Kennedy, Cuba, and the Press
Graham, James T., Journalism History
John F. Kennedy has been labeled the standard bearer for presidential television, but this depiction belies a transition era for American journalism where the print press still reigned supreme.1 In the nation's political development television was still an infant medium and considered a novelty throughout the Kennedy presidency. Despite a strong television performance against Richard Nixon in the 1960 presidential debates, Kennedy feared overexposure and told aides to reserve "that gadget" for special occasions to stage performances that struck a high note with the American public.2 On election night, he confided to Benjamin Bradlee, a friend and reporter for Newsweek, that "a few close friends" in Chicago, not television, might have provided the real edge.3 Kennedy introduced the innovation of live television to presidential press conferences, but only after being pushed by advisers.4 After studying President Franklin D. Roosevelt and learning that FDR averaged two radio addresses a year and focused primarily upon influencing newspapers to shape public opinion, Kennedy worried about overexposure and decided to use television sparingly and targeted print journalists.5
A brief experience as a reporter covering the opening of the United Nations and the Potsdam Conference in 1945 filled President Kennedy with confident pride that he understood how the press worked in politics and what journalists looked for and needed when covering a story.6 Driven by the belief that newspapers and magazines were the most influential channels to shape public opinion, Kennedy personally monitored print coverage of the New Frontier every morning.7 For the routine, day-to-day business of framing his agenda in the press, Kennedy focused upon personally influencing print journalists. He was the last president to enjoy the luxury of picking and choosing between print and television. For most of his time in office, network newscasts ran for only fifteen minutes; they expanded to thirty minutes in September 1963, shortly before his death. After the assassination, television came of age with unprecedented marathon coverage of Kennedy's funeral. The question of how to handle foreign policy events under the glaring eye of expanded television news coverage was left for Lyndon B. Johnson and Richard M. Nixon. Television news offered Americans only fleeting glimpses of the New Frontier's foreign policy, even as Kennedy presided over a series of dramatic crises with the Soviet Union.8
Empowered by the limitations of television news technology, the White House looked to the print press to shape American perceptions of Kennedy's handling of foreign policy. Television journalists lacked minicameras and satellites necessary for spontaneous coverage that would challenge the official version of foreign policy events. Televising foreign policy events required cooperation from participants, along with elaborate arrangements to replicate studio conditions in distant lands. Before an event could be aired, film needed to be developed and flown back to the United States. In addition, the Cold War made countries such as China and Cuba off limits to television cameras.9
Kennedy also benefited from the Cold War because journalists wanted to help the White House win the war against Communism. During the early 1960s journalists, like most Americans, still trusted government. For American journalism, the pre-Vietnam/Watergate period was an innocent era marked by the absence of contemporary Washington's cynicism and combative "feeding frenzy." Stories about Kennedy's personal life were considered off limits by most reporters, although many later recounted in memoirs that they were aware of womanizing and questions about his health. Kennedy's peccadilloes and health problems were over-looked as they had been during the Great Depression and World War II for Roosevelt.11
Over the course of his political career Kennedy, much like Roosevelt, developed a small network of relationships with journalists which he relied upon after he became president. As the columnist Joseph Alsop later put it, "he (JFK) had in some sense a kind of court."11 When friendship did not work, the President made personal appeals to journalists' patriotism.12 Theodore Sorensen, a close political adviser, later noted that Kennedy worried about information strategy because the majority of editors and publishers had opposed him during the 1960 election. Sorensen claimed that the President worried less about the spoken word because history would be based upon the printed word.13 Concerned about influencing history's first draft, Kennedy ran the White House like a newspaper and offered favored reporters inside stories.14 The term "news management" was actually coined by Arthur Krock of the New York Times to criticize Kennedy for controlling access more extensively than previous presidents. 15
Despite criticism, Kennedy never changed his tactics. Documents declassified since the close of the Cold War underscore that Kennedy's manipulation was nowhere more evident than in his Cuba policy. Scholars can only now differentiate reality from the spin Kennedy encouraged in the original newspaper sketches of history. When the New Frontier's declassified record is juxtaposed against the private papers and memoirs from publishers and journalists of this period, it becomes clear that Kennedy faced a dilemma regarding Cuba. The picture that emerges contradicts the early memoirs on the New Frontier that claimed Kennedy did not have a press strategy and that denied his deep involvement in the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, and negotiating a missile trade to resolve the Missile Crisis.
From the outset, President Kennedy's instincts placed him a step ahead of advisers in developing information strategy. Because covert operations sometimes required misleading the press, Kennedy had already assured reporters that an invasion of Cuba was not imminent. His personal involvement in setting media strategy for Cuba alarmed the White House counselor, Arthur M. Schlesinger. "When lies must be told, they should be told by subordinate officials," Schlesinger warned in a memorandum to Kennedy. The Bay of Pigs invasion was only a few days away, but the White House had already prepared for a cover-up.16
Kennedy had been elected in 1960 with a promise "to strengthen . . . democratic forces in exile and in Cuba itself who offer eventual hope of over-throwing (Fidel) Castro," the revolutionary dictator of Cuba.17 But Kennedy apparently did not know that President Dwight Eisenhower had already developed a plan to deal with Castro.18 The original Eisenhower plan called for a large invasion at the foot of the Escambray Mountains.19 Under pressure, Kennedy moved forward, but ordered a less conspicuous landing at the Bay of Pigs.20 Cuba became a litmus test for Kennedy's macho public image.21
After a reporter for the New Republic uncovered the plans, Kennedy requested the story be canceled as a "patriotic act" in the Cold War.22 Tad Szulc, a reporter for the New York Times, also uncovered the story.23 James Reston, the Washington bureau chief of the New York Times, consulted with the President and told his editors to back off or risk being blamed for killing the invasion.24 The Tunes publisher, Orvil Dryfoos, eliminated references to the CIA and the word "imminent" and changed Szulc's story from a four-column banner to a routine single column on the front page.25 The majority of reporters patriotically applauded.26
"Castro doesn't need agents over here," Kennedy complained privately. "All he has to do is read our papers."27 Nonetheless, he decided to go ahead although the mission no longer had the element of surprise.28 Then the President refused to escalate when his military advisers urged sending American forces, and the Bay of Pigs invasion became a complete debacle.29 Afterward, Kennedy regretted his own success at influencing the press before the Bay of Pigs. "Maybe if you had printed more . . . you would have saved us," he later confided to Dryfoos. In a speech before newspaper publishers, however, the President complained that America's enemies in the Cold War were able to gather information about "covert operations" by reading the newspapers.30 Kennedy urged news executives to adopt self-censorship and coordinate with the government when a story involved national security.3' The reporters and publishers grumbled.
