Law Report: Case Summaries
THE FOLLOWING notes of judgments were prepared by the reporters of the All England Law Reports.
Foley and another v Attorney General; Court of Appeal (Peter Gibson, Schiemann LJJ, Wilson J) 1 March 2000.
THE ATTORNEY General could succeed in an application for a civil proceedings order under s 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 in the absence of evidence of his authorisation of the proceedings. Like any other litigant, the Attorney General was entitled to employ solicitors and counsel to make an application on his behalf and, in the absence of any challenge, solicitors making such an application were assumed to have authority to do so from their client.
The first appellant appeared in person; Raymond Croxon QC, Frank Slevin (Mahmood Southcombe, Ilford) for the second appellant; Guy Sankey QC (Treasury Solicitor) for the Attorney General.
R v The Parole Board and another, ex p Oyston; Court of Appeal (Lord Bingham of Cornhill CJ, Pill, Hale LJJ) 1 March 2000.
IN CONSIDERING applications for release on parole, the Parole Board was required to apply directives issued by the Secretary of State for the Home Department pursuant to s 36 of the Criminal Justice Act 1991. The Board's primary task was to consider the risk to the public if parole were granted, but that risk had to be balanced against the benefit to the offender of early release. Whilst the Board had to focus in each case on the question of risk, it should, in its decision letter, identify in general terms the matters which it had considered on both sides in carrying out the balancing exercise, and its reasons for striking the balance, and it should summarise the considerations which had led to its decision.
Beverley Lang (Kirk Jackson, Manchester) for the applicant; Steven Kovats (Treasury Solicitor) for the Secretary of State.
Atkins v Director of Public Prosecutions; Goodland v Director of Public Prosecutions; QBD, Div C (Simon Brown LJ, Blofeld J) 8 March 2000.
ALTHOUGH SECTION 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1978 should be construed as narrowly as it reasonably could be on order to avoid innocent people falling foul of its provisions, the language of the subsection was unambiguous. The words "to make" a photograph had to be given their natural and ordinary meaning, namely to cause to exist, to produce by action, or to bring about. "Making", therefore, included copying photographs but did not include unintentional copying. Material which was unknowingly stored in, and recoverable from, a cache file on the hard disc of a computer would not, accordingly, be caught by s 1(1)(a). …