Going Once, Going Twice, Sold: Auctions and the Success of Economic Theory
Zaretsky, Adam M., Regional Economist
In 1994, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) began auctioning electromagnetic spectrum bandwidth to firms interested in using it for personal communications services (PCS). Before that time, spectrum bandwidth had been given away to broadcasters through administrative hearings or lotteries-procedures that were not only inefficient, but also costly. According to the Commerce Department, the federal government in the 1980s gave away cellular phone licenses valued at $46 billion.1 Realizing the revenu, potential, Congress turned to auctions as a way to both allo cate spectrum more efficiently than it had in the past and to reap revenue that could be used to help offset the budget …
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Publication information:
Article title: Going Once, Going Twice, Sold: Auctions and the Success of Economic Theory.
Contributors: Zaretsky, Adam M. - Author.
Magazine title: Regional Economist.
Publication date: January 1998.
Page number: 10+.
© Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Jan 2009.
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