The President continued to play damage control. "There's an old saying that victory has 100 fathers and defeat is an orphan," Kennedy declared during a televised press conference.32 He publicly accepted responsibility, but privately blamed the Joint Chiefs of Staff.33 "(The) President accepted their judgment as to whether it was militarily feasible," the Attorney General emphasized to Hanson Baldwin, the national security reporter for the New York Times. Over lunch with Times reporter Herbert Matthews and dinner with Robert Estabrook of the Washington Post, Schlesinger repeated the same line.34 In May 1961, the President emphasized similar exculpating rationalizations to Arthur Krock, complaining that the Joint Chiefs had overestimated the probability of success. Krock doubted Kennedy's account and later wrote that the "enforced silence" of the Joint Chiefs made it impossible to assess the President's role objectively.35
The President did tell Alsop that the Bay of Pigs was his personal responsibility, but the fingerpointing left the columnist perplexed because he already knew that Kennedy had cut back on Eisenhower's original plan. Kennedy's tactic only raised doubts in his mind about Kennedy's leadership. "I don't understand the President having said, `Well, we'll take this gamble,'" Alsop later wrote.36
Kennedy's backgrounders could not prevent the rest of official Washington from talking to Henry Luce. TimeLife's publisher eventually learned every detail about the Cuban debacle and struck out at Kennedy in the September 1961 issue of Fortune Magazine. The resulting article, written by Charles V. Murphy and approved by Luce, was titled, "Cuba: The Record Set Straight." Murphy's article blamed the White House for the Bay of Pigs failure because Kennedy rejected requests for air cover.37
The White House secretly dispatched General Maxwell Taylor to New York to meet with Luce. Taylor had supervised the internal investigation (the so-called Taylor report) into the Bay of Pigs.38 "I have not been converted," the publisher reported back to the President.39 Nevertheless, Luce agreed that "the less said the better about it." Wanting to push Kennedy to take a tough stand against Communism, Luce did not wish to make the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev more confident in the process with continued public criticism of the President.40
Dazed by defeat, the lesson Kennedy learned from the Bay of Pigs was to push harder and quietly defeat Communism in Cuba. Operation Mongoose became the code name for clandestine CIA operations against Castro. The fundamental difference from the Bay of Pigs, however, was that Mongoose operated with the understanding that overt U.S. action might eventually become necessary.41 Nonetheless, Kennedy still had ambivalent feelings about a U.S. invasion and never allowed full-scale military exercises to go beyond the planning stage. He kept reporters in the dark and maintained plausible deniability, but secrecy created a dilemma for maintaining the macho public image he had created during the 1960 election. He was unable to satisfy publicly the demands of Luce and others who wanted harsher actions against Cuba.42
The Missile Crisis soon punctuated this atmosphere of covert confrontation. In 1962, the CIA warned the President about rumors of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Throughout the summer, Republicans attacked Kennedy by claiming that offensive missiles were already in Cuba, and Cold War leadership (or the lack thereof) became a central theme in the 1962 campaign.43 In response, Kennedy decided to have Roger Hilsman, the State Department's Director of Intelligence and Research, offer the press a background briefing on August 24. Hilsman did not discuss Mongoose and assured reporters that Castro was only building defensive systems.' The August 31 issue of Time magazine featured classified U.S. intelligence documents with anonymous warnings about the Soviet build-up in Cuba. Claiming that Soviet missiles were already only ninety miles from American shores, Senator Kenneth Keating, a New York Republican, offered the press an elaborate intelligence briefing on the floor of the Senate that same day. Fully aware of U.S. intelligence capabilities, Kennedy suspected a leak. "Those CIA bastards," grumbled Kennedy, who suspected leaks of unsubstantiated rumors from his spooks.
At Kennedy's August 29 press conference reporters asked him to respond to Republican Senator Homer Capehart's recommendation that the White House should launch a preemptive invasion. Kennedy did not offer Khrushchev a clear warning that the U.S. would not tolerate nuclear weapons in Cuba.46 On September 13 the President promised to take action if Cuba became an offensive military base, but once again failed to make it clear that the U.S. would not tolerate nuclear weapons.47 The following day, he ordered the Joint Chiefs to develop contingency plans for an air strike to take out Soviet surface-to-air missile sites in Cuba.48 "For the public, the President's address (October 22) was the first alarm bell of danger," an official military history later noted.49
On October 14 American U-2 spy plane photos confirmed that the Soviets were indeed building nuclear missile sites in Cuba. The photographic evidence became available the following evening; nevertheless, the National Security Council advisor McGeorge Bundy decided not to disturb Kennedy while he slept and recovered from a weekend of campaigning. He also worried that the President would roust advisers from their sleep, thus alerting reporters. Furthermore, there was no need to disturb the President because contingency plans for an air strike, invasion, or blockade of Cuba were already well underway.
