It Was a Failure of Regulation: The Evidence from History Is Clear. Weakly Controlled Banking Systems Tend to Have a High Proportion of Bad Loans and Thus to Collapse

By Crafts, Nicholas | New Statesman (1996), October 6, 2008 | Go to article overview

It Was a Failure of Regulation: The Evidence from History Is Clear. Weakly Controlled Banking Systems Tend to Have a High Proportion of Bad Loans and Thus to Collapse


Crafts, Nicholas, New Statesman (1996)


The bank failures of recent weeks have been shocking. For many people it is almost beyond belief that names such as Bradford & Bingley, HBOS, Lehmann Brothers and Wachovia could disappear apparently just like that. Yet economic history tells us that the risk of banking crises is ever present, goes up in an age of globalisation as capital becomes more internationally mobile and requires effective regulation to be contained.

The most infamous banking crises in economic history were those of the 1930s and the worst affected country was the United States, in which 9,000 banks failed between 1929 and 1933, a period when the money supply and real GDP fell by 29 and 33 per cent, respectively. As is well-known, the Roosevelt administration responded to the crisis with a "Bank Holiday", the introduction of Federal Deposit Insurance, re-regulation of the banking system and closure of a further 1,000 banks, and then recapitalised the banking system through the Reconstruction Finance Corporation. By 1935, the government in effect owned about a third of the American banking system and the fiscal cost of state aid to the financial system was 13 per cent of GDP. This was not, of course, the end of capitalism but a necessary, temporary phase on the road to recovery in the later 1930s.

The banking crisis of the American Great Depression was an extreme event but the risks and the costs of a milder version are not trivial. It has been found that in recent decades there has been around a 2 per cent chance per year that a country will have a banking crisis and that the cumulative GDP loss when this happens is about 6 per cent of GDP. Moreover, World Bank research shows that the fiscal costs of a banking crisis are frequently 10 per cent or more of GDP.

Mainstream economists are well aware that important "market failure" issues arise in the context of banking. In a world of imperfect and asymmetric information, the banking system is prone to failures of monitoring by depositors (who face a free-rider problem) and excessive risk-taking ("moral hazard") by bankers. Bank runs are an ever-present risk in a context of uncertainty about the true value of bank assets and the inability of depositors to co-ordinate their actions. The implications are that solvent banks with liquidity problems may be forced into bankruptcy and that a scramble for liquidity may entail meltdown risks for the financial system. These points were long ago well articulated by writers such as Frederic Mishkin, and have found their way into the textbooks.

Several equally well-known and important policy lessons follow. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

It Was a Failure of Regulation: The Evidence from History Is Clear. Weakly Controlled Banking Systems Tend to Have a High Proportion of Bad Loans and Thus to Collapse
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.