The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces
Kingsbury, Damien, Contemporary Southeast Asia
Indonesia's armed forces have played a dominant role in domestic politics from 1957 under their so-called "dual function". While the armed forces consolidated in the early Soeharto period, a significant faction later came to challenge his authority, contributing to his resignation from the presidency. This marked the beginning of the armed forces' reform movement, and its transition away from the political arena. Despite its reform orientation, under the Habibie presidency the armed forces were a stronger (and united) political actor. This carried over into the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid. However, as a consequence of the reform movement within the armed forces and with the assistance of Abdurrahman, the armed forces have splintered into several factions. This factionalism has given greater strength to the reform movement within the armed forces, and may contribute to the strengthening of democracy in Indonesia.
When Indonesian President Abdurrahman Wahid (Gus Dun "suspended" Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security, General Wiranto, on 14 February 2000, he marked what was seen by many as a new direction in the political role of Indonesia's military. By extension, this act also signified a critical juncture in Indonesian politics. For two weeks Wiranto had refused Abdurrahman Wahid's request to resign over being implicated in the bloody carnage surrounding East Timor's vote for independence and, briefly, Gus Dur appeared to accede. But the President did an abrupt about-face and relieved Wiranto of his Cabinet position. This action followed weeks of open speculation about a possible military coup against Gus Dur, and, although many ambiguities remained, it appeared that Gus Dur had triumphed over Wiranto. 
While Wiranto was in the Cabinet, he was effectively equal to the most powerful person in Indonesia. Despite having been removed from his position as armed forces chief in October 1999, Wiranto still retained a strong grip over the Tentara National Indonesia (TNI, or the Indonesian National Military),  which had its own firm grip over Indonesian political society. The TNT had played a pivotal role in Indonesian politics, in particular through its so-called dwi fungsi (dual function) of engagement in civil and military affairs.  However, as Indonesia moves through its transition towards democratization, the role of the TNI as a political participant has been identified as a major impediment to that process.
Yet, throughout the post-Soeharto period, at a time of continuing unprecedented political change, the TNI had also been reinventing itself. This process had begun before the fall of Soeharto and had deep roots in divisions within the armed forces, particularly between what was known as the "professional" as opposed to "financial" officers.  It was a later manifestation of this division that finally undermined Soeharto's presidency and led, via the economic collapse it precipitated,  to his resignation. The question remained, however, whether or not the changes that were taking place in the TNI marked a broad shift in commitment to its previous politically active policy. Most of the signs were that the TNI had partly shifted its style, but was only slowly shifting its substance. After a period of relative unity, the TNI had again fractured and there were competing visions for its future, with a more genuinely reformist movement aimed at political disengagement gaining ground.
The TNI in Decline?
It was suggested, after the fall of Soeharto as President in May 1998, that the TNI then called ABRI, Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, or the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)  enjoyed little public support and, without the support of Soeharto, was seriously weakened as a political institution. In particular, many commentators claimed that ABRI had come into public disrepute and that this had weakened its standing as a state institution.
This analysis was flawed for two reasons. The first is that ABRI had not, since the late 1950s, relied on popular support to legitimize its role as a political actor. It might have used such rhetoric for the purposes of propaganda, but popular discontent with many of ABRI's activities never manifested itself in a reflexive policy response. Secondly, such analysis did not take into account the role of the majority Red and White (nationalist-secular) faction (Fraksi Merah-Putih) of ABRI in Soeharto's fall, nor did it take into account the significant weakening of the presidency as a political institution. Indeed, in the early period of the Habibie presidency, the Red and White faction consolidated control within ABRI under the leadership of General Wiranto, displacing senior officers loyal to the Green (pro-Soeharto, and pro-Islamic) faction headed by Soeharto's son-in-law Lieutenant-General Prabowo Subianto. Even if it could be claimed that ABRI had been weakened, it remained a relatively stronger political f orce vis-a-vis the presidency than it had been under Soeharto.  The most obvious illustration of this was the role of the TNI in East Timor, against the explicit wishes of President Habibie. There is no doubt that elements of the TNI orchestrated the campaign of violence and intimidation of the East Timorese people in the lead-up to the territory's ballot on self-determination and that it was deeply implicated in the orgy of violence and destruction that followed that ballot.
However, following the democratic general elections in Indonesia in June that year, in October 1999 both elected and appointed representatives chose a new president, Abdurrahman Wahid. Gus Dur increasingly moved to limit the political power of Wiranto and the TNI, not only removing Wiranto as head of the TNI and later "suspending" him from the Cabinet, but also signing the documents that would end his commission in the TNI. To end Wiranto's commission, Abdurrahman also had to end the commissions of other serving generals, despite their more reformist credentials, as a balance to Wiranto -- that is, Gus Dur appeared to regard the commissions of other ministers from the TNI as expendable if it helped to end Wiranto's own commission.
There was some belief after the election of Gus Dur that the TNI might be more pliable. Senior figures within the TNI had close links to Gus Dur and to his on again-off again ally, Megawati Soekarnoputri, through the Centre for Strategic and International Studies and related individuals and institutions.
However, there were a number of instances in the post-October 1999 period when the balance of political power in Indonesia still seemed to be as or even more firmly with the TNI as it had been during the latter part of Habibie's presidency. It will be argued that the balance of power later began to shift towards the presidency, primarily because the TNI had splintered. In part, this splintering was a product of Gus Dur's moves to rein in the TNI, and the effective corralling of General Wiranto's power, but in part it also reflected different streams of influence and other tensions within the TNI.
