Boards of Directors and Fraud

By Beasley, Mark S. | The CPA Journal, April 1998 | Go to article overview

Boards of Directors and Fraud


Beasley, Mark S., The CPA Journal


What characteristics of the board of directors play a role in preventing financial statement fraud? Useful insights can be obtained by comparing board characteristics for companies experiencing financial statement fraud with board characteristics for com panies not experiencing such fraud. Knowledge about board of director characteristics likely to affect the occurrence of financial statement fraud will be particularly useful to auditors as they fulfill their fraud risk assessment responsibilities described in the recently issued SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit.

While the board of directors often delegates day-to-day responsibility for the design and operating effectiveness of internal control to top management, the board is gener ally viewed as a key internal control mechanism within a company because it is ultimately responsible for top management's actions. Auditing standards recognize the significant influence the board has over a company's internal control. Those standards particularly highlight the role of the board in establishing an effective control environment component of a company's internal control. In fact, SAS No. 55 requires the auditor to obtain "sufficient knowledge of the control environment to understand management's and the board of director's [emphasis added] attitude, awareness, and actions concerning the control environment." Other auditing standards recognize the importance of the board of directors by requiring the auditor to communicate various matters related to the audit directly to the board of directors or its audit committee (see, for example, SAS Nos. 54, 60, 61, and 82).

Even though auditing standards identify the board as a critical component of a company's internal control, little insight is provided about characteristics of the board of directors that might influence its ability to reduce instances of material financial statement fraud. While the recently issued SAS No. 82 notes that "Domination of management by a single person or small group without compensating controls such as effective oversight by the board of directors or audit committee" can be a risk factor relating to misstatements arising from fraudulent financial reporting, guidance is not provided as to the nature of characteristics of boards that may affect the board's ability to prevent or detect the occurrence of such fraud.

A potentially useful study examines differences in certain board of director characteristics between companies experiencing financial statement fraud and companies not experiencing financial statement fraud. Findings from the study may prove helpful to auditors as they evaluate fraud risk factors described in SAS No. 82.

The underlying Study

The population used to examine the relation of board of director characteristics and instances of financial statement fraud includes 150 publicly traded companies. Seventy-five of the 150 companies had an occurrence of material financial statement fraud reported during the period 1980-1991. Most of these fraud companies (67 of 75) were identified from a review of Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs) issued by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). The remaining eight fraud companies were identified from reports of financial statement fraud allegations in The Wall Street Journal. Seventy-five additional companies very similar in size, industry, national stock exchange, and time period to the 75 fraud companies were identified to serve as a benchmark for comparison. Thus. the total population consists of 75 fraud companies, each individually matched with a similar no-- fraud company.

Differences in Characteristics

Several differences in board of director characteristics are evident when comparing boards of the fraud and no-fraud companies. Boards of fraud companies differ from boards of no-fraud companies in composition, tenure, and ownership levels of its members and in the presence of an active audit committee as described more in the paragraphs that follow. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

Boards of Directors and Fraud
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Welcome to the new Questia Reader

The Questia Reader has been updated to provide you with an even better online reading experience.  It is now 100% Responsive, which means you can read our books and articles on any sized device you wish.  All of your favorite tools like notes, highlights, and citations are still here, but the way you select text has been updated to be easier to use, especially on touchscreen devices.  Here's how:

1. Click or tap the first word you want to select.
2. Click or tap the last word you want to select.

OK, got it!

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.