Robert Weisbrot. Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence
Krenn, Michael L., International Social Science Review
Robert Weisbrot. Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2001.
"Not another study on the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962," was my first thought upon being asked to review Robert Weisbrot's new book. I was pleasantly surprised, however. Maximum Danger presents much more than another rehashing of the familiar arguments and evidence surrounding the 1962 diplomatic crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union. Weisbrot instead offers an interesting synthesis of the previous work on the missile crisis that points the way to future research and investigation into the defining moment of John F. Kennedy's foreign policy.
According to Weisbrot, most studies of the Cuban Missile Crisis (which began appearing as early as the mid-1960s) have focused almost exclusively on the role played by President Kennedy. Kennedy admirers or former members of his administration, such as Ted Sorenson, Arthur Schlesinger, …
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Publication information: Article title: Robert Weisbrot. Maximum Danger: Kennedy, the Missiles, and the Crisis of American Confidence. Contributors: Krenn, Michael L. - Author. Journal title: International Social Science Review. Publication date: Spring-Summer 2002. Page number: 72+. © 2008 Pi Gamma Mu. COPYRIGHT 2002 Gale Group.
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