Illustrations of the continuing influence of the TNI included the occasion when, after Gus Dur announced in November that the troubled province of Aceh could hold a referendum on independence, he was immediately contradicted by then TNI chief spokesman, Major-General Sudrajat. He said that the President did not have the authority to make such a policy and that the matter would have to be referred to the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR). Gus Dur later said that he would offer Aceh the option of applying Shariah (Islamic) law, which was quite different from his earlier proposition. There were other instances of Wiranto exercising undue influence over the so-called democratic political process. These included organizing and authorizing the biggest reshuffle of the TNI's senior positions in several years,  without consulting either Gus Dur or the Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono. Wiranto's office also issued a press release under Gus Dur's name that asked the security forces to take necessary measures t o control the situation in Aceh and Ambon. 
Wiranto also exercised a guiding, if not controlling, hand in Cabinet meetings until his suspension in February 2000. Juwono said that in Gus Dur's Cabinet meetings, Wiranto sat at Gus Dur's right hand and chaired the meetings, deciding the agenda and laying out the policy options.  Other Cabinet ministers, mostly newcomers, were too intimidated by Wiranto to oppose him. "Wiranto on occasion becomes effectively the president and the vice-president at the same time,"  Juwono said. Beyond that, neither Wiranto nor the Cabinet ministers, such as Lieutenant-Generals Yudhoyono and Agum Gumelar, accepted the idea that they resign their commissions, as required both under law and under the TNI's "New Paradigm". As the balance of power shifted in early 2000, however, Gus Dur ordered that their commissions be terminated. In all, these moves constituted at least a precarious balancing act by Gus Dur in which he recognized the continuing power of the military and its ability to hold on to aspects of national po licy which it had traditionally considered as part of its dwi fungsi.
At a time when many were calling for a reduced role for the TNI, it also did well in the formation of Gus Dur's new government, receiving five ministries as well as having close supporter, Juwono Sudarsono, appointed as Defence Minister. Juwono had earlier been head of the TNI's think-tank, the National Resilience Institute (Lemhanas), prior to being appointed twice to the Cabinet, and had long been a supporter of the Red and White faction. Lemhanas is primarily responsible to the TNI for training its military lecturers and for providing support material.  As long ago as 1993, Juwono had indicated that he strongly supported the reformist goals of what later became known as the Red and White faction, including the removal of Soeharto from office.  His appointment as Defence Minister was recommended to Gus Dur by Wiranto, indicating that while Juwono was a civilian he was in practical terms very close to the TNI's core group. Claims that Juwono's appointment to the position of Defence Minister somehow represented a "civilianization" of the TNI reflected the limited understanding of the commentators (mostly foreign journalists) at that time of Juwono's links to the TNI.
Juwono affirmed his commitment to the TNI when, on 22 November 1999, he asked the House of Representatives (DPR) to grant a 62 per cent increase in the 2000-2001 budget allocation for the TNI and the police.  While conceding that the requested increase was significant, Juwono said that past inadequate budgetary allocations had forced the TNI into extra-military business activities. He said: "We have seen in the past that the military's involvement in politics, bureaucracy and business was due to its insufficient budget."  Juwono also affirmed his commitment to Wiranto by defending him against charges related to the East Timor ballot. He said that he did not believe Wiranto was guilty of any offences and was critical of "the court of public opinion" and the United Nations investigation into such alleged offences. 
Juwono later confirmed that while as minister he was in theory responsible for the TNI, his position was at best still in the process of becoming substantive. He said: "I would like the commander of the forces to be subordinate to me". "That would be my long term goal."  Juwono acknowledged that Wiranto was the dominant power in military politics and, until his suspension, in the Cabinet of Gus Dur.
Besides Juwono, the appointment of five TNI generals in the Cabinet also showed the TNI's continued political influence. Wiranto's appointment as Co-ordinating Minister for Politics and Security had elevated him in terms of ministerial position to the inner Cabinet, but ended his role as TNI's commander-in-chief. The influence he was able to bring to bear from this position reflected less the authority of the ministry and more the power he retained through his links to the TNI. One of those links was, initially, to Admiral Widodo, who had been groomed by Wiranto for the position of the TNI's commander-in-chief after his appointment as deputy commander-in-chief earlier in 1999. Widodo later shifted his allegiance from Wiranto to Gus Dur.
The significance of Widodo's appointment as head of the TNI, however, was that, at the time, he was a close associate of Wiranto and was considered to be one of Wiranto's inner group. As head of the Navy, Widodo was also chief of the Marine Corps, which was more politically popular than the variously tainted arms of the Army, and his appointment did not represent a threat to Wiranto's grip on power. Indeed, Widodo did not have a power base within the TNI independent of Wiranto's group until he began to receive direct support from Gus Dur towards the end of 1999.
Wiranto's grip on power continued despite his thwarted bid in October 1999 for the position of Vice-President. Wiranto withdrew his nomination when he realized that he could not count on enough support from voting members of the Golkar Party. Wiranto's interest in a political career, supported by many in the Army, was indicative of the military's continuing commitment to active engagement-in politics.