"We are probably going to have to bomb them," Kennedy declared on October 16 after Bundy's briefing on the U-2 photographs.51 The President convened a series of meetings with top officials who later became officially known as the Executive Committee or ExComm. He ruled out doing nothing or limiting the US response to diplomacy; the options considered were an air strike, an invasion, or a blockade along with a deal to "buy 'em out.' "Last month, I should have said . . . that we don't care," Kennedy commented privately. He also regretted that not enough had been done earlier to communicate a clearer U.S. position to Khrushchev. 53 On October 18 the President obtained U-2 intelligence data suggesting that some of the missiles in Cuba would be ready to fire in twenty-four hours. A vote showed Kennedy advisers divided with eleven for a blockade and six for an air strike. He told them that he tentatively supported a blockade, and later made it clear to Sorensen that he preferred a blockade over an air strike. While alone Kennedy spoke into a tape recorder that the consensus among his advisers was to begin a blockade on Sunday night, but he wanted more support. The Attorney General and Sorensen were instructed to build a bigger consensus while he maintained his normal schedule and left Washington to campaign for Democrats.54
Advisers were admonished not to talk to other government officials or the press. To prevent the Soviets from learning about the crisis, only twelve government officials knew about the photographs. Kennedy wanted the government to speak with one voice and personally orchestrated the flow of information and prohibited Pentagon and State Department officials from talking to the press without White House approval. The restrictions were designed to prevent the "disaster" that would result from news being leaked while Kennedy deciphered what the Soviets were doing in Cuba and determined how to respond.55 Nevertheless, reporters from the New York Times and Washington Post learned about crisis details. Kennedy persuaded them not to publish before he told the public. "This White House is like a sieve," he declared.56
On October 19, Kennedy told ExComm that he preferred a blockade because an invasion of Cuba offered the Soviets a "clear line" to invade West Berlin. Moreover, Kennedy wondered if Europeans would "regard us as trigger-happy Americans who lost Berlin because we did not have the guts to endure the situation in Cuba." After Khrushchev invaded Berlin, Kennedy said he would be forced to fire nuclear missiles and the Soviets would fire back. 'A hell of an alternative," he commented.57 "This blockade and-political action," declared Air Force Chief Curtis LeMay, "this is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich." Kennedy ignored LeMay's criticism of his cautious stance.58
The President went on national television on October 22 to announce a "quarantine," and both sides were pushed to the brink of war.5 The State Department gave 125 reporters an off-the-record briefing in conjunction with Kennedy's announcement. By contrast, Alsop, Luce, Reston, the columnist Walter Lippmann, and Philip Graham, the publisher of the Washington Post and Newsweek, received private briefings by ExComm members.60 Charles Bartlett, a syndicated columnist with the Chattanooga Times and friend of the Kennedys, had been given a briefing by the President a day earlier. Kennedy confided that he wanted a diplomatic solution and was prepared to trade the Jupiter missiles in Turkey for the Soviet missiles in Cuba.61 ccording to Soviet documents, American reporters scrambled to help Kennedy find a peaceful solution. On October 23 Bartlett arranged a back-channel meeting with Georg Bolshakov, a Soviet KGB agent. He wanted Bolshakov to know that Kennedy, despite his tough public stance wanted to trade the Cuban missiles for a Turkish base. Frank Holeman of the New York Daily News arranged a similar meeting with Bolshakov that same day. Bolshakov's notes indicate that Robert Kennedy wanted to trade missiles in Cuba for missiles in Turkey. There is no record to indicate whether Bartlett or Holeman's meeting with Bolshakov was President Kennedy's idea. Bolshakov did not report the news to the Kremlin.62
"What we are doing is throwing a card on the table in a game we don't know the ending of," Kennedy told advisers later.63 The President expressed concern about criticism raised by Senator Keating and in Krock's New York Times column that argued the White House should have known about the missiles earlier and was simply playing politics.64 Krock had called Kennedy's announcement of the missile crisis a "marvelous public relations job" timed to influence the election.65 John McCone, the director of the CIA, was told to brief Krock along with congressional leaders on how quickly mobile missile sites can be set up and moved. "(Krock's) suggesting it's part of the political campaign," Kennedy said. The President also worried about Hanson Baldwin's reporting, but one adviser assured Kennedy, "We can get him. 66
On October 24 after the blockade officially went into effect, Kennedy discussed the decision with his brother Robert. "There was no choice," the President said. The Attorney General agreed. "You would have been impeached," he said. "That's what I think," the President said. "I would have been impeached." The conversation offers insight into Kennedy's perception of his decisionmaking leeway. The domestic political consequences clearly weighed heavily in President Kennedy's mind, although at the outset he decided that America's international credibility required demonstrating American strength and resolve to the world.67
Behind-the-scenes Robert Kennedy dispatched Bartlett to meet with Bolshakov. "The President does not want to invade Cuba," Bartlett assured Bolshakov. After Bartlett returned he was sent back with U2 photos stamped "For the President's Eyes Only." The impressive stamp made it clear that Bartlett spoke for the White House. Bolshakov reported his encounters to his KGB supervisor, but his boss did not forward it to Moscow.68
The Attorney General did not know that the effort at back-channel diplomacy had foundered on a Soviet bureaucrat's desk. He observed later that "the luckiest thing in the world" had been the President's ability to control the timing and flow of information the public received about Cuba. There had been time to weigh U.S. options and take minimal action while securing the endorsement of Allies.69 There was also time for the President to "lay the foundation for a peaceful resolution" by authorizing the Attorney General to negotiate secretly with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet Ambassador to the United States.70 The President later admonished the ExComm to assume that the Soviets would respond to a US invasion of Cuba with a nuclear strike against American cities. "Can we say before we invade, evacuate these cities?" he asked.71
Lippmann also anticipated that war might break out over the missiles in Cuba. In order to pressure Kennedy to resist the temptation to escalate, the columnist used his insider's knowledge and published a column on October 25 that supported a British proposal to trade missile bases in Cuba for missile bases in Turkey. Significantly, Kennedy did not call Lippmann to demand a retraction or warn him not to interfere with foreign policy.72 Recently declassified Soviet cables reveal that Dobrynin was aware of Kennedy's friendships with journalists, such as Alsop and Lippmann, and analyzed their columns for details from conversations between the Kennedys and Soviet diplomats.73
Khrushchev read the column with interest and probably concluded that a missile trade was Kennedy's proposal after the White House did not disavow Lippmann. On October 26, John Scali of ABC News was contacted by Alexander Fomin, an attache at the Soviet Embassy. According to traditional accounts, Fomin wanted Scali to tell Kennedy that Khrushchev was interested in trading missile bases.74 The State Department prepared a response for Scali to give Fomin at 7:45 p.m. on October 26. After assuring Fomin that Kennedy wanted to negotiate at the United Nations, Scali assured him that the message came from "very high sources.7 The release of recent Soviet cables bring into question the role that Scali actually played. The new documents reveal that Scali actually initiated the meeting and the KGB did not regard him as a channel to Kennedy. Moreover, Fomin's cable to Moscow regarding his contact with Scali went through routine bureaucratic channels and arrived on Khrushchev's desk after he had already proposed trading missiles in Cuba for missiles in Turkey.76
Kennedy continued to scramble to secure a diplomatic solution, but the public remained unaware of his efforts. His secret instructions to Secretary of State Dean Rusk emphasized that missiles in Cuba should not be an obstacle to any peaceful settle-ment. In 1987 Rusk revealed that the President had made arrangements for Andrew Cordier, a former United Nations employee, to quietly contact U Thant, the Secretary General of the UN, at the last minute with instructions to propose exchanging missiles in Cuba for missiles in Turkey. The UN had become Kennedy's hidden trump card because it would allow both sides to step back from the crisis without necessarily losing face. Yet, the possibility still loomed of unforeseen events emerging to push both sides beyond the reach of a peaceful resolution. Kennedy realized that the key to finding a solution was to avoid public negotiations in the press while maintaining a tough public position for domestic political consumption and to strengthen the U.S. hand in negotiations with the Soviet Union.77
Subsequent U-2 photos gave the President furtler reason to fear a Soviet response to an invasion or air strike. On Friday, October 26, during a private briefing with McCone, a CIA photo analyst pointed to one site and noted there was a possibility that Cuba already had "tactical nuclear weapons for fighting troops in the field." The CIA director expressed concern about pursuing the political route because the missiles might become operational by the following morning. Kennedy remained unsure whether the missiles could be removed by diplomacy, and unsure whether an invasion or air strike would prevent the Soviets from firing at the US from Cuba. Nevertheless, McCone exhorted the President to "move quickly on an air strike."78 At a sub-sequent briefing another adviser observed, "The 64 dollar question is whether they (the Soviets) would use tac-tical nuclear weapons because they [frog mis-siles] would do bloody hell with Guantanamo." Kennedy retorted, "The decision to use any kind of nuclear weapon, even the tactical ones, presents such a risk of it getting out of control so quickly."'
