Road from Rio: The Battle Lines Are Drawn between Multinational Corporations and Nongovernmental Organizations at the Upcoming Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development
Garcia-Johnson, Ronie, Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy
The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development -- the Rio Earth Summit of 1992 -- was to be the moment in which states would cooperate for the protection of the global environment. More heads of state than had ever come together to discuss any issue would meet to sign conventions on global climate change and biological diversity, to forge principles on environment and development and sustainable forestry, and to chart a course for a sustainable future. With its emphasis on development, the Earth Summit was supposed to heal the 20-year rift between Northern and Southern countries and to dispel the notion that Northern environmental concern was a ruse to slow Southern progress.
Yet this confluence of state power was not satisfying to the environmental activists who had hoped that states would finally contend with the role of multinational corporations in the devastation of the environment. They left Rio with the feeling that they had been cheated. Multinationals, they argued, had much more access and influence at the conference than these corporations should have had. Corporate preferences were clearly articulated in conference conventions, declarations of principles, and Agenda 21. (1) Multinational corporations, they claimed, had successfully precluded stronger statements about the need to make serious changes for the environment while promoting free trade.
Thanks to these companies, lamented the activists, there was no action on the regulation of multinational corporations across borders. The UN Centre on Transnational Corporations, which had been working on a code of conduct for multi-nationals, was relieved of its independent status just before the Earth Summit, and the critical report that it had prepared for Agenda 21 was not accepted by the Earth Summit Secretariat in time for inclusion. (2)
Instead, the secretary general of the Earth Summit, Maurice Strong, invited a Swiss businessman, Stephen Schmidheiny, to be his principal advisor for business and industry. (3) Schmidheiny accepted the offer and gathered together about 50 executives to create the Business Council for Sustainable Development. Participating executives represented Dow Chemical, DuPont, 3M, Mitsubishi, and Chevron, among others. In preparation for the Earth Summit, the council prepared a manifesto: Changing Course.
In Changing Course, the council agreed with the authors of the 1987 Brundtland Report that sustainable development could be achieved only through economic growth. The council argued that this growth could be realized through open international trade. Although the report recognized that some government regulation would be necessary to shape sustainable development, particularly by harmonizing patchwork environmental regulations, it argued that much of this change should take place through market mechanisms and the voluntary efforts of firms and industries. Smart, strategic firms would demonstrate their ability to protect the environment and make profits at the same time.
Despite the report's fears that the GATT and NAFTA talks would fall through, significant trade barriers were down by 1995. These barriers were removed, in part, because multinational corporations and industry organizations convincingly made the case that they could protect the environment through the implementation of corporate voluntarism.
Many environmental nongovernmental organizations--popularly known as NGOs--still feel the sting of multinational corporate victories at the Earth Summit. That sting, along with a variety of state efforts to deregulate international trade since, has galvanized them. So, while multinational corporations have been enjoying the fruits of free trade--despite painful competition and consolidation--they have been under attack from a nascent but growing anti-globalization movement.4 Increasingly, over the past 10 years, multinational corporations have struggled to maintain dominance in a turbulent global economy while defending themselves against the argument that they want to eat the world's cake and save it for tomorrow, too. The attempts of multinational corporations to operate across borders without government restraint, as well as the ongoing struggle between these companies and activist nongovernmental organizations, have generated a proliferation of private, voluntary environmental initiatives.
Given the failure of states at the Earth Summit to develop an international framework for either voluntary or binding regulation, multinational corporations today must contend not only with patchwork national environmental laws, but with a plethora of codes of conduct, certification mechanisms, and reporting guidelines. The battle that many activists thought multinational corporations won in 1992 has bogged down in a thick web of institutions that have altered global environmental governance without providing clear environmental, economic, or democratic benefits.
As preparations for the 2002 Rio + 10 conference--the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development, which takes place late this summer--proceed, nongovernmental organizations will more explicitly and forcefully demand that states develop binding corporate accountability mechanisms. The Business Council for Sustainable Development--now the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD)-with the support of the International Chamber of Commerce, is intent on countering this demand. Yet, given the transaction costs caused by the complex array of voluntary initiatives that multinational corporations face, the two organizations may be doing their members a disservice.