The appointment as Minister for Transportation and Communication of Lieutenant-General Agum Gumelar, a former head of Kopassus (July 1993-August 1994), who had a reputation for dealing strongly with student demonstrations, also did nothing to soften the TNI's influence in the Cabinet. Interestingly, immediately prior to Gus Dur's announcement on the composition of the Cabinet, there was considerable speculation that Agum Gumelar would be made Defence Minister.  Other ministries taken by the TNI included Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono as Minister for Mines and Energy, Rear-Admiral (ret.) Freddy Numberi as State Minister of Administrative Reform, and Lieutenant-General Surjadi Sudirdja as Home Minister.  In the words of one observer: "TNI is still playing a strong role in politics". Student leader An Wibowo said, "The presence of five military officers proves the continued military dominance in the government." 
One omission from Gus Dur's Cabinet was that of Minister for Information. During the Soeharto period, the Minister of Information had been one of the most powerful figures in the Cabinet. One of the great breakthroughs of the Habibie administration was its lifting of media bans and the effective dismantling of restrictions on the media and other forms of communication. To a large extent, this de-restriction of the media was undertaken not just under the guidance but at the behest of Habibie's Minister for Information, General Yunus Yosfiah.  In dropping both the Minister and the Ministry, Gus Dur remarked that the whole idea of a Ministry of Information was antithetical to the removal of restrictions on the media.
The "New Paradigm"
The "New Paradigm", the framework through which the TNI intended to reform itself, had been under discussion for at least a year before Soeharto resigned as President, but was only made public after his resignation, when notions of reform were not only more acceptable but were often demanded. The main proponent of, and key figure within, military reform was Lieutenant-General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. In broad terms, the reformist push came from two overlapping sources. The first main source of reformism came from what was considered to be the core group of the Red and White faction, including Generals Wiranto, Yudhoyono, Agum Gumelar, Hendropriyono, and Farid Zainuddin. While each of these officers had somewhat independent support bases, by the mid-1990s they had tended to coalesce under the nominal guidance of retired armed forces chief General Benny Murdani. As a core group, and with support from influential sections of both the military and civilian elite, these officers were understood to support at leas t parts of the reform programme promoted by Yudhoyono. The second push for reform of the military came from a group of officers from the Akabri (Akademi ABRI) Class of 1973, of which Yudhoyono was considered the intellectual leader and of which Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah later came to be considered the more public and radical leader. Interestingly, Soeharto's son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, who was also from this class,  in 1997-98 came to head the military's pro-Soeharto, pro-Islamic Green faction which developed in opposition to the Red and White group.
While there had been discussion of the TNI's depoliticization at in-house seminars at Seskoad  for some years, serious public discussion was boosted by Soeharto's resignation as President. Within days of Soeharto's resignation, on 26 May 1998, Yudhoyono was reported as saying that reform was the key to resolving the crisis that affected Indonesia, inferring that reform of the armed forces would be included in such a process. However, he said that such reform should take place within a much wider context of "reform". "ABRI is aware of the fundamental weakness and ... violations of procedures involving all sectors and elements in society", he said.  Similarly concerned for the standing of the armed forces, then commander-in-chief General Wiranto called on 10,000 middle and high-ranking soldiers from the Jakarta garrison to re-establish good relations with students following the May riots and the military response. "Let's enter the campus and apologise to all the students for all that has happened to th eir friends. Let them know that we share their views about reform," he said.  It was during this speech, at the Istora Senayan sports stadium in central Jakarta on the night of 25 May 1998, that Wiranto also confirmed what was to be a brief period of unity of the armed forces, on the cusp of the final denouement of the pro-Soeharto Green faction.
The "New Paradigm", which was the formal programme of the military reform movement, can broadly be categorized by the separation of the armed forces from civilian and political functions. In particular, it intended to achieve the following:
1. To separate the police and the armed forces.
2. To end military involvement in local political affairs.
3. To turn the office of Social and Political Affairs into Territorial Affairs.
4. To end the social and political role of the armed forces in political affairs down to the local level.
5. To end the appointment of military officers to civilian positions in the central and regional governments.
6. To remove the influence of the military from day-to-day politics.
7. To require that officers choose between military or civilian careers.
8. To reduce the number of seats allocated to the armed forces in the MPR (People's Consultative Assembly).
9. To cut links with Golkar.
10. To remain neutral in politics, especially in elections. 
The TNI was relatively successful in achieving these aims, in particular points 1, 3, 8, 9 and 10. The extent to which it was successful in terms of removing itself from an active role in politics was limited, especially under the Habibie administration. Discussing the "New Paradigm", Yudhoyono affirmed the TNI's commitment to the 1945 Constitution, but said that given its brevity it would be added to, to make it more comprehensive. However, he said that additions to the Constitution could not have been made in the October 1999 session of the MPR (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat or People's Consultative Assembly) because it would be preoccupied with more pressing matters, and that more time was needed to consider such changes. A key aspect of the "New Paradigm" was letting other components of civil society contribute to a public debate on such issues, although Yudhoyono said that the TNI would have to lead such a debate for some time as "the current national psychology is still not conducive to make this possi ble". 
In terms of the depoliticization of the TNI, Yudhoyono noted that its neutrality during the June 1999 elections was a significant step in the right direction. Those elections were, he said, "far more honest and just" than previous elections and had proceeded "fairly and honestly". He added that, in terms of the TNI's 38-man representation in the DPR/MPR, in principle he favoured a one-man-one-vote system. However, he said that in the shorter term, the arrangement which had secured for the TNI 38 seats was suitable, and that the TNI's representatives should continue to vote as an institutional bloc. Yudhoyono's colleague, the more outspoken reformist Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah (known in the media as Agus Wira), said that he hoped the TNI could drop its representation in the DPR/MPR by the year 2004, starting in 2002. 
