Revenue Protection for Organic Producers: Too Much or Too Little?
Singerman, Ariel, Hart, Chad E., Lence, Sergio H., Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics
A framework is developed to examine organic crop insurance established by the Risk Management Agency (RMA). Given that the RMA links organic and conventional crop prices, the model is calibrated to reflect both markets to illustrate the impacts that pricing has on insurance coverage. Findings indicate that at the 75% coverage level, the RMA's fixed-price factor implies an effective coverage ranging from 43% to 105% depending on the ratio of planting-time organic to conventional market prices. Results suggest the RMA's program is likely to induce adverse selection because the nominal coverage level is likely to deviate substantially from the effective coverage.
Key words: adverse ā¦
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Publication information:
Article title: Revenue Protection for Organic Producers: Too Much or Too Little?.
Contributors: Singerman, Ariel - Author, Hart, Chad E. - Author, Lence, Sergio H. - Author.
Journal title: Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
Volume: 37.
Issue: 3
Publication date: December 2012.
Page number: 415+.
© Western Agricultural Economics Association Dec 2008.
Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
This material is protected by copyright and, with the exception of fair use, may not be further copied, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means.
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