Preemption Option: A Must for Israel

By Louis Rene BeresThomas McInerney | The Christian Science Monitor, February 27, 2007 | Go to article overview

Preemption Option: A Must for Israel


Louis Rene BeresThomas McInerney, The Christian Science Monitor


The core of Israel's active defense plan remains the Arrow antiballistic missile program. Test results of the Arrow have been promising. They indicate not only the mutual benefits of close cooperation between Washington and Jerusalem, but also the technical promise of Israel's missile defense system.

But serious decisions must still be made. Faced with a steadily nuclearizing Iran, Israel must consider whether it can rely entirely upon a suitable combination of deterrence and active defenses or whether it must also prepare for preemption. The results of this essential consideration will have existential consequences for the Jewish state.

Israel's preemption option should now appear less urgent. If the Arrow were truly efficient, even an irrational Iranian adversary armed with nuclear and/or biological weapons could be dealt with effectively. If Israel's nuclear deterrent were immobilized by an enemy state willing to risk a massive "counter-value" Israeli reprisal, that aggressor's ensuing first strike could still be blocked by Arrow. So why even consider preemption against Iran?

Missile defense is no guarantee

The answer lies in certain crucial assumptions. "Operational reliability of intercept" is a "soft" concept, and any missile defense system will always have "leakage" - it can't stop every incoming missile. Whether such leakage would fall within acceptable levels must ultimately depend, primarily, upon the kinds of warheads fitted upon the enemy's incoming missiles. Shall Israel now bet its very life on a capacity to fully anticipate offensive enemy capabilities? We think not.

A tiny number of enemy missiles penetrating Arrow defenses could still be "acceptable" if their warheads contained only conventional high explosive or even chemical high explosive. But if the incoming warheads were nuclear and/or biological, even an extremely low rate of leakage would be intolerable. This means that Israel cannot depend upon its antiballistic missiles to defend against any future attack by Iran using a weapon of mass destruction. Even if Israel could expect a 100 percent reliability of interception for Arrow, this would do nothing to blunt the unconventional threat from terrorist surrogates. …

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