Please update your browser

You're using a version of Internet Explorer that isn't supported by Questia.
To get a better experience, go to one of these sites and get the latest
version of your preferred browser:

EU Military Endorsed

By Golino, Louis R. | The Washington Times (Washington, DC), April 8, 2001 | Go to article overview

EU Military Endorsed

Golino, Louis R., The Washington Times (Washington, DC)

The United States should welcome the European Union's efforts to establish a rapid-reaction force because it will make Europe a better U.S. partner and help promote a more balanced trans-Atlantic relationship, according to a new report from a London think tank.

The report, "Europe's Military Revolution," argues that while the United States will remain the senior partner within the Atlantic alliance, America should accord Europe greater political weight if and when Europeans deliver on their promised military capabilities.

"An alliance in which the Europeans feel that they are real partners, and in which the Americans feel that they do not have to carry an unfair burden, would be the best basis for their future relationship," it said.

The report by the London-based Center for European Reform (CER) was prepared by Charles Grant, CER director; Christoph Bertram, director of Germany's largest foreign policy think tank; and French analyst Gilles Andreani, a former head of policy planning for the French Foreign Ministry.

The CER has close ties with the government of British Prime Minister Tony Blair. It reportedly influenced Mr. Blair's 1998 decision to propose an EU defense initiative focused on actual military capabilities rather than new institutions.


The report was issued March 1 during a private seminar in Brussels with the authors and Javier Solana, the EU's foreign and security policy chief, and Chris Patten, the European commissioner for foreign relations.

It says the mandate of these two EU officials overlaps too much, and having both posts fragments policy making. To help establish an effective common foreign policy, it suggests that these two positions be merged into one, which would be the single voice of the EU abroad.

Until December 1998 when Mr. Blair and French President Jacques Chirac put forward the EU defense plan, the EU had been exclusively and self-consciously a civilian power. It was frequently referred to as a economic giant and a political pygmy. But, say these writers, the European military revolution is raising Europe's global profile and will force the EU to develop a military and security culture - something it has lacked since its inception.

What is known as "the headline goal" refers to establishing by 2003 a rapid-reaction force of corps size (60,000 troops) with naval and air support that can be deployed within a month and sustained in the field for a year.

The CER analysis says that to achieve this objective, European governments will need to overcome their tendency to devote inadequate resources to defense.


It also maintains that Europeans should allocate what they do spend in a more rational way. In particular, each state needs to spend at least 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense and devote a quarter of its defense expenditures on research and development and procurement.

The authors suggest creation of an EU defense budget "to finance the cost of common weapons programs, common capabilities or forces, and EU military missions." They also argue that peer pressure can help encourage further European military reform and make two suggestions toward this end.

One is to create a monitoring group to evaluate each nation's progress in achieving defense reform; this would further the recent convergence of European military forces and doctrines the report highlights.

The other is that "the EU's defense ministers should meet on their own at least twice a year, as a Council of Defense Ministers."

Mr. Solana, the EU foreign and security policy chief, has also made the latter proposal and argued that it is essential to a serious EU defense capability.


The report says that the planned EU defense role will require integration of the intergovernmental and supranational aspects of the common European security policy.

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Cite this article

Cited article

Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)


1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25,

Cited article

EU Military Endorsed


Text size Smaller Larger
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25,

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.