At the launch of the book, Indonesia Baru dan Tantangan TNI (New Indonesia and TNT's Challenge) on 26 October 1999, Wirahadikusumah described the dwi fungsi doctrine as "a bastard whose birth could not be prevented". "It was to be temporary, but instead it became institutionalised; officers grew to enjoy their positions", he asserted in a thinly veiled reference to military corruption. Wirahadikusumah urged new commander-in-chief Widodo to purge the military leadership of officers "unworthy" of their positions. He also stated during the book launch that the TNI wished to end its involvement in politics. He was supported in this call by sixteen other serving officers, who had also contributed to the book. Agus had previously published a similar book, ABRI: Profesionalisme dan Dedikasi (ABRI: Professionalism and Dedication) which was not made public.  Brigadier-General Saurip Kadi, one of the authors of the book, who was also a special investigator with the Ministry of Defence and Security, said that endin g dwi fungsi "was the only way to put an end to the deviation of commands".
Unofficial support for the book came at the time of its launch from Wiranto.  However, within two months, a major division appeared to have opened up between Wirahadikusumah, on the one hand, and Wiranto and his supporters, on the other. Wirahadikusumah had criticized those officers who had taken up other positions but who had not resigned their commissions in the TNI, including Wiranto, Agum Gumelar, and Yudhoyono. Wirahadikusumah's comments sparked a "heated exchange" between senior TNT officers over the investigation into the involvement by senior TNT officers in human rights violations in Aceh and East Timor. In particular, then chief of the influential Army Strategic Reserve (Kostrad), Lieutenant-General Djaja Suparman, said that "continuing humiliation of the Army generals would hurt the pride of their soldiers and could spark their ire".  Wirahadikusumah replied that TNT soldiers did not serve their generals but the TNT as an institution and the state. Lieutenant-General Agum Gumelar later sai d he regretted the spat between the two generals and that such differences should remain an internal matter. Both Agum and the pro-Gus Dur chief-of-staff General Tyasno Sudarto claimed that differences of opinion were normal between individuals within the TNT.
Wirahadikusumah also angered some senior TNT officers by saying that the TNI should streamline its operational structure by abolishing some territorial commands. Former army chief-of-staff General (ret.) Rudini said that Wirahadikusumah's proposal could only work if the army changed its doctrine based on territorial defence, which was held as sacrosanct by most TNI officers.  In February 2000, Wirahadikusumah's comments came back to haunt him as Widodo ordered General Tyasno to take disciplinary measures against Wirahadikusumah for asking Wiranto to step down from the Cabinet. Wirahadikusumah was called back to Jakarta to explain himself, although it later transpired that this did not hurt his opportunities for promotion in a proposed further reshuffle of the TNI. Notably, Gus Dur supported Wirahadikusumah, saying that his comments reflected a need as a result of poor communications within the TNI.  In this, there could be seen an attempt by some within the TNI to isolate Agus Wirahadikusumah from the more moderate reform group within the TNI, if not from the President himself.
A further change to the structure of the TNI that was promoted as a part of the reform process was the diminution of power in the hands of the military commander-in-chief through the restructuring of the top echelons of the TNI. The positions of commander-in-chief, and his deputy were expected to be scrapped in favour of a "joint chiefs of staff" (JCS) structure. In this structure, there is a chairman, a vice or deputy chairman, and chiefs-of-staff of the various services.
This structure, as it is practised in the United States and which would probably be the model for Indonesia, has the primary responsibility of the JSC members as JSC members, taking precedence over their roles as chiefs of military services. In this, the deputies to the service chiefs would be responsible for the day-to-day operational command of the services. The chairman of the JSC would be the primary military adviser to the President, although all JSC members would also have an advisory capacity.
Given that this change was likely, probably later in 2000, a number of questions remained. These included the kind of relationship that it would create between the TNI and the government, what it would mean for the TNI's dual function, in what way would the practical functions of the chairman of the JCS be different from the existing commander-in-chief, and what would become of the balance of power between the chairman of the JCS and, for example, the Minister of Defence.
There was no structural reason for this change to reduce the political role of the TNI itself. However, it could be taken as an opportunity to tie more closely the roles and responsibilities of the TNI to the government, the presidency, or the DPR (House of Representatives). In this, there was at least a passing suspicion that the accountability of the new structure for the TNI's leadership would reflect who in government personally wielded power, as opposed to who occupied the highest nominal position.
While Yudhoyono was seen as perhaps the key reformer in the TNI, his opportunity for pushing through military reform was forestalled by his appointment as Minister for Mines and Energy. While Gus Dur personally supported Yudhoyono's inclusion in the Cabinet, his decision was promptly backed by Wiranto.  Wiranto's prompt support for Yudhoyono for a Cabinet position may have reflected his suspicion that if Yudhoyono stayed in the TNI he would quickly achieve the top military job, thereby displacing Wiranto's continuing dominance of the TNI.
The split between Wiranto and Yudhoyono was a manifestation of a fundamentally different approach to both the TNI and to politics. Where Yudhoyono promoted the idea that the TNI should disengage itself from the political process, Wiranto in theory agreed but in practice continued to play his political hand. It seemed that while Wiranto had supported reform, albeit of a limited type, his long-term agenda came to include wider political ambitions through a Cabinet position, the vice-presidency, or even the presidency. In terms of policy, Wiranto pushed a "nationalist" line, with a reduced but continuing role for the TNI in the political process. Yudhoyono wanted a less active political role for the TNI, and for Wiranto. This was the key reason for the falling out between the two formerly close military and political associates in the first half of 1999.
