A "[Non]essential Limit on Our Power": Standing Doctrine and Judicial Restraint in Hollingsworth V. Perry

By Abbotoy, Joshua | Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Winter 2014 | Go to article overview

A "[Non]essential Limit on Our Power": Standing Doctrine and Judicial Restraint in Hollingsworth V. Perry


Abbotoy, Joshua, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy


Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution grants federal courts broad jurisdiction to consider "Cases" and "Controversies." (1) The Supreme Court has established that there is no "Case" or "Controversy"--and thus no federal court jurisdiction-if a plaintiff has not suffered an "injury in fact" that is likely to be "redressed by a favorable decision." (2) This doctrine, known as standing, plays a vital role in ensuring that the judiciary acts within its granted powers. (3) Despite the doctrine's importance, scholars have long deplored its inconsistent application by the Supreme Court, (4) and the Court itself has admitted that "the concept of 'Art. III standing' has not been defined with complete consistency ... by this Court...." (5)

Last term, in Hollingsworth v. Perry, (6) the Supreme Court found that ballot initiative proponents who intervened to defend their initiative--Proposition 8--against a constitutional challenge had no standing to appeal in federal court because they had not "suffered a concrete and particularized injury" and they were not authorized to represent California's interests. (7) Citing judicial restraint as the rationale behind limitations on standing, the Court vacated the decision of the Ninth Circuit and remanded with instructions to dismiss the case for a lack of standing. (8)

On its face, the judicial restraint argument made by the Court was persuasive. The Court emphasized the public nature of the debate over same-sex marriage and how the standing doctrine prevented the Court from legislating by entering that debate. (9) Upon closer inspection, however, the Hollingsworth decision did not promote judicial restraint in the least. Instead, the Court's inaction amounted to an abdication of its constitutionally granted power to decide "Cases" and "Controversies."

I. THE FACTS

In 2008, in 111 re Marriage Cases, (10) the California Supreme Court held that the California Constitution allowed same-sex couples to marry. (11) Less than six months later, California voters passed the ballot initiative known as "Proposition 8" that amended the Constitution of the State of California to confine marriage to heterosexual couples. (12)

Plaintiffs Kristin M. Perry, Sandra B. Stier, Paul T. Katami, and Jeffrey J. Zarrillo-two same-sex couples wanting to marry-brought suit against the State of California in a federal district court. (13) The plaintiffs argued that Proposition 8 violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by forbidding marriage between two people of the same sex. (14) When the Attorney General of California conceded the case, the district court allowed the official ballot initiative proponents to intervene. (15) The district court ruled for the plaintiffs and enjoined state officials from enforcing Proposition 8. (16)

After the State of California chose not to appeal, the ballot initiative proponents attempted to appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. (17) The Ninth Circuit certified a question to the California Supreme Court, asking whether the intervenors had the authority to argue on behalf of the state's interest in a law when its officials declined to do so. (18) The California Supreme Court answered that the intervenors could "assert the people's, and hence the state's, interest in defending the validity of the initiative measure." (19) After receiving this answer, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the intervenors had standing to appeal the case. The Ninth Circuit proceeded to consider the merits of the case and affirmed the district court's holding. (20) The intervenors then petitioned the United States Supreme Court. (21)

II. THE MAJORITY OPINION

The Supreme Court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss. (22) Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts found that the intervenors, who had petitioned the Court, lacked a concrete and particularized injury and thus lacked standing to appeal.

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A "[Non]essential Limit on Our Power": Standing Doctrine and Judicial Restraint in Hollingsworth V. Perry
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