The multinational corporate executives that participated in the WBCSD have built private environmental institutions to bolster the reputations of firms and industries, as well as to improve environmental performance. In just 10 years, two such institutions, Responsible Care and ISO 14001, have grown tremendously in scope and influence and have even shaped one another as they compete for legitimacy and dominance. Most major multinational corporations are operating within the guidelines of at least one of these institutions, even promoting them to peers and smaller firms. Indeed, 19 of the top 20 nonfinancial multinational corporations, ranked by foreign assets by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in 1999, adhere to ISO 14001 or Responsible Care requirements.
Responsible Care began in the late 1970s. The Canadian Chemical Producers Association developed it in a more detailed form during the early 1980s. After the Bhopal disaster in 1984, and the political fallout that ensued, the Canadian Chemical Producers Association and then the U.S. Chemical Manufacturers Association--now the American Chemistry Council--introduced detailed guidelines and reporting mechanisms.
Just a year after the Chemical Manufacturers Association made participation in Responsible Care mandatory for all association members, the association, along with other industry associations, created the International Council of Chemical Associations and began the process of exporting Responsible Care to associations around the world. Recognizing the global importance of environmental issues (symbolized by the Earth Summit), trade associations in developing countries began adopting Responsible Care.
The work of giant chemical multinationals, including WBCSD members like Dow and DuPont, was critical in the diffusion of this initiative. Protecting their corporate reputations required the protection of the industry's global reputation. (5)
By 1998, the industry could claim that the Responsible Care family covers 87 percent of the production of global chemicals by volume, and by 2000, Responsible Care could boast industry association members from 46 countries around the world. (6) While there are guidelines that each association must follow as it develops its own initiatives, Responsible Care varies from country to country with differing rules, membership, and outside access. For example, the Canadians, who have always been leaders on this last point, just recently unveiled a revised set of principles that more comprehensively address the public's concerns.
Responsible Care, at times, has been heavily criticized and denounced as a public relations program. Yet it is quite a few steps above business as usual, whether it is implemented in countries with stringent environmental regulation or not. Responsible Care encompasses safety, health, and environmental concerns with its detailed guidelines, and it has mechanisms for community involvement. The American Chemistry Council cites the program as a factor in its improved environmental performance, but methods are difficult and one study argues that the effects of Responsible Care are not so positive. (7) Responsible Care has also failed to win credibility, in part due to the reluctance of participants, especially in the United States, to allow third-party oversight.
An initiative from the Business Council for Sustainable Development spurred the creation of ISO 14001. In the early 1990s, stringent environmental management systems were emerging in industries and countries, and the Eco-Management and Audit Scheme was poised to take off in Europe. Concerned about a proliferation of environmental management systems, Business Council participants raced to develop their own voluntary standards through the ISO process.
The ISO is not an intergovernmental or multilateral organization; it is a nongovernmental federation of national standard-setting bodies, many of which are private. Not only was ISO 14001 developed privately, it was developed in the absence of significant developing-country representation. U.S. companies were also very active, and their contention that they were already heavily regulated in the United States helped them to decrease the stringency of the resulting environmental-management-systems standard. (8)
ISO 14001 diffused rapidly, especially in Asia, after it was launched in 1996. It was seen as a ticket to business, in part because of the expectations created by ISO's earlier quality standard, ISO 9000. Although ISO 14001 certification has been relatively slow in the United States, it received a boost in 1999 when General Motors, Ford, and Daimler-Chrysler announced that their first-tier suppliers around the globe would have to gain ISO 14001 certification. By July 2000, some 18,052 facilities around the world had received ISO 14001 certification. (9)
While many are optimistic that companies will take ISO 14001 seriously, the initiative has significant shortcomings. The most glaring is that while ISO 14001 requires that a company implement an environmental policy, as well as conduct environmental assessments, it requires no assurance that the policy actually works to protect the environment.
Unlike Responsible Care, ISO 14001 focuses only on environmental issues--not safety or health issues--and it has no mechanism for dealing with communities or allowing public access to data. Companies can use any policy, and in some cases may even self-certify, despite the general third-party certification process. Many worry that ISO 14001 certifiers will prove inconsistent or lax. (10)
As ISO 14001 is a general environmental management system initiative, facilities in any industry can gain certification. ISO 14001 has thus come head-to-head with various industry-specific certification initiatives. While Responsible Care dominates the chemical industry worldwide, some environmental leaders have expressed concern that, when faced with a choice between ISO 14001 and Responsible Care, companies will select the more general, flexible, and less rigorous ISO 14001.
