Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries
Smith, Douglas G., Brigham Young University Law Review
Veil piercing doctrines have been the subject of much scholarly attention in recent years.1 They have generated diametrically opposing views, with some legal commentators advocating the complete abolition of the doctrines and others advocating a significant relaxation of the standards for piercing the corporate veil.
Those who advocate abolition of these doctrines argue that limited liability for corporations has significant economic benefits.2 These scholars argue that aside from reducing the costs of equity ownership and facilitating economic growth, limited liability facilitates diversification of investment, reduces monitoring costs, increases liquidity of shares, and ā¦
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Publication information:
Article title: Piercing the Corporate Veil in Regulated Industries.
Contributors: Smith, Douglas G. - Author.
Journal title: Brigham Young University Law Review.
Volume: 2008.
Issue: 4
Publication date: July 1, 2008.
Page number: 1165+.
© Brigham Young University, Reuben Clark Law School 2008.
Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
This material is protected by copyright and, with the exception of fair use, may not be further copied, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means.
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