It should also be noted that while Yudhoyono had long advocated the depoliticization of ABRI, later the TNI, he also insisted that it be a gradual process. After his appointment as a minister, Yudhoyono refused to resign his commission from the TNI, in contrast to his earlier comments on the role of active officers in government positions.  The rationale for this apparent about-face on what was a core reform issue signalled Yudhoyono's reluctance to be permanently shifted from the military. The move to the ministry, then, given its requirement to resign his active commission, was not a part of Yudhoyono's game plan as TNI's "rising star", which had come to mean countering Wiranto's repoliticization of the TNI from within.
If Gus Dur was able to move against Wiranto, it was because Wiranto's power base within the TNI had been seriously eroded between the time of his appointment to the Cabinet in October 1999 and his suspension from the Cabinet in February 2000. Within the TNI, after a period of relative unity between mid-1998 and late 1999 there could be discerned at least five factions, and a number of sub-factions. The cause for this factionalism reflected Indonesia's unstable political dynamic, the residual loyalties of what has been described as "patrimonial-prebendalism"  and ideological differences within the TNI, in particular over the issue of the TNI's dual function, reform, and the role of Islam. At a time of shifting loyalties within a constantly moving political landscape, any assessment of military politics could only at best be a snap-shot of what was happening at that time. The blending and separating of factional interests was constant, unstable, and often unpredictable, with the end result largely difficult to assess.
To accurately identify the percentage of the TNI that remained loyal to Wiranto would be impossible, but before his removal from the Cabinet it was estimated by some military observers in Jakarta to be in the order of 60 to 70 per cent, predominantly from the army. In part, this could be seen to reflect a major reshuffle of the army by Wiranto on 4 November 1999, in which officers close to him were promoted. This shake-up could have been expected following the appointment of Admiral Widodo as the new commander-in-chief, as claimed by the TNI.  But in large part, the reshuffle was also intended to promote and reward those officers who had been close to Wiranto, demonstrating his continuing power to determine the shape of Indonesia's key political institution.  Wiranto authorized the reshuffle and promotions of officers while Gus Dur was out of the country and without first submitting the list to the Defence Minister, Juwono Sudarsono. In this, Wiranto clearly took a most senior executive decision that enhanced his own power base within the TNI while at the same time demonstrating where power actually lay in terms of critical decision-making. In the period after his removal from the Cabinet, support for Wiranto from within the TNI was, not surprisingly, said to have fallen. However, that he still retained a significant support base even after being removed from office reflected his personal power and the antithetical views of many within the TNI towards the political emasculation of the institution.
In a system still dominated by patrimonialism, it was to be expected that Gus Dur would also move to build his own loyal following within the TNI, which he had worked at since October. In particular, he favoured the Navy and Air Force officers and appeared to have secured the loyalty of TNI commander-in-chief, Admiral Widodo. Widodo was initially seen as a Wiranto appointee who would fall meekly into line with the latter's wishes. However, Widodo supported Gus Dur's removal of Wiranto from the Cabinet, indicating his independence from Wiranto's patronage. However, he was ambiguous in his support for the TNI's withdrawal from politics, saying that he wanted the TNI to maintain its presence in the MPR, even after it had left the House of Representatives (DPR) in 2004.  This was seen as a bid for the TNI to retain political influence in the election of the president and vice-president, although it also might have been a sop to more belligerent officers within the TNI.
In a further bid to claw back Wiranto's influence within the TNI, on 28 February 2000, Widodo announced a further major reshuffle of 74 senior positions within the TNI, to take effect from 1 March 2000. This reshuffle did not displace all of Wiranto's allies within the TNI, but it did begin to shift the balance of power further towards the Gus Durreformist camp.
The most notable change in this reshuffle was the appointment of Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah as the new head of Kostrad (Strategic Reserve).  This move had the effect of promoting the TNI's most outspoken reformer to both a geographically and strategically central role within the TNI, and put him in a position for further significant promotion. it also had the effect of sidelining Wiranto ally, Lieutenant-General Jaya Suparman, who had publicly argued with Wirahadikusumah over Wiranto's position and the future of the TNI. Suparman was later suggested to be behind threats against Gus Dur. Shadowy figures at the time were also linked to what were claimed to be a series of political killings and other attacks.
Another powerful position, that of the TNI Chief of General Affairs, was vacated by Wiranto ally, Lieutenant-General Suaidi Marasabessy, who joined Zacky Anwar Makarim as an officer without a substantive position. Suaidi's replacement was the deputy army chief-of-staff, Lieutenant-General Jamari Chaniago, who had in the past been seen as a Wiranto loyalist.
Other senior officers reportedly aligned with Gus Dur included the army chief-of-staff General Tyasno Sudarto; the head of the Jakarta garrison Major-General Ryamizard Ryacudu; the head of the Military Intelligence Board (BAIS), Air Rear Marshall Ian Santoso Perdanakusumah; and the military spokesman, Air Rear Marshall Graito Husodo.
Another, increasingly small faction remained loyal to the latter, although Prabowo had made moves to redress the divisions between himself and Wiranto. Prabowo moved to patch up differences with Wiranto first in early 1999, and then during Prabowo's visit to the officer training college (Sesko) at Magelang during Aidil Fitri (the end of the fasting month) in early 2000. Some of this "faction" could also be seen to be supporting a more explicit Islamic agenda, deriving their association with Prabowo from the more "green" element of what was the pro-Soeharto group. Aided by financial and political interests at odds with Gus Dur's government, these groups could be seen behind at least some of the civil strife in Maluku, Lombok, and Riau in late 1999 and early 2000.