The choice between Responsible Care and ISO 14001 became more explicit after the big-three automakers specified that their first-tier suppliers around the world should be certified under ISO 14001. Many chemical firms that were first-tier suppliers were already operating under Responsible Care. Failing to gain reciprocal agreements from the automakers, the American Chemistry Council began work on a hybrid Responsible Care/ISO 14001 certification process, eventually creating a third-party audit and certification mechanism, RC-14001, which nongovernmental organizations had long awaited.
Responsible Care and ISO 14001 are both environmental certification institutions. Environmental certification institutions provide rules--in the form of codes of conduct, guidelines, or principles--for multinationals and other firms to follow wherever they operate. They also provide reporting mechanisms, such as corporate environmental reports, certification, and seals of approval, that allow firms to signal to peers, the public, and others that they are, indeed, following these rules. (11)
Environmental certification institutions provide firms with mechanisms for protecting their reputations while remaining competitive and limiting external participation in corporate affairs. But they also provide a kind of public good, setting expectations for corporate behavior and then, to some extent, providing information about whether those expectations have been met, so violators can be sanctioned or the rules altered.'2 Through the creation and maintenance of environmental certification institutions, business makes the argument that the government's role in the provision of such public goods is unnecessary.
Business certification institutions such as ISO 14001 and Responsible Care may have preempted new regulations at the international level and facilitated the opening of global trade, but they have not limited criticism from nongovernmental organizations. Instead, these organizations and activists claim that multinational corporations have coopted the concept of sustainable development.
Since 1992, when it became apparent just how difficult it would be for states to protect the environment across borders, and even more so since the mid-1990s, when it became clear that direct foreign investment across those borders would only increase, environmental activists have focused their efforts on multinational corporations. They have not only criticized multinational corporations in general, they have isolated specific companies for targeted campaigns, turning hardwon brand assets into liabilities. The slightest misstep of any multinational corporations is used as evidence that "free trade is not free."
Nongovernmental organizations denounce and challenge multinational corporations in multilateral for a, on the streets of major cities, and over the Internet. To the chagrin of corporate executives, the "enviros" are seen as being more legitimate and as acting more in the public interest than multinational corporations in all of these arenas. The arguments of young, untested nongovernmental organizations are often given more credence than those of 200 year-old companies.
True enough, the debate in the early 1990s over whether NAFTA would protect or destroy the environment created a rift between major environmental groups in the United States. But during the latter part of the l99 Os, anti-trade environmental activists frequently joined forces with labor and human rights activists, student groups, unions, and a growing number of nongovernmental organizations in the corporate accountability movement in a larger anti-globalization movement that targets multinational corporations and the international institutions (such as the IMF, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization) that seem to privilege them.
This unwieldy coalition of nongovernmental organizations blames rampant globalization for social inequity, poor working conditions, environmental devastation, human rights violations, and the destruction of indigenous culture.
The anti-globalization movement came into its own during the Seattle protests against the World Trade Organization in November 1999, but it does more of its work over the Internet than on the streets. Making the most of the medium, activists in the movement collect and disseminate information about multinational activities and manage campaigns. (13)
For many nongovernmental organizations, the various individual initiatives of multinational corporations and industry associations amount to little more than greenwash. Others may acknowledge a step in the right direction--like the break by several large companies from the conservative Global Climate Coalition--but still criticize the same companies for not breaking into a full run.
Some nongovernmental organizations have ventured into successful, productive partnerships with multinational corporations or industry associations, (14) but those that do so risk their own reputations. For example, Environmental Defense criticized the chemical industry for failing to test high production volume chemicals, and then worked with the Chemical Manufacturers Association to facilitate such testing in 1998. In 2001, when the American Chemistry Council claimed that it had tested its products for safety in a television discussion that aired after a PBS expose of the industry, Environmental Defense had to deliver a public reproach of its partner.
Moments when nongovernmental organizations and multinational corporations can work together, as they did in talks leading up to the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants, are increasing in frequency but are still relatively rare.
The potential for nongovernmental organizations to seriously challenge multinational corporations--Davids taking on Goliaths--may seem limited to some, especially since the terrorist attacks of September 11 have turned any protest that seems anti-capitalist into a temporary taboo. But during the past decade, these groups have ripped at the reputations of Mitsubishi, Chevron, Shell, Starbucks, Weyerhaeuser, McDonalds, and a long list of other companies.