To test ExComm's reaction to the diplomatic route, Kennedy invited Adlai Stevenson., the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, to discuss scenarios for U.S. negotiation with the Soviet Union. Stevenson wanted the long-term goal to include withdrawing the missiles from the hemisphere, making a no invasion pledge, and exploring the possibility of making the Western Hemisphere a nuclear free zone. He warned that in order to begin negotiations the United States might have to suspend the quarantine and a settlement might involve trading missiles in Turkey and Italy in exchange for the Soviets' withdrawing missiles from Cuba. Stevenson was careful to say that missile swaps should not be included in initial negotiations, and that Italy and Turkey needed to be consulted in advance.80
McCone adamantly disagreed with the Ambassador about lifting the quarantine while missiles still "pointed at our hearts." Kennedy never informed Stevenson or all of ExComm about his plans to use his brother as a backchannel to broker a similar deal with Khrushchev. "I'm not saying we should lift the quarantine or what we should do about the quarantine," Kennedy said. "But we all have to now realize that we are going to have to trade them out or go in and get them out."81
During the evening of October 26 Kennedy received a message from Khrushchev asking whether the United States would be willing to resolve the crisis by exchanging the missiles for a pledge not to invade Cuba.81 While the State Department dissected Khrushchev's proposal, the Attorney General met secretly to discuss a diplomatic solution with Dobrynin. The Soviet Ambassador pointed out that the Soviet Union had a right to security and the placement of missiles in Cuba was very similar to the U.S. placement of missiles in Turkey. Robert Kennedy then asked if Khrushchev might be interested in the missiles in Turkey and left to call his brother. He returned with good news: "The President said that we are ready to consider the question of Turkey, to examine favorably the question of Turkey." The following day, Khrushchev sent Kennedy another note demanding that the United States withdraw missiles from Turkey as a quid pro quo for missiles in Cuba.83
ExComm debated how to interpret Khrushchev's new demand without the benefit of knowing about the President's secret diplomacy.84 Llewellyn Thompson, the former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, speculated that Khrushchev was overruled or misled by Lippmann's article. "And Lipp-mann had it when?" Kennedy asked. "Two days ago," Bundy replied. Apparently, Kennedy had missed or forgotten the Lippmann article, but even after being told by advisers, he did not disavow the columnist's proposal.85
Instead, the President wanted to accept the Soviet offer and noted that world opinion would be on the Soviet side if the United States rejected the Soviet Premier's offer and dropped the bomb on Cuba. "Most . . . people think that if you are allowed an even trade you ought to take advantage of it," Kennedy said.86 "If we don't take it we're going to be blamed and if we do take it we're going to be blamed.87 He added, "I don't want to take this nation to war over a pile of junk," implying that the Jupiters were worthless. Unpersuaded, hawkish advisers warned that trading missiles in Cuba for outdated Jupiter missiles in Turkey would nonetheless weaken NATO and make other nations question U.S. security pledges.88
On October 27 without informing the hawkish members of ExComm or the press, President Kennedy met with his brother Robert, McNamara, Bundy, Sorensen, Rusk, and Thompson. The Attorney General was told to inform Dobrynin that the Jupiter missiles in Turkey were "irrelevant" to the question of missiles in Cuba, but would be withdrawn after the crisis was over. The President pointedly did not tell all of his advisers that he wanted his brother to make an "explicit" deal.89 Kennedy's lack of candor was designed to influence his advisers' perceptions of the final resolution of the Missile Crisis. He realized that selective omission would ultimately influence what newspapers wrote and ultimately the historical record. The loyal doves who knew about the deal protected President Kennedy's tough domestic image by telling lies. "We denied in every forum that there ever was a deal," Bundy later admitted. The Soviets, of course, knew of the deal, but the American public and policy-makers were left out. Kennedy did not want a public debate and decided against using the press to educate the American public about the imperatives of great power diplomacy in the nuclear age.90
With one eye on domestic politics, President Kennedy anticipated that political opponents would raise the specter of Munich's appeasement, just as LeMay had done inside ExComm, and he opted to conceal the missile deal. He therefore responded to Khrushchev's first letter agreeing to pledge publicly not to invade Cuba in exchange for the Soviets withdrawing the missiles. He instructed his brother to make a secret arrangement with Dobrynin: the United States would exchange missiles in Turkey for missiles in Cuba, but only if Khrushchev remained silent. ExComm remained on board because the President chose not to reveal to everyone that his brother Robert had cut an "explicit" deal. The President also kept ExComm in the dark about the backup arrangements for U Thant to propose the missile trade at the eleventh hour. Unnervingly, the world trembled on what appeared to be the brink of nuclear war while only a few White House advisers saw all of the cards in Kennedy's hand.91
The overtures to Dobrynin found fertile ground because Khrushchev shared the President's desire to end the crisis. Eager to step back from the brink, Khrushchev accepted the terms of the deal.92 Similarly, the White House was also eager to end the crisis and did not force the issue of verification when Castro refused to allow inspections. As a compromise, the two leaders agreed that the United States would monitor the removal of weapons by flying over Soviet ships and Cuban territory.93
In the event that Khrushchev rejected Kennedy's demand to keep the missile trade a secret, nuclear war still remained an unlikely possibility. "In retrospect, I am bound to say that the risk of war in October 1962 seems to me to have been exaggerated," Schlesinger later admitted. Nonetheless, memoirs by White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger, Schlesinger, and Sorensen suggested that Kennedy appeared very uncertain about the final resolution of the crisis on the evening before Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of Soviet missiles. Sorensen later admitted in 1987 that if Khrushchev had rejected the deal, Kennedy would have faced enormous pressure to go to war. The ExComm transcripts indicate that Kennedy's advisers discussed tightening the blockade and arresting the flow of oil and other strategic resources into Cuba before taking military action. The arrangement for Cordier to contact the United Nations also indicates that Kennedy was prepared, if necessary, to trade the missiles in public. Nevertheless, the possibility of an inadvertent outbreak of hostilities existed throughout the crisis.94 Obviously, Kennedy had to keep tight controls over the press during such delicate negotiations.
