Is Indo-Pakistan Peace Possible? Aniket Aggarwal Discusses Efforts of India and Pakistan to Reconcile Their Differences in Light of Violence in Kargil and Mumbai

By Aggarwal, Aniket | New Zealand International Review, May-June 2013 | Go to article overview

Is Indo-Pakistan Peace Possible? Aniket Aggarwal Discusses Efforts of India and Pakistan to Reconcile Their Differences in Light of Violence in Kargil and Mumbai


Aggarwal, Aniket, New Zealand International Review


In the recent past, both India and Pakistan have been accusing each other of ceasefire violations across the Line of Control in Kashmir, and both have denied the other's accusations. While both claim such accusations to be baseless, the reality on the ground, the casualties, cannot be denied. The Kashmir dispute is the prime territorial dispute in the region. It is, in fact, one of the most prolonged and still unsettled disputes in the history of the United Nations. Could the recent aggression in the region lead to an all-out war? If so, should we consider the possibility of nuclear warfare? Is it possible that Pakistan's army still takes some independent decisions in these matters? How does public sentiment shape the face of foreign policy in both the nations?

Although the issue dates back to 1947, the current tensions between the two 'nuclear' states can be attributed to the 1999 Kargil War. That conflict brought defining changes in the way that the world perceived both nations and the way they interacted with each other. It is also significant for providing a rare account of how nuclear capable states interact in a conflict situation.

The armies of both nations had an unspoken mutual understanding for years that they would withdraw to low altitudes in winter and return to their respective posts in spring. In the spring of 1999, local shepherds reported Pakistani intrusions in the vacated Indian posts in the Kargil area. Indian soldiers who went on patrol near the town of Kargil, about 8 kilometres on the Indian side of the Line of Control, were ambushed by assailants firing from undetectable positions high among the frozen peaks of the Himalayas. After several weeks of denial by Pakistani officials, the Indian authorities asserted that the intruders were not civil militants, but rather well trained and equipped troops of Pakistan's Northern Light Infantry (NLI). With similar reports from the Dras, Kaksar and Mushkoh sectors, Indians became conscious that the infiltration was much larger and better organised than they had realised. India then mounted a significant military and diplomatic campaign to counter the intrusion, in what they later termed the 'Kargil War'. After 55 days of intense fighting within the Kargil, Dras, Kaksar and Mushkoh sectors, during which both sides suffered several hundred casualties, Pakistan ordered its troops to retreat. The crisis ended and the status quo ante bellum was restored.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Research by the Centre for Contemporary Conflict subsequently confirmed India's claim that the intruders were NLI troops rather than civilian militants. (1) Later, Pervez Musharraf, the former president of Pakistan, admitted in his autobiography In the Line of Fire to using NLI troops in the fighting. (2) Pakistan's strategy to deceive India and the rest of the world into believing that the reported intrusions were carried out by civilian militants fighting to liberate Kashmir worked brilliantly in favour of Pakistan at the outset of the crisis. Pakistan clung to this deceit well after their troops' direct involvement in the war was revealed. There are a number of explanations for Islamabad's persistence in claiming that the conflict was completely civil in nature. Firstly, India's initial response was hampered by the need to prepare units for its response, a requirement that favoured Pakistan militarily. Further, most of the world saw Kargil as an extension of the struggle to liberate Kashmir rather than a conflict with territorial aims. If Pakistan had agreed on NLI responsibility for the intrusion, it would have had to give an explanation to the international community for its unprovoked military aggression and its disrespect for the on-going Lahore peace process. Islamabad also recognised the fact that the international community would not tolerate its forceful occupation of India's territory.

[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]

Serious deterioration

But Pakistan's actions severed the Indo-Pakistan peace process, caused a severe cletenoranon in US-Pakastan relations and undermined Pakistan's international credibility, leaving it labelled as an irresponsible aggressor capable of behaving irrationally. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Is Indo-Pakistan Peace Possible? Aniket Aggarwal Discusses Efforts of India and Pakistan to Reconcile Their Differences in Light of Violence in Kargil and Mumbai
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.