Monsanto was particularly hard hit by activism spearheaded by Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth in Europe during the late 1990s. The subsequent failure of Europeans to swallow the notion that genetically modified foods were good for them caused a group of EU states to block licenses for genetically modified imports in June 1999, and Monsanto stock plummeted. Some observers doubted the company's ability to survive the blow.
Activists, nongovernmental organizations, and other networks have not only become more visible and powerful, they have made demands for transparency and accountability more specific as they target multinational corporations. It is no longer good enough for a multinational corporation to report on its environmental activities. Environmental accountability, according to some, should go beyond environmental concerns to incorporate labor and social concerns as well.
While multinational corporations are not so reluctant to discuss their "triple bottom line," (15) they have balked at the assertion that corporate accountability should go beyond the company and its subsidiaries to include joint ventures, subcontractors, and suppliers, and even those multinational corporations that acquire others.
Activists are willing to experiment with novel mechanisms to impose accountability or liability across borders. One such mechanism is a proposal promoted by Amnesty International, Friends of the Earth, and the AFL-CIO, among other groups in the International Right to Know Campaign. The proposal mandates the disclosure of information about corporate activities across the globe.
Another trendy mechanism is the arcane Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, initially designed to protect U.S. citizens from piracy. The act has been employed--for the most part unsuccessfully--in U.S. district courts to sue multinational corporations and CEOs for damage incurred in host countries. There is talk as well of an international criminal court for corporations.
Some companies--like Union Carbide--have been slammed with the weight of growing nongovernmental organization demands and tactics. While the Economist cited the forces of specialization, consolidation, and globalization for Dow's acquisition of the company, it too has acknowledged the shadow of Bhopal. (16) If we cannot argue that Union Carbide's role in the disaster in Bhopal had anything to do with the company's eventual demise, we can surmise that the abandonment of the firm's very old name was an attempt to relinquish a ruined reputation.
Activists around the world have never let the shadow of Bhopal fade, and now they refuse to let the Union Carbide name die. Although the Indian government's civil case against Union Carbide was settled in India's Supreme Court in February 1989 for $470 million, that court restored criminal charges in 1991. To make matters worse for the company, survivors and relatives filed a class action suit in a Manhattan federal court on November 15, 1999, against Union Carbide and its former chairman Warren Anderson. Representing the Bhopal Gas Peedit Mahila Udyog Sangathan and the Bhopal Group for Information and Action, Attorney Himanshu Sharma based the case on the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789, alleging that the defendants exercised "depraved indifference to human life." (17)
The case, which was particularly concerned with possible contamination of water and soil in the area, was dismissed in 2000, and Dow Chemical successfully merged with Union Carbide. However, the movement to hold Union Carbide responsible for the Bhopal disaster continued. In March 2001, working in a broad network with various anti-globalization groups, survivor organizations initiated a "Campaign for Justice," targeting Dow. "Following its merger with Carbide," explained Rashida Bi, BGPM Stationery Karmachari Sangh president, "Dow has the blood of Bhopal on its hands and this we had told them on February 28, when 300 of us stormed Dow's Mumbai office." (18) More recently, Greenpeace has also asserted that Dow Chemical had to accept responsibility for the Bhopal disaster.
Perhaps most importantly, nongovernmental organizations have done more than criticize multinational corporations. They have stepped in to address some of the problems they have identified, through the creation of rules and reporting mechanisms for production, to provide public goods themselves.
The Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES), launched in 1989, released its Valdez Principles--later known as the CERES Principles--a code of corporate environmental conduct, before the Earth Summit. (19) It has generated a new institution, the Global Reporting Initiative, in a broad consultation process with the United Nations Environmental Programme, nongovernmental organizations, business and accounting firms, and even individuals. (20)
Some observers say that the Global Reporting Initiative is the answer to the problem of proliferating environmental and social reports and that it promises to make corporate environmental reporting on a triple bottom line more systematic. The Global Reporting Initiative may eventually provide a standard by which all corporate environmental reports will be judged. To date, a diverse group of corporations operating around the world say they have taken the Global Reporting Initiative sustainability reporting guidelines into account.
