Quebec Accord," Ottawa: Library of Parliament, May 2004, http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp252-e.htm#1txt.
31. Irwin Block, "Canada-Quebec Immigration Pact Displays Flexibility," Montreal Star, 1 February 1978, A7.
32. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 6(2a).
33. Carens, "Immigration, Political Community, and the Transformation of Identity," 7.
34. Irwin Block, "Canada-Quebec Immigration Pact Displays Flexibility," Montreal Star, 1 February 1978. A7
35. Joseph Garcea, Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration 1971-1991, Ph.D. thesis (Ottawa: Carleton University, 1993), 237.
36. Irwin Block, "Canada-Quebec Immigration Pact Displays Flexibility," Montreal Star, 1 February 1978, A7.
37. "Couture Accepts Immigration Pact," Montreal Star, 21 February 1978.
38. "One Set of Rules," Winnipeg Free Press, 27 May 1977.
39. Garcea, Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration 1971-1991, 251.
40. Mollie Dunsmuir, Constitution Activity from Patriation to Charlottetown Accord (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, November 1995), http://www.parl.gc.ca/information/library/PRBpubs/bp406-e.htm#D.%20Immigration.
41. Garcea, Federal-Provincial Relations in Immigration 1971-1991, 251.
42. Canada-Quebec Accord, sections 5, 67, 8.
43. Ibid., sections 11 and 20.
44. Ibid., sections 24-27.
45. Keith Henderson, "Immigration a Litmus Test for Followers of Meech Accord," Financial Post, 27 August 1997.
46. Canada-Quebec Accord, sections 24-25, Annex B.
47. Clifford Krauss, "Separatists in Quebec Seek Immigrant Votes," New York Times, 12 December 2005.
48. Don J. DeVoretz, "The Immigration Triangle: Quebec, Canada and Rest of the World," http://www.atlantic.metropolis.net/event/HalifaxNov04/Papers/Directions%20and%20Concerns%20Thursday%201025%20-%201155/Devoretz%20presentation.ppt.
49. Ibid., 8.
50. Carens, "Immigration, Political Community, and the Transformation of Identity," 37.…
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Publication information: Article title: Canada-Quebec Immigration Agreements (1971-1991) and Their Impact on Federalism. Contributors: Kostov, Chris - Author. Journal title: American Review of Canadian Studies. Volume: 38. Issue: 1 Publication date: Spring 2008. Page number: 91+. © 2008 Association for Canadian Studies in the United States. COPYRIGHT 2008 Gale Group.
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