Voodoo Economics: A Look Abroad for a Supply-Side Solution to America's Campaign-Finance Riddle

By Sanderson, Matthew T. | Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, May 2008 | Go to article overview

Voodoo Economics: A Look Abroad for a Supply-Side Solution to America's Campaign-Finance Riddle


Sanderson, Matthew T., Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law


ABSTRACT

The title of this Note--"voodoo economics"--is, at its core, an analogy: U.S. campaign-finance regulation operates like a price ceiling in the political money marketplace. Political campaigns are financed through money-for-access transactions and campaign-finance regulation caps the level of exchange. Like any other price ceiling, regulation is both effective and flawed. It suppresses the "price" of political money but inherently falls victim to some market players' avoidance activities. This price-ceiling analogy, among other things, makes apparent that many proposals forwarded by pro-regulation and deregulation advocates cannot solve the United States' century-old campaign-finance riddle. Instead, attention should turn to shaping market forces through expanding the political money supply. Political donation incentive programs in Germany and Canada provide attractive supply-side models for reform in the United States.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

  I. INTRODUCTION
 II. CAMPAIGN FINANCE THROUGH AN ECONOMIC LENS
     A. Economic Theory and Financial Support for Campaigns
        1. Supply, Demand, and Market Equilibrium in
        Campaign-Finance Markets
        2. Is Campaign-Finance Regulation a
           Restriction on Supply or a Price Ceiling?
           a. Past View: Campaign-Finance Regulation as a Supply-Side
              Restriction
           b. Proposed View: Campaign-Finance
              Regulation as a Price Ceiling
           i. Rent-Control Price Ceiling
              (1) Circumvention
              (2) Substitution
          ii. Campaign-Finance Price Ceiling
              (1) Circumvention in the Political Context
              (2) Substitution in the Political Context
           c. Viewing Campaign-Finance Regulation as a Price Ceiling
              Rather than a Supply-Side Restriction
              i. Describing Limits' and Disclosure Requirements'
                 Market Roles
              (1) Placing Disclosure Requirements in the Market
              (2) Allowing for Limits' and Disclosure Requirements'
                 Dual-Sided Form
          ii. Reflecting the Regulatory Scheme's Purpose
         iii. Capturing the Effects of Regulation on the
              Campaign-Finance Markets
             (1) Depicting Campaign-Finance Regulation's Prospects for
                 Success
             (2) Explaining Avoidance Activities
     B. Historical Examples of Price Ceilings in Campaign-Finance
        Regulation
        1. The Federal Election Campaign Act
           a. Pre-FECA Regulation and Circumvention
              i. The Pre-FECA Regulatory Regime
              ii. Circumvention
           b. Reinvigorating and Creating Price Ceilings with FECA
           c. Post-FECA Circumvention and Substitution
              i. Circumvention
              ii. Substitution
        2. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act
           a. Reinforcing the Donation and Outlay Price Ceilings with
              BCRA
           b. Circumvention and Substitution after BCRA
              i. Circumvention
              ii. Substitution
III. THEORETICAL SOLUTIONS: VIGOROUS ENFORCEMENT AND SUPPLY-SIDE
     EXPANSION
     A. Laws with a Negative" Character
     B. Theoretical Solutions
        1. Reducing Demand
        2. Expand Supply
 IV. BUILDING ON THEORY: CONTRIBUTION INCENTIVE PROGRAMS IN
     FOREIGN NATIONS
     A. Germany's Tax Deduction
        1. Tax Deduction Structure
        2. Evaluating Germany's Tax Deduction
     B. Canada's Tax Credit
        1. Tax Credit Structure
        2. Evaluating Canada's Tax Credit
           a. Expanding Supply
           b. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Canadian Tax Credit
  V. SOLUTION: EXPANDING THE SUPPLY OF POLITICAL MONEY THROUGH A
     CANDIDATE-DONATION TAX CREDIT PROGRAM
 VI. CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION

Few Americans give money to candidates, parties, and political action committees (PACs). …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Voodoo Economics: A Look Abroad for a Supply-Side Solution to America's Campaign-Finance Riddle
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.