Obama, the Disarmer in Chief; Willful Neglect Is De Facto Disarmament

The Washington Times (Washington, DC), April 14, 2010 | Go to article overview

Obama, the Disarmer in Chief; Willful Neglect Is De Facto Disarmament


Byline: Frank J. Gaffney, Jr. , SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON TIMES

Sarah Palin clearly has gotten under President Obama's skin with her sharp critique of his muddle-headed pursuit of U.S. denuclearization. In response, Mr. Obama felt compelled to note that he wasn't acting on his own. He told ABC News last week, If the secretary of defense and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are comfortable with it, I'm probably going to take my advice from them and not from Sarah Palin.

Now, based on the acquiescence of Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates and Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen with respect to the president's other radical assault on the U.S. military - namely, his determination to repeal the law barring avowed homosexuals from serving in the armed forces - one would have reason to doubt the ability, or at least the willingness, of these two men to give the commander in chief advice he did not want to receive.

In fact, it appears to have taken the policy equivalent of sustained waterboarding to bring the Pentagon leadership around to support much of Mr. Obama's anti-nuclear agenda. The New York Times reported that it required 150 interagency meetings, including 30 by the National Security Council, to produce the new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and START follow-on treaty. Give the guys on the E-Ring credit for holding out as long as they did. In the end, however, the Defense Department was reduced to agreeing to the following extraordinary decisions:

* The United States will not design, produce or test any new nuclear weapons. This condemns the nation to relying for the indefinite future (Mr. Obama says for more than his lifetime, and he's a fairly young man) on an arsenal comprising bombs and warheads that are, on average, already about 30 years old. There is no getting around it: They are obsolescing, increasingly unsupportable and, in any event, designed primarily to destroy superhardened Soviet silos, not to perform the deterrent missions of today.

* The United States will not test any of its old weapons, either - even when changes to their components have to be made to try to maintain their viability. These are among the most complex pieces of equipment ever manufactured. In the absence of realistic underground nuclear testing, it is a leap of faith to believe that new components and materials can be introduced to replace old ones (including, in some cases, vacuum tubes) without affecting the weapon's performance and perhaps its safety.

* That safety and, indeed, the reliability and credibility of the nuclear deterrent will, accordingly, rely ever more critically on a dwindling number of highly skilled scientists, engineers and technicians in the U.S. nuclear-weapons complex. It is unlikely they will be terribly motivated - or, at least over time, be the best and the brightest the country has to offer. After all, pursuant to the NPR, the government not only will be hamstringing their work (see the above) but is determined to devalue the role of such weapons. …

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Obama, the Disarmer in Chief; Willful Neglect Is De Facto Disarmament
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