A significant faction within the TNI could be considered "reformist". The public leader of this group was South Sulawesi (Wirabuana Command), later Kostrad, head, Major-General Agus Wirahadikusumah, while Territorial Commander Major-General Agus Widjojo was also a prominent figure.  However, this group had no clear plan of action and wavered in its commitment to pushing its cause in public. For example, there was a major division between Agus Wirahadikusumah and Agus Widjojo over the retention of a number of regional military commands (Kodam), which had implications for the TNI's territorial structure and hence its involvement in politics at the local level. In part, Wirahadikusumah moved towards abandoning the territorial structure in its entirety, even though he had earlier been an advocate of its retention. The division between Agus Wirahadikusumah and Agus Widjojo may have reflected some rivalry, as there was press speculation that Wirahadikusumah was seen by other TNI officers as shifting his positi on to that which was most politically fashionable.
Because of his more radical stand and, in part, because of perceptions of superficiality in his commitment to the reforms he proposed, there was no certainty that Wirahadikusumah could count on the loyalty of other reformists if the military reform process were to reach a critical juncture. The reformists generally (and Agus Wirahadikusumah in particular) enjoyed the support of Gus Dur, but were not necessarily directly beholden to him, as were some other officers.
In particular, although some reformist officers coalesced around Wirahadikusumah, there was no sense of unity of purpose or agreed agenda within the reform camp. In part, this reflected the idea that escaping politics by playing politics was antithetical to the reformists' final goal. It also reflected the varying degrees of ease, or lack thereof, many officers felt in pushing what was far from certain to be a successful or clearly defined process.
In large part, the success of the reformist group would depend on the success of Gus Dur's presidency. If he could negotiate peaceful settlements to the many civil problems that plagued Indonesia, this group would have a better chance of success. However, if Gus Dur (and consequently the process of democratization) failed, this group would lose much ground within the TNI.
A number of officers, not suprisingly, stayed on the side-lines and were not committed. Within the above identified "factions" there were, as noted, a number of sub-factions aligned with particular senior officers or had multiple or shifting agendas. The idea of "constellations" of officers forming and dividing around key ideas or individuals is probably more accurate than factions as such,  although this begins to beg semantic differences. It has also been suggested that such factions or constellations that do exist are not ideologically differentiated, but are reflections of a more traditional pattern of patrimonial loyalty. 
Although not a formal part of the armed forces since separation from ABRI (which led to the creation of the TNI in early 1999), Indonesia's national police, Polri, were also increasingly forming a faction in the competition for political power as it manifested on the ground. There has long been competition between elements of Polri and the TNI, with clashes between them over the past two years in West Timor, and Ambon in particular, and resentment festering elsewhere.
The appointment of Lieutenant-General Rusdihardjo as the national police chief on 4 January 2000 surprised both the public and the police, as his name was not among those put forward to replace General Roesmanhadi, and he was only notified of his appointment the night before it was announced. His appointment could be seen as Gus Dur's attempt to strengthen the independence of Polri in its relations with the TNI, and to create a further service directly loyal to him.
Implications of the Territorial Structure
If the TNI has been seen to be involved in local political issues over a wide area, it was almost entirely the result of its "territorial" structure. The territorial structure of the TM was evident in the way it located itself throughout the country. The purpose of this was to ensure a parallel administrative structure to the government throughout the archipelago. It was later rationalized as ABRI/TNI being able to provide in-depth defence should Indonesia be attacked, which was claimed to derive from the days when the army worked with local people in the anti-colonial struggle against the Dutch from 1945 to 1949. The retention of this system was theoretically based on the limited numbers of the armed forces, its unsophisticated weaponry, and its relatively slow response times, requiring that the army be already in place should an attack occur. In practice, and almost certainly in original intention, this placement of soldiers among the civilian population had the effect of creating a parallel military-civi lian structure and provided the opportunity for the army to act as a type of localized paramilitary police. As a guiding philosophy, the notion of territorial placement was firmly fixed in most TNI thinking (although in practical terms emphasis was placed more on the centre by the redevelopment of the Kopassus and Kostrad forces in the mid-1980s). It was a core element of dwi fungsi while at the same time being the means by which the dwi fungsi could not be practically removed. 
In the aftermath of the East Timor ballot, the TNI again moved to strengthen its territorial structure, to ensure no other territories broke away. This was undertaken by Lieutenant-General Agus Widjojo, formulated while he was director of Sesko. A part of this plan was to increase to seventeen from ten the number of kodam, which reversed the reduction from seventeen to ten kodam undertaken in 1984 as part of the restructuring of the armed forces under then commander-in-chief General Benny Murdani. Wirahadikusumah called for the number to be reduced to eight, and for regency (Korem), district (Kodim), sub-district (Koramil) and village level (Babinsa) placement of the TNT to be removed. Under the new structure, there were intended to be 'A' and 'B' kodam, with the 'A' kodam receiving an extra combat brigade (including infantry and intelligence units) and a cavalry unit (tanks and armoured personnel carriers). The intention was to deploy the 'A' units to more troubled areas. Also reversing Murdani's 1984 moves , the three kowilhan (regional defence commands) were planned to be returned, while a rapid deployment force known as PRRM was set up to deal with popular unrest. 