The Forest Stewardship Council, a certification institution spearheaded by the World Wildlife Fund and other groups, has also set a standard for others to follow. (21) This certification institution--which provides performance standards, tracks sustainably harvested wood through the chain of custody, and provides labels for retail sale--grew out of discussions in 1990 and later talks at the Earth Summit. It was a specific response to the problem of global deforestation and the failure of states to address the problem.
The American forest products industry responded to the Forest Stewardship Council with its own certification institution, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative. (22) Environmental activists, accusing the Sustainable Forestry Initiative of providing lax standards, campaigned against key retailers like Lowes and Home Depot until these companies promised to buy Forest Stewardship Council certified wood. In response, the Sustainable Forestry Initiative has evolved to look more and more like the Forest Stewardship Council. (23)
Certification initiatives and institutions, both social and environmental, are in place or developing in industries from coffee and hospitality to bananas and mining. If multinational corporations and industry associations thought that they could mitigate the transaction costs of dealing with activists through the creation of codes of conduct and reporting mechanisms in 1992, they thought wrong. Nongovernmental organizations are more intent than ever on getting their way by creating competing institutions. So, for some years now, companies that have not created their own environmental certification institutions have been wondering which certification institutions they should adopt.
While many argue, for example, that the Forest Stewardship Council or Responsible Care are compatible with ISO 14001, why should companies bother to adopt a more rigorous mechanism along with the ISO standard? In any case, the proliferation of social and environmental certification institutions is increasing the search costs that the presence of just one global, standard environmental certification institution would mitigate. Firm decisions about which environmental certification institutions will work best for them are votes for the continuance of those institutions. This should be a cause for concern; the certification institutions that eventually become dominant may not be best for the environment. And no matter who creates or maintains environmental certification institutions, they are not necessarily more transparent or accountable than traditional governance mechanisms.
Behind the Curve
The only actor that has lagged behind in this story is the state. This should not be surprising since governments of many countries have worked very hard in the last decade to pull back their efforts, not to extend diem, either within or beyond their borders. Some states have mandated that specific "voluntary" codes be followed or, at least, have encouraged participation in them. With few exceptions--like the European Code of Conduct for European Enterprises Operating in Developing Countries--states have not worked to address the substantive problem of multinational corporations and jurisdiction, or multinational corporations and accountability and they have not systematically tried to build institutional mechanisms that would more effectively or constructively channel the diverse preferences of non-governmental organizations and multinational corporations.
Although the OECD has recently revived its voluntary code for multinational enterprises, intergovernmental institutions too have been slow to move on this issue for the most part. Some of the multilateral environmental agreements that would affect the multinationals--like the Kyoto Protocol--have been thwarted. (24)
In this context, the United Nations' efforts to forge a compact with multinational corporations stands out. The UN Global Compact, enthusiastically promoted by Kofi Annan and spearheaded by UN Assistant Secretary General John G. Ruggie, is built upon nine principles culled from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Labor Organization's Fundamental Principles on Rights at Work, and the Rio Principles on Environment and Development. In addition to these rules, the compact provides an informal reporting mechanism whereby corporations post their achievements on the Internet, and non-governmental organizations look them over.
When the Global Compact was unveiled in 2000, many non-governmental organizations hesitated to participate; they did not want to endorse the companies involved. Others, like Corporate Watch and groups in the Alliance for a Corporate-Free UN, are still incensed by what they call "bluewashing." The Global Compact, they argue, draws firms into a partnership with the UN, and this partnership provides legitimacy to firms, like Nike and Shell, that they say have demonstrated only a partial or superficial commitment to the environmental and social goals of the Global Compact. They argue that the Global Compact should be dismantled or revised, as it precludes what is really necessary: a binding multilateral code of conduct for multinational corporations. (25)
The activists claim that voluntary corporate social responsibility is insufficient in a world of Union Carbides and Enrons. The Business Charter for Sustainable Development, ISO 14001, Responsible Care, and the long list of voluntary initiatives rolled out by multinational corporations to demonstrate their capacity to self-regulate are inadequate to protect people in the environment. Instead, they explain, corporate accountability must be backed up by the coercive powers of states.
