The Reciprocity of Search
Chiang, Tun-Jen, Vanderbilt Law Review
The discussion of search in patent law always frames the problem in terms of producers looking for patentees. But search is reciprocal. In designing a patent system, we can have producers look for patentees, or patentees look for producers. Either will result in the ex ante negotiation that is the goal of a property system. The legal rule that produces the most efficient social outcome depends on identifying the party with the lower search cost.
The corollary is that patentees should have the duty of search when they are the lower-cost searcher. For example, if there are thousands of patents covering a product, but only one producer in the industry, then it will likely be more …
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Publication information:
Article title: The Reciprocity of Search.
Contributors: Chiang, Tun-Jen - Author.
Journal title: Vanderbilt Law Review.
Volume: 66.
Issue: 1
Publication date: January 2013.
Page number: 11+.
© Vanderbilt Law Review Jan 2009.
Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
This material is protected by copyright and, with the exception of fair use, may not be further copied, distributed or transmitted in any form or by any means.
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