In this, even among the TNI's leading reformers, there could be seen a distinct disinclination by some, including Widjojo, to abandon the territorial structure, which located the TNT so deeply in the day-to-day politics of Indonesia. This issue, then, was one that constituted a major divide within the ranks of the reform faction. A political analyst close to DPR Speaker Amien Rais has said that while the TNI's territorial structure remained in place, real democratization would be thwarted.  It was Gus Dur's goal, he said, to break down the TNT's territorial structure.
A "New" Dwi Fungsi?
Despite his removal as commander-in-chief of the TNT, General Wiranto continued to be the dominant, if declining, power in the armed forces. The removal of untrusted officers in the first half of 1998, and the reshuffling of senior positions in November 1999, ensured that Wiranto loyalists occupied many of the TNT's key posts, which the February 2000 reshuffle only partially dismantled. Differences of style continued to exist, primarily over the issue of reform, but many reformist officers still found themselves accommodated within Wiranto's overarching patronage, in part, ironically, through his own role as a supporter of TNI reform.
Wiranto had also reconstructed his position as Co-ordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs as the most influential position in Gus Dur's Cabinet. This did not imply that the position itself was a powerful one, but that the Ministry carried Wiranto's personal imprint, and this was defined by his continuing control over the TNI. Outside the Cabinet, the TNI continued to pursue its own interpretation of state policy with regard to security matters, in particular in Aceh, Ambon, and Irian Jaya. But, as a consequence of Wiranto's own "old-style" intransigence over his political role, other pre-existing loyalties and, not least, because Gus Dur had begun to assert some presidential authority, Wiranto's personal grip on power was slipping. The political power exercised by the TNI was similarly weakened, in large part because of its factionalism, which was in turn encouraged by Gus Dur.
In all of this, it seemed that while there had been significant political changes in Indonesia since May 1998, the TNI's disengagement from the political process was slow in coming. The push for reform from within the TNI continued, although with a "reform leadership" divided between the less and more radical demands of Yudhoyono and Widjojo, on the one hand, and Wirahadikusumah, on the other. Their main point of contention, the future of the territorial structure of the TNI, was, in a sense, the key to Indonesia's further democratization and certainly to plans for economic and political devolution. Acts 22/99 and 25/99 on regional government and financial redistribution passed in October 1999 are still awaiting the development of regulations to enact them, with the territorial role of the TNI being widely seen as the major sticking point. There was concern that, apart from other matters, if decentralization went ahead while the territorial structure remained in place, there would be the opportunity for loca l military commanders to commandeer the local political and economic processes and, in effect, establish themselves as independent warlords.
Wiranto played godfather to the reform process while also managing to effectively quarantine it from his own activities. There was also the belief that Wiranto, or others, could continue to destabilize Gus Dur's presidency by engineering further conflict in the provinces. In this, and in particular Yudhoyono's initial refusal to resign from the TNI after being appointed minister, it seemed there was a deeply ingrained culture within the TNI that was inherently and overtly political. Most of its moves towards reform were not only intensely political, but were also played out within the national political arena and as part of the national political process. It seemed that many senior officers of the TNI simply did not understand how to be non-political. Those looking for a genuine and thorough overhaul of the TNI, including a complete end to its dwi fungsi role, would probably have to wait for some time.
Two related points come from this, the first being that Gus Dur's support for a personally loyal faction within the TNI signalled a return to "patrimonial-prebendal" politics. This, in turn, could engender a reactionary response from officers within the TNI, which could again see it consolidate into two, essentially pro- and anti-presidential, factions. As Soeharto discovered, the appointment of loyal officers to senior positions did not guarantee control over the TNI.
In terms of a Weberian analysis, this continuation of a power bloc outside the presidency challenged the notion of Indonesia as a "patrimonial-prebendal" political society and introduced the type of power competition that more accurately aligned with "patrimonial-feudal" political society. Weber noted that "patrimonial-prebendalism" constituted a major obstruction to the development of democratic political forms, while the competing power bases in a more feudal arrangement eventually led to the development of democratization. It was the Red and White group led by Wiranto that destabilized Soeharto's grip on power and opened up political space for competing voices; a prerequisite for democratization. The continued obstruction from, fragmentation of, and competing voices within the TNI could, ironically, further aid the process of Indonesia's democratization.
DAMIEN KINGSBURY is Executive Officer at the Monash Asia Institute, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia.
The author would like to thank Emeritus Professor John Legge and Marcus Meitzner for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this article.
(1.) At the time of writing, it was too early to say definitively whether that was the case, but it appeared to be so.
(2.) The literal translation of tentara is not "military" but "army", although this confuses the roles of the three services within the TNI.
(3.) The dwi fungsi role was implemented in 1957 and elaborated by the army in 1965, 1966, and 1967, while in 1982 the government formalized this arrangement through legislation.
(4.) Harold Crouch, "Democratic Prospects in Indonesia", in Democracy in Indonesia, edited by D. Bourchier and J. Legge (Melbourne: Monash University, Monash Papers on Southeast Asia, 1994).
(5.) Although the situation was more complex than this, the underlying reason for the capital flight that precipitated the collapse of the Indonesian rupiah in 1997 and the consequent economic collapse was the belief that a group of Red and White officers would move against Soeharto after his bid for the presidency in 1998. These officers had already acted against Soeharto in lesser ways, but the situation was coming to a head and many cronies believed that their wealth would be in jeopardy if they left it in Indonesia.
(6.) The TNI was always the "army" branch of ABRI, but when the police separated from ABRI, the armed forces became known as the TNI.
