The Politics of Military Strategy

By Kingseed, Cole C. | Army, April 2013 | Go to article overview

The Politics of Military Strategy


Kingseed, Cole C., Army


The Politics of Military Strategy Defeating Japan: The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Strategy in the Pacific War, 1943-1945. Charles F. Brower. Palgrave Macmillan. 231 pages; photographs; maps; notes; bibliography; index; $90. Publisher's website: www. palgrave.com.

Contrary to the popular misconception fostered by wartime allies that American military leaders of World War II were amateur strategists who failed to understand the integral relationship between war and politics, soldier-historian Charles F. Brower offers a compelling alternative interpretation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) in Defeating Japan. In Brower 's view, the JCS evolved into seasoned strategists who "found political and military considerations, both American and Allied, to be inseparable in the global coalition war that they were fighting. ... They recognized that war was not an autonomous, independent phenomenon but the product of political forces that would continue to exert their influence as the war progressed."

Brower is a lifelong student of political and military affairs. A 32-year Army veteran, Brower is the former chairman of the U.S. Military Academy's Department of Behavioral Sciences and Leadership and the former dean of academics at Virginia Military Institute (VMI). Brower currently serves as professor of history and international relations at VMI, where he teaches courses in American foreign policy and strategy and holds the Henry King Burgwyn chair in military history. He also edited World War II in Europe: The Final Year and George C. Marshall: Servant of the American Nation.

Defeating japan is Brower 's "effort to understand the relationship between such 'political and morale considerations' and American strategy-making in the war against Japan." He focuses principally on strategic planning at the national level - that is, at the juncture between the commander in chief and his principal military advisors. Consequently, America's great battle captains from World War II, with the exception of GEN Joseph W. Stilwell - whose China Theater responsibilities inevitably drew him into the political sphere - make only an occasional appearance in Brower 's study.

Brower begins his narrative with an examination of the political considerations that governed the conduct of the war against the Japanese empire, claiming that disagreements over policy and strategy never disappeared entirely. Brower asserts that American military policy and strategy-making in World War II remained a "'model of quiet, uncomplaining military acceptance' of the primacy of national policy and civilian supremacy." Accordingly, the JCS willingly accepted "their subordination in the difficult collaboration and 'unequal dialogue' with their civilian masters that led to the shaping and execution of wartime military strategy."

Brower also sees an evolving sophistication within the JCS as they attempted to cope with the political dimensions of military strategy in 1943 and 1944. In 1943, two strategic issues proved paramount: the development of a long-range plan for the defeat of Japan and the need to stimulate action in Burma to lift the siege of China, which was critical in President Franklin D. …

The rest of this article is only available to active members of Questia

Sign up now for a free, 1-day trial and receive full access to:

  • Questia's entire collection
  • Automatic bibliography creation
  • More helpful research tools like notes, citations, and highlights
  • Ad-free environment

Already a member? Log in now.

Notes for this article

Add a new note
If you are trying to select text to create highlights or citations, remember that you must now click or tap on the first word, and then click or tap on the last word.
One moment ...
Default project is now your active project.
Project items

Items saved from this article

This article has been saved
Highlights (0)
Some of your highlights are legacy items.

Highlights saved before July 30, 2012 will not be displayed on their respective source pages.

You can easily re-create the highlights by opening the book page or article, selecting the text, and clicking “Highlight.”

Citations (0)
Some of your citations are legacy items.

Any citation created before July 30, 2012 will labeled as a “Cited page.” New citations will be saved as cited passages, pages or articles.

We also added the ability to view new citations from your projects or the book or article where you created them.

Notes (0)
Bookmarks (0)

You have no saved items from this article

Project items include:
  • Saved book/article
  • Highlights
  • Quotes/citations
  • Notes
  • Bookmarks
Notes
Cite this article

Cited article

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

(Einhorn, 1992, p. 25)

(Einhorn 25)

1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited article

The Politics of Military Strategy
Settings

Settings

Typeface
Text size Smaller Larger Reset View mode
Search within

Search within this article

Look up

Look up a word

  • Dictionary
  • Thesaurus
Please submit a word or phrase above.
Print this page

Print this page

Why can't I print more than one page at a time?

Full screen

matching results for page

Cited passage

Style
Citations are available only to our active members.
Sign up now to cite pages or passages in MLA, APA and Chicago citation styles.

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn, 1992, p. 25).

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences." (Einhorn 25)

"Portraying himself as an honest, ordinary person helped Lincoln identify with his audiences."1

1. Lois J. Einhorn, Abraham Lincoln, the Orator: Penetrating the Lincoln Legend (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1992), 25, http://www.questia.com/read/27419298.

Cited passage

Thanks for trying Questia!

Please continue trying out our research tools, but please note, full functionality is available only to our active members.

Your work will be lost once you leave this Web page.

For full access in an ad-free environment, sign up now for a FREE, 1-day trial.

Already a member? Log in now.