In the aftermath, however, Kennedy once again focused upon influencing print reporters to publicize his version of the Missile Crisis. His public statements stopped short of declaring a one-sided American military victory, but he privately planted a false but tough version of what had taken place with key journalists in highcirculation publications. Kennedy's information strategy deliberately de-emphasized the role of behind-the-scenes diplomacy in ending the crisis and the Missile Crisis became known as the "Gettysburg of the Cold War."95 Kennedy offered an exclusive to Bartlett and Stewart Alsop, the brother of Joseph Alsop and managing editor of the Saturday Evening Post96 The President received assurances from Bartlett that his goal was to show "an effective operation." The act of friendship provided a public relations coup for the New Frontier. The President refused to be the main source, so Bartlett and Alsop were briefed by advisers. "There's no point in sitting around patting myself on the back," Kennedy said.97 The President had cut off access to other journalists and was positioned to control the sources and edit the first insider's account of the Missile Crisis. Details that contradicted his "Profile in Courage" were kept away from journalists or classified. The Attorney General eventually testified in muted form, but Sorensen's diligent revision did not dilute the heroic first draft of Camelot's history that had already been written.
"I heard this amazing story about Adlai," Bartlett said to Kennedy over dinner at the White House. "Oh, you got that, huh?" Kennedy said. "I wasn't sure you'd get that."98 An aide had told Bartlett that Stevenson was yellow and ready to negotiate a deal, but Kennedy had over-ruled appeasement. "Are you going to put it in the article?" he asked. Bartlett said, "Yes." Kennedy just shook his head, but was not displeased. The Attorney General added further confirmation by fuming to Bartlett about Stevenson's allegedly naive cowardice.99
Before publication in the Saturday Evening Post, Bartlett gave Kennedy the article for final approval. The President edited out references to Sorensen because of his wartime record as a conscientious objector, but kept the attack on Stevenson.100 The article used Dean Rusk's phrase "eyeball to eyeball" to emphasize drama and "hawks and doves" to divide Kennedy's advisers.101 Hawks wanted a military strike against Cuba, while Doves wanted a blockade first to give Khrushchev time to back down. According to the article edited by the President, Stevenson was the only exception because he wanted to trade the Cuban missile base for Turkish, Italian, and British bases. "Adlai wanted a Munich," read one of the quotes that Kennedy approved in the final draft. "I want it in," he said, thus covering-up the fact that the White House had traded missiles secretly to quickly end the crisis and avoided the consequences of an invasion. 102
On December 2 Schlesinger reminded Kennedy that Stevenson wanted the political route explored within the context of "vigorous U.S. military action to defend our security." The President nodded but did not disavow the damaging quotes about Stevenson's alleged appeasement. Schlesinger later defended Stevenson in his memoir/history, A Thousand Days, albeit noting that the Ambassador had "caused worry over the weekend that he might make premature concessions."'04 Yet Schlesinger wrote of the Missile Crisis without the knowledge that the President had cut a deal that actually followed Stevenson's broad outline.105 Instead the Missile Crisis became an epic drama celebrating Kennedy's "nerve and wisdom."106
For the 1964 election, Kennedy planned to ride the wave of adulation about his handling of Cuba policy, rather than go down in history as a deal-maker. He encouraged Hugh Sidey, the White House reporter for Time, to write a campaign biography that offered further insight into how he wanted his record in Cuba portrayed. Kennedy did not argue with Sidey's descriptions of the Missile Crisis as a tale of heroic military leadership and of the Bay of Pigs as a learning experience.107 "The country rather enjoyed the Cuban quarantine," Kennedy nonchalantly confided to Sidey. "It was exciting; it was a diversion; and there was a feeling we were doing something. But that was an easy one."108 Apparently, Kennedy was aware of the entertainment value of the Missile Crisis and called it "easy," but Sidey never asked why.
Kennedy needed to end the Missile Crisis, rather than spark a national debate over the missile deal. Public statements and U-2 photographs were used to reassure the American public that the Soviets had taken all missiles and bombers out. He downplayed questions regarding the accuracy of US intelligence reports and never pressured Khrushchev on the inspection issue109 Kennedy confessed to Bradlee that the Soviets still had 17,000 troops in Cuba, but Khrushchev's move made sense in the context of the United States stationing 27,000 troops in Turkey. The President claimed it would be political suicide to draw public comparisons between United States and Soviet strategic decisions.110
The comments made shortly before his death suggest that Kennedy harbored private doubts, but decided not to publicly push the verification issue with Khrushchev. For the moment, however, the secrets were locked away and Kennedy was pragmatically positioned to counterpunch political opponents with the successful image he had created for his Cuba policy. Yet, the President's tragic murder soon overshadowed the political landscape and partisan differences were temporarily placed aside and the myth of Camelot emerged.lll The legend promoted by Kennedy's followers found fertile ground to flourish with an unsuspecting public, but he had personally begun the process by putting White House spin on the first draft of history.
At the end of the Cold War, after being confronted by Dobrynin's explicit testimony in 1989, Theodore Sorensen confessed that six advisers alone had been aware of the missile deal. In ghost-writing Robert Kennedy's Thirteen Days, Sorensen had used exclusive access to Robert's diary to expunge details about the missile swap that did not coincide with President Kennedy's tough Cold Warrior image. "I took it upon myself to edit that out of his diaries," he admitted. The censored diary was posthumously published in 1969 as the Attorney General's personal account of the crisis. Such a post-Cold War disclosure underscores how controlling access to historical records even allowed Camelot's courtiers to refine Kennedy's portrait for the tastes of a new era.112 Notwithstanding, President Kennedy did not view his tactics cynically and justified his use of the press as a constitutional obligation to insulate foreign policy from domestic politics. The lack of live television coverage of unfolding foreign policy events made it possible for Kennedy to contemplate options and control the flow of information to the press during the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, and Missile Crisis. For the short-term, Kennedy seemingly could have it both ways in foreign policy because of his ability to hide chinks in his armor from the press, but for the long-term the strategy was a double-edged sword. Success during the 1960 election and throughout his presidency in nurturing a tough macho image in the press created pressure to act and take risks in foreign policy. The tough image was dysfunctional and a burden because it concealed Kennedy's middle-of-theroad instincts and created an imperative for tougher action in foreign policy than he actually wanted.
Had Kennedy lived, the tension between balancing his macho image with behind-the-scenes diplomacy would have become more strained. Communications technology was rapidly changing and television news was poised to become the dominant medium when Kennedy was assassinated. Future presidents were left with the question of how to make foreign policy with live cameras on-the-scene offering Americans and domestic political opponents an opportunity to witness the unfolding spectacle.
Johnson and Nixon responded by adopting Kennedy's tactics to manipulate the flow of information, but without recognizing that their predecessor had made foreign policy during a transition era for the American press. The print press was in its final glory days until September 1963 when television news programs expanded from fifteen minutes to thirty minutes and needed to fill the time. But expanded newscasts did not pose a great political threat to Kennedy's policies because the television industry did not have the technology to cover unfolding foreign policy events unless studio conditions could be recreated in the field. Kennedy dealt with foreign crises while it was still possible for the White House to control the flow of information to the press and the American public by relying heavily upon print reporters.113 He was able to "manage the news" by offering exclusive stories about the Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs to print reporters without worrying about contradictory images appearing on television.