On to Johannesburg
At meetings leading up to the Johannesburg Summit, and during the event itself, groups like Friends of the Earth International will fight for, while the WBCSD and likeminded parties will fight against, a negotiation process for a binding convention on corporate conduct. The outcome is uncertain. While state power in the wake of September 11 seems to be on the rise, President Bush has reasserted the need for voluntary action and market mechanisms domestically. States may be reinvigorated as they address security concerns, but nor as they address social and environmental ones. Still, the Firestone/Ford and Enron scandals that bookend the September terrorist attacks make claims for corporate social responsibility sound much less convincing than they did in 1992.
We can expect some progress at Johannesburg towards the creation of a multilateral code of conduct for multinationals. But we cannot expect the United States, home and host to the world's largest and most influential multinational corporations, to allow it to become binding in the near future.
(2.) See P. Chatterjee and M. Finger, The Earth Brokers: Power, Politics and World Development (New York, NY: Routledge, 1994); J. Karliner, The Corporate Planet: Ecology and Politics in the Age of Globalization (San Francisco, CA: Sierra Club Books, 1997).
(3.) S. Schmidheiny, Changing Course: A Global Perspective on Development and the Environment (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992).
(4.) The anti-globalization movement is a loose confederation of environmental, social, and human rights organizations that have a growing disaffection with the control that multinational corporations have on international politics and the global economy. The movement reached a head in 1999 when 60,000 protestors closed down World Trade Organization meetings in Seattle.
(5.) R. Garcia-Johnson, Exporting Environmentalism: U.S. Multinational Chemical Corporations in Brazil and Mexico (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000).
(6.) International Council of Chemistry Associations, "ICCA Responsible Care Status Report 1998." Available at
(7.) A.A. King and M.J. Lenox, "Industry Self-Regulation without Sanctions: The Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program," Academy of Management Journal 43 (698) (2000).
(8.) R. Krut and H. Gleckman, ISO 14001: A Missed Opportunity for Sustainable Global Industrial Development (London, UK: Earthscan Publications, Ltd., 1998).
(9.) Richard N.L. Andrews et al., "Environmental Management Systems: History, Theory, and Implementation Research," in Regulating from the Inside, eds. Cary Coglianese and Jennifer Nash (Washington, DC: Resources for the Future, 2001), pp. 31-60.
(10.) See Krut and Gleckman.
(11.) Gary Gereffi, Ronie Garcia-Johnson, and Erika N. Sasser. "The NGO-Industry Complex," Foreign Policy (Jul-Aug 2001).
(12.) R. Garcia-Johnson, "Beyond Corporate Culture: Reputation, Rules and the Role of Social and Environmental Certification Institutions" (unpublished paper, February 2000).
(13.) J. Bray, "Web Wars: NGOs, Companies and Governments in an Internet-Connected World," Greener Management International 24 (Winter 1998), p. 115.
(14.) J. Bendell, ed., Terms for Endearment: Business, NGOs and Sustainable Development (Sheffield, UK: Greenleaf Publishing Ltd., 2000).
(15.) The triple bottom line is a measure of a company's financial prosperity, environmental quality, and social justice, sometimes expressed in terms of economy, environment, and equity.
(16.) "Chemicals Cracking Deal," Economist 352(8132) (August 7, 1999).
(17.) "Union Carbide, Ex-Chief to Face Trial in U.S.," The Hindu (June 5, 2000) online edition. See the article at:
(18.) "Drive for Justice to Bhopal Gas Victims," The Hindu (March 19, 2001) online edition. See article at
(23.) E.N. Sasser, "Gaining Leverage: NGO Influence on Certification Institutions in the Forest Products Sector," Paper presented at the Forest Policy Center's Global Initiatives and Public Policies: First International Conference on Private Forestry in the 21st Century (Atlanta, GA, March 26, 2001).
(24.) See Jennifer Clapp's discussion of the Basel Convention in "Cleaning Up Their Act" beginning on page 28 in this issue of FORUM.
(25.) See "Greenwash +10: The UN's Global Compact, Corporate Accountability and the Johannesburg Earth Summit," at
Ronie Garcia-Johnson is assistant professor of Environmental Policy, Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina.…
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Publication information: Article title: Road from Rio: The Battle Lines Are Drawn between Multinational Corporations and Nongovernmental Organizations at the Upcoming Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development. Contributors: Garcia-Johnson, Ronie - Author. Journal title: Forum for Applied Research and Public Policy. Volume: 16. Issue: 4 Publication date: Summer 2002. Page number: 6+. © Not available. COPYRIGHT 2002 Gale Group.
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