(7.) D. Kingsbury, "The Political Resurgence of the Tentara Nasional Indonesia", in Pemilu: The 1999 Indonesian Election, Annual Indonesia Lecture Series 22, edited by S. Blackburn (Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999).
(8.) Wiranto actually authorized the reshuffle during his last few days as commander-in-chief of the TNI, which did put the decision under his jurisdiction at that time. However, the reshuffle was enacted nearly two months later and by-passed those who should otherwise have been informed of the process, including Juwono and, as Supreme Commander, Gus Dur.
(9.) "President Issues Written Statement", Jakarta Post, 2 December 1999.
(10.) K. Richburg, "Indonesian General Exploits New Role", Washington Post, 3 December 1999, p. 25.
(12.) R. Lowry, The Armed Forces of Indonesia (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1996), p. 202.
(13.) Juwono said this in an interview with the author on the subject of the mounting criticism of Soeharto's tenure and corruption, and increasing divisions within the armed forces.
(14.) A 32 per cent increase was later granted.
(15.) "62% Hike in Military Budget Urged", Jakarta Post.com, 23 November 1999.
(16.) L. Murdoch, "Jakarta Minister Shrugs Off UN Pressure", The Age (Melbourne), 19 February 2000.
(17.) Juwono's stated intention to scale back the Kopassus force from around 7,000-8,000 to 800 could be seen as an attempt at asserting control over the TNI but, more importantly, to break the back of a branch of the TM that had supported Prabowo's Green faction and which had run an agenda somewhat independently of the TNI.
(18.) "Turning Without Giving Directional Lights", GATRA Information Services, 30 October 1999.
(19.) Surjadi was later appointed by Gus Dur to replace Wiranto as Co-ordinating Minister for Politics and Security.
(20.) "Gus Dur Forms Compromise Cabinet", Jakarta Post.com, 27 October 1999.
(21.) During his period as minister, Yunus dropped his father's name, preferring to be known as Mohamad Yunus. Yunus was also referred to as the "Father of Information" by Hinca Pandjaitan, the key drafter of the new Press Law 40/99 (personal communication).
(22.) Prabowo graduated in 1974 and is therefore formally regarded as belonging to the class of that year, rather than 1973.
(23.) A successor institution to Akabri.
(24.) "ABRI Committed to Fundamental Reform", Tempo Interaktif, 26 May 1998.
(26.) R. Layandor, "Indonesia and the Military at the Crossroads", Indonesian Quarterly 27, no. 3 (1999): 224.
(27.) "Not Being Indifference" (sic.), GATRA Info Services, 2 July 1999.
(28.) AFP, "Military 'Ready to Give Up its Seats", Sydney Morning Herald, 27 May 1999.
(29.) "TNI Officers Want to End Dual Function", Jakarta Post.com, 29 October 1999.
(31.) "No Friction in TNI, Says General Tyasno", Jakarta Post.com, 18 December 1999.
(32.) "Widodo Calms Concerns over Generals in Cabinet", Jakarta Post.com, 18 December 1999.
(33.) "President Supports Agus in Argument with Wiranto", Jakarta Post.com, 19 February 2000.
(34.) "Gus Dur Forms Compromise Cabinet", Jakarta Post.com, 27 October 1999.
(35.) T. Abriansyah, "Rising Star for Civilian Posting", GATRA Information Services, 6 November 1999.
(36.) J. Bakker, and G. Ferrazzi, "Weber's Pure Ideal Type Model of Patrimonial Prebendalism: Testing the Applicability of the Model to Indonesia" (Paper presented at the 92nd Annual Meeting of the American Sociology Association, Toronto. 9-13 August 1997; and M. Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958); M. Weber, Economy and Society (Berkely: University of California Press, 1968).
(37.) "Military Announces Sweeping Reshuffle", Jakarta Post.com, 6 November 1999; and "Army Chief Subagyo Defends TNI Reshuffle", Jakarta Post.com, 10 November 1999.
(38.) In early December 1999, 23 senior officers were further promoted by TNI chief Widodo, for "dedication and loyalty" (Jakarta Post, 10 December 1999).
(39.) "TNI to Quit House, but Not Assembly", Jakarta Post, 26 February 2000, p.1.
(40.) "Major TNI Reshuffle Announced", Jakarta Post, 29 February 2000, p. 1.
(41.) One critic of the TNI, Munir, observed that because of his support for a continuing territorial structure, Agus Widjojo is in fact not a reformist but a conservative.
(42.) The idea of constellations of officers rather than factions was first mooted to me by Herb Feith and Lance Castles in Jogjakarta in 1997. At that time it had considerable validity, which in late 1999 and early 2000 had become more explicit.
(43.) Munir, "Civil and Military Relationships" (Paper presented to the conference on "Rethinking Indonesia", Melbourne, 4-5 March 2000).
(44.) I. MacFarling, The Dual Function of the Indonesian Armed Forces: Military Politics in Indonesia (Canberra: Australian Defence Force Studies Centre, 1996); and Lowry, op.cit.
(45.) Tapol, "The TNI's Expanding Territorial Structure", Bulletin 154, no. 5 (November 1999).
(46.) Personal communication with the author.…
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Publication information: Article title: The Reform of the Indonesian Armed Forces. Contributors: Kingsbury, Damien - Author. Journal title: Contemporary Southeast Asia. Volume: 22. Issue: 2 Publication date: August 2000. Page number: 302. © 1999 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS). COPYRIGHT 2000 Gale Group.
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