Many reporters considered themselves Kennedy's close personal friends and traded loyalty for exclusives insider stories. Nonetheless, during the aftermath of the Bay of Pigs Kennedy was unable to keep Luce from learning embarrassing details. The lesson for Operation Mongoose and the Missile Crisis was to put further restrictions on the flow of information to White House advisers and the press. Kennedy's tactics did not escape Krock's criticism, although "news management" charges never captured the interest of the general public and working press.
Ultimately, Kennedy's "news management" tactics had long-term consequences for American politics. Inadvertently, the tactics Kennedy used to control the flow of information regarding foreign policy to the press laid the ground work for public cynicism toward government and the "credibility gap" debate during the late 1960s over Vietnam. Johnson and Nixon sought to emulate Kennedy's success and adopted his tactics for influencing press coverage of foreign policy but without recognizing that increased television coverage of foreign policy and the development of new technology required new tactics. Ironically, at the time of his death, Kennedy recognized that the emergence of the thirty-minute television news program meant that he needed to shift away from his print-oriented press strategy.114
The point underscores that throughout Kennedy's presidency the print press remained the dominant institution of power in Washington, although its grip gradually weakened. Underlying Kennedy's Cuba policy was a Cold War version of Roosevelt's print press strategy for World War II. Kennedy followed Roosevelt's model for radio and used television sparingly. He focused primarily upon influencing print reporters with appeals to friendship or patriotism and by controlling access to information. Placed in this context, Kennedy's Cuba policy marked the final moments of an era of dominance for the print press that pre-dated America's founding. But at the root level, the Bay of Pigs, Operation Mongoose, and the Missile Crisis must be considered as simple, although striking, examples of the ongoing tension resulting from the conflicting institutional prerogatives of the president and the press.
Moreover, the new revelations regarding Cuba since the close of the Cold War should not be startling. Kennedy, like all presidents, wanted favorable press and had friends who were reporters. He was also not unique in his desire to be remembered kindly by history or for asserting his authority over foreign policy to control the flow of information to the press. He was unique to the extent that he was the only president who had experience as a working reporter and was driven by a personal belief that history would be based primarily upon first-hand newspaper accounts. As a result, Cuba policy was inevitably entangled in Kennedy's concern for both the short-term and long-term benefits of personally shaping tomorrow's headlines. The lesson for Kennedy was that the press can be used to gloss over weaknesses and emphasize strengths for personal political advancement.
It might have been different. In October 1961, Sorensen turned to Lippmann for advice on a key presidential address. "We would like to answer-affirmatively not defensively the various attacks on the 'firmness' of our foreign and military policy," Sorensen wrote. Kennedy felt boxed in by critics who called negotiations "appeasement" and pigeonholed policy as hard or soft. "How do we describe our policy ... so that the average citizen can . . . embrace it?" Sorensen asked.115 Lippmann urged the President "to make people realize what they don't realize at all, what it means to conduct great diplomatic affairs like Southeast Asia, Cuba, and Berlin in the new and revolutionary nuclear age that has just begun."116 He recommended a dramatic campaign to mobilize the American public to recognize the "differences between appeasement and negotiation." President Kennedy chose not to follow Lippmann's advice.
Thus during the Missile Crisis, he never challenged the country's perception of negotiations as surrender. The press supported him during the Missile Crisis and the Bay of Pigs because reporters believed that part of their duty was to support the government in the fight against Communism. The press accepted the President's word during the Missile Crisis, but the risk of nuclear war was escalated because of the outwardly tough crisis stance adopted by the White House. The truth regarding the diplomatic resolution of the Missile Crisis was hidden from the public with the cooperation of Kennedy's unwitting friends in the press. By modern reporting standards, Bartlett and Alsop were guilty of a gross dereliction of duty for allowing Kennedy to edit the first insider's account of the crisis. Lippmann was also guilty for not informing the public that Kennedy felt cornered by political opponents who equated diplomatic negotiations with weakness. Whether contemporary journalists are also guilty of performing similar deeds for modern presidents is something that only future historians will uncover. The revelations regarding Kennedy's Cuba policy add truth to the adage that in politics perceptions are more important than reality. Therefore, the first draft of history must always be viewed cautiously.
1. See, for example, Richard Davis, The Press and American Politics: The New Mediator (New York: Longman, 1991); John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of Comunications and the Management of Presidential News (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1990); Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents (New York: Macmillan, 1992); Samuel Kernell, Going Public: New Strategies of Presidential Leadership (Washington, D.C.: Congressisonal Quarterly Press, 1993); William C. Spragens, The Presidency and the Mass Media in the Age of Television (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1979); Doris Graber, Mass Media and American Politics (Washington DC: Congressional Quarterly Inc, 1993); John Tebbel and Sarah M. Watts, The Press and the Presidency: From George Washington to Ronald Reagan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 12.
2. Pierre Salinger, With Kennedy (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1965), 54-56.
3. Benjamin Bradlee, Conversations Wth Kennedy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), 33. 4. Salinger, With Kennedy 54-56.
5. Arthur Schlesinger, A Thousand Days: John F. Kenney in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 714-16.
6. Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), 310; Christopher Matthews, Kennedy and Nixon: The
Rivalry that Shaped Postwar America (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 28-29.
7. Theodore Sorenson, The Kennedy Legacy (New York: Macmillan, 1969), 71.
8. Davis, The Press and American Politics, 96-98. There were nearly 150 million people in the United States with 54 million television sets when Kennedy took office and 61.5 million at the time of his death. Harry Hansen, ed., The World Almanac and Book of Facts, (New York: Newspaper Enterprise Association 1961-1965, 463, 694; (1965), 768]. CBS and NBC news went from fifteen minutes to one-half hour in fall 1963 while ABC waited until 1967. [Davis, The Press and American Politics, 97; Marc Gunther, The House that Roone Built: The Inside Story of ABC News, (New York: Little and Brown, 1994), 37.1 9. Davis, The Press and American Politics, 98; Mary Ann Watson, The Expanding Vista: American Television in the Kennedy Years (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 75-89; see also Bradley S. Greenberg and Edwin B. Parker, eds., The Kennedy Assassination and the American Public: Social Communication in Crisis (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1965). 10. Larry J. Sabato, Feeding Frenzy: How Attack Journalism Has Transformed American Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1991) 30-42; William G. Mayer, The Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed Between 1960 and 1988, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1993), 287-88, 343.
11. Joseph Alsop Oral History Interview (hereafter cited Alsop Oral History), with Elspeth Rowstow, Washington, DC, 18 June 1964, John F. Kennedy Library (hereafter JFKL), Boston. 12. Sorensen, Kennedy, 319. 13. Ibid., 312.
14. Paul Fay, The Pleasure of His Company (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 32.
15. Ibid., 141; Salinger, With Kennedy, 296. 16. Arthur Schlesinger Memorandum to President Kennedy "Protection of the President,' 10 April 1961, Box 62, Presidential Office Files (POF), JFKL. 17. Matthews, Kennedy and Nixon, 296. 18. Arthur Schlesinger, One Thousand Days, 226. 19. Peter Grose, Gent/eman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1994), 523.
20. Trumbull Higgins, The Perfect Failure (New York: W.W. Norton, 1987), 93. 21. Ibid., 66.
22. Schlesinger, A Thousand Days 261. 23. Harrison E. Salisbury, Wthout Fear or Favor: The New York Times and Its Tmes (New York: Times Books, 1980), 151-56. 24. James Aronson, The Press and the Cold War (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970), 167.
25. Chalmers Roberts, First Rough Draft: A Journalist's Journal of Our Times (New York: Praeger, 1973), 189; James Reston, Deadline: A Memoir (New York: Random House, 1991), 326; Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor, 151-56. 26. Roberts, First Rough Draft, 191. 27. Salinger, With Kennedy, 146. 28. Roberts, First Rough Draft, 191. 29. General Anatoli I. Gribkov, General William Y. Smith, Alfred Friendly eds., Operation ANADYR: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban Missile Crisis (Chicago: Edition Q, 1994), 8990.
30. Reston, Deadline, 326; Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor, 158; Public Papers of the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy 1961 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), 334-38.
31. Salinger, With Kennedy, 148-51. 32. Ibid, 307-15.
33. News Conference, 21 April 1961, Public Papers . Kennedy 1961,139-40; Deborah and Gerald Strober, "Let Us Begin A new" An Oral History of the Kennedy Presidency (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 135.
34. Arthur Schlesinger Lunch Notes, 30 June 1961, Herbert Matthews Papers, Box 27 and Background Dinner with Arthur Schlesinger, 10 May 1961, Box 1, Robert Estabrook Papers, JFKL; Lucien Vandenbrouke, Perilous Options: Special Operations As An Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy (Ph.D. diss., University of Connecticut, 1991), 171.
35. Arthur Krock, Memoirs: Sixty Years on the Firing Line (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968), 371; Krock Notes On Conversation with Kennedy, 5 May 1961, Box 31, Krock Papers, Princeton University Library.
36. Alsop Oral History, 32-36.
37. Henry Luce Oral History Interview by John Steele, New York City, 11 Nov. 1965, Henry Luce Estate Papers, (hereafter HLEP), Time Life Archive, 2829; Charles V. Murphy, Fortune Magazine, SCuba: The Record Set Straight,' September 1961, 92; Robert McNamara memorandum to President Kennedy, 30 Aug. 1961, Box 65, POF.
38. President Kennedy to Henry Luce 12 Sept. 1961, Box 31, POF.
39. Luce to Kennedy, 14 Sept. 1961, 1961-1963 Folder, HLEP. 40. Luce Oral History, 24-25.
41. Operation Zapata.lzL The Ultrasensitive Report and Testimony of the Board of Inquiry on the Bay of Pigs, intro. by Luis Aguilar (Frederick, MD: Aletheia Books, University Publishers of America, 1981), 44-53. Covert activities under Mongoose included CIAsponsored raids by Cuban exiles to burn crops and fire at boats in Havana. Other activities included assassination attempts against Castro. See Thomas G. Paterson, "Fixation with Cuba: The Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis, and Covert War Against Castro," in Thomas G. Paterson, ed., Kennedy's Quest for Victory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 123-55.
42. Herbert L. Matthews, Revolution in Cuba: An Essay in Understanding, (New York: Scribner Publishing, 1975), 195. 43. Elizabeth Cohn, "Building Consensus in ExComm," in James A. Nathan, ed., The Cuban Crisis Revisited (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 221; Richard Reeves, President Kennedy: Profile of Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1993), 78-121, 349-425; Salisbury, Without Fear or Favor, 160-61; Luce Oral History, 31-32.
44. William Leogrande, Uneasy Allies: The Press During the Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: New York University Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, 1987), 5-6.
is. Peter Kornbluh and Lawrence Chang, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: A National Security Archive Documents Reader (New York: The New Press, 1992), 354; Reeves, President Kennedy, 1993), 345. Kennedy concluded that Keating obtained information from the CIA, but historians have been unable to document the source. See Thomas G. Patterson, "The Historian as Detective: Senator Kenneth Keating, the Missiles in Cuba, and His Mysterious Sources," Diplomatic History 10 (Winter 1987):67-70.
46. Pubic Papers of the President of the United States, John F. Kennedy 1962, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), 631-39. 47. Ibid., 674-81.
48. James G. Hershberg, Before the Missiles of October,' in Nathan, The Cuban Crisis Revisited, 253-61. 49. Cohn, "Building Consensus," 221. 50. Reeves, President Kennedy, 368; McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival in the Nuclear Age (New York: Random House, 1988), 395-96.
51. Reeves, President Kennedy, 170. 52. James A. Nathan, "The Heyday of the New Strategy," in Nathan, The Cuban Crisis Revisited, 23-24; POF, Presidential Recordings, Transcript, Tape 28.2, 16 Oct. 1962, JFKL, 13.
53. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," 68-69; POF, Presidential Recordings, Transcript, 16 Oct. 1962, JFKL, 15-16, 36.
54. Sheldon M. Stern, "Time Line for Press Briefing On the Release of Cuban Missile Crisis Meeting Tapes," 24 Oct. 1996, JFKL, 3; POF, Presidential Recordings, Evening Monologue, 18 Oct. 1962, Tape 31.1, JFKL; Salinger, Wth Kennedy, 251-52; Sorensen, Kennedy, 691.
55. Sorensen, Kennedy, 320; Robert Manning, The Swamp Root Chronicle.' Adventures in the Word Trade (New York:W. W. Norton, 1992), 251; Pierre Salinger, Wth Kennedy, 286; Benjamin Bradlee, A Good Life: Newspapering and Other Adventures, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 244-45; Joseph Alsop, gI 've Seen the Best of It": Memoirs (New York: Norton, 1992), 448-49.
56. Kenneth O'Donnell, David Powers, and David McCarthy, "Johnny, We Hardly Knew Yer(Boston: Little and Brown, 1972), 326; Chalmers M. Roberts, The Washington Post: The First 100 Years (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977), 351-52.
57. POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 31.2, 19 Oct. 1962, JFKL; Peter Howe, "JFK Tapes Show Criticism for Refusal to Invade Cuba, Boston Globe, 25 Oct. 1996; ABC Nightline Transcript, 24 Oct. 1996.
58. POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 31.2, 19 Oct. 1962 JFKL.
59. Reeves, President Kennedy, 78-121, 349-425.
60. POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 34, 23 Oct. 1962. 61. Aleksander Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, 'One Hell of a Gamble. Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy 1958-1964 (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), 236-37. 62. Ibid., 249-51.
63. POF, Presidential Recordings Tape 34.1, 23 Oct. 1962. 64. Ibid.
65. Arthur Krock, 'The Preparations Were Anything But Secret," New York Tunes, 23 Oct. 1962, 36. 66. POF, Presidential Recordings Tape 34. 67. POF, Presidential Recordings Tape 36.2, 24 Oct. 1962. 68. Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 250-51. 69. POF, Presidential Recordings Tape 36.2. 70. Arthur Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Tunes (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1978), 514.
71. POF, Presidential Recordings Tape 36.1, 24 Oct.1962. Boston Globe, 25 Oct. 1996; Michael Ellis, SCuba Missile Crisis 72. John Luskin, Lippmann, Liberty, and the Press, (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1972), 211-12; Kornbluh and Chang, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 372.
73. James Hershberg, "More On Bobby and the Cuban Missile Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 9 (Spring 1997):274, 344.
74. Salinger, Wth Kennedy, 271-79. 75. Frank A. Sieverts, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, "The Cuban Crisis, 1962," U.S. Department of State, National Security File Cuba, Box 49, JFKL, 173-174.
76. Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, "Using KGB Documents: The Scali-Feklisov Channel in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8 (Spring 1995):58-61.
77. Reeves, President Kennedy, 78-121, 349-425; J. Anthony Lukas, "Class Reunion," New York Times Magazine, 30 Aug. 1987, 22-27.
78. POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 40, 26 Oct. 1962. 79. POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 40.2, 26 Oct. 1962. Scholars who have relied on Ernest May and Philip Zelikow's transcription of the Cuban missile crisis tapes may be confused by the reference made to "frog missiles. The quote regarding "frog missiles" is based upon my listening to the tapes at the Kennedy Library, together with a time-line summary prepared by Sheldon Stern for reporters attending the release of the tapes at the Kennedy Library on 24 Oct. 1996. [see Zelkow and May, The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House During the Cuban Missile Crisis (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997).] 80. POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 39.1, 26 Oct. 1962. 81. Ibid.
82. Bruce J. Allyn, James G. Blight and David Welch, "Essence of Revision: Moscow, Havana, and the Cuban Missile Crisis," International Security 14 (Winter 1989/90): 158.
83. Reeves, President Kennedy, 78-121; Allyn, "Essence of Revision," 158-59; Kombluh and Chang, The Cuban Missile Crisis, 374.
84. James G. Blight and David Welch, On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: Noonday Press, 1989), 416; Roger Hilsman, To Move A Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy, (New York: Doubleday, 1967), 221.
85. POF, Presidential Recordings, Transcript for Tape 42.1, 27 Oct. 1962, 62-63. 86. Ibid.
87. POF, Presidential Recordings, 41, 27 Oct. 1962. 88. "ABC Nightline" Transcript, 24 Oct. 1996. 89. Lawrence Chang, "The View From Washington,' in Nathan, The Cuban Crisis Revisited, 151, 159; Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," 96.
90. Nathan, "The Heyday of the New Strategy " 23. Khrushchev sent the White House a message that warned the Soviet's public stance was contingent upon President Kennedy accepting the missile deal. See Fursenko and Naftali, "One Hell of a Gamble", 286.
91. Nathan, "The Heyday of a New Strategy," 5S57, 96; POF, Presidential Recordings, Transcript, 27 Oct.1962, JFKL, 15-16; Allyn, "Essence of Revision,' 158-59; Reeves, President Kennedy, 78-121, 349-425.
92. Vladislav Zubok and Constantine Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1996), 266; Roger Hilsman, The Cuban Missile
Crisis: The Struggle Over Policy (Westport: Praeger Publishing, 1996), 129.
93. -ABC Nightline."
94. Bernstein, Reconsidering the Missile Crisis," 100-101, 126-27; Salinger, Wah Kennedy, 249-83; Sorensen, Kennedy, 667718; Schlesinger, A Thousand Days, 822-41; Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy, 529.
95. Sorensen, Kennedy, 724; Walt W. Rostow, The View From the Seventh Floor (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), 19. 96. Robert W. Merry, Taking On the World: Joseph. and Stewart Alsop-Guardians of the American Century (New York: Viking, 1996), 387-95; Kern and Levering Papers, Box 1, Alsop folder, JFKL; Charles Bartlett oral history interview with Fred Holborn, 6 Jan. 1965, Washington , DC, JFKL, 123-27, 141-42; POF, Presidential Recordings Tape 36.2, 24 Oct. 1962, JFKL. 97. Charles Bartletttt to President Kennedy, 29 Oct.1962, POF, Box 28, JFKL; Bartlett Oral History, 128-29. 98. Merry, Taking On the World, 387-95. 99. Ibid.; Bartlett Oral History, 130-31; POF, Presidential Recordings, Tape 39.1, 26 Oct. 1962; Schlesinger memorandum to President Kennedy, 12 Dec. 1962, NSF Cuba, Box 57, JFKL, Bartlett interview, 128-29.
100. Merry, Taking On the World, 387-95- Stewart Alsop, The Center: The People and Power in Poltrcal Washington, (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), 191. 101. Alsop, The Center, 190.
102. Merry, Taking On the World, 387-93; Bartlett interview, 130-31; Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis, (Basingstoke England: Macmillan,1996),164-84.
104. Schlesinger, One Thousand Days, 835-38. 105. Stern, Tune Line, 11. 106. Schlesinger, One Thousand Days, 840-41. 107. Sidey , John F. Kennedy, President, 268-89. 108. Ibid., 321. 109. Ibid.,152-55.
110. Bradlee, Conversations with Kennedy, 131-32. 111. Theodore White, In Search of History: A Personal Adventure (New York: Harper and Row 1978), 518-20; Camelot Papers, Theodore White Papers, JFKL.
112. Bernstein, "Reconsidering the Missile Crisis,' 56-57, 96. 113. For Nixon and Johnson's press tactics see Maltese, Spin Control; Salinger, Wih Kennedy, 54-56.
114. David Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York: Random House, 1972), 361-62; Montague Kern, Patricia Levering, and Ralph Levering, The Kennedy Crises: The Press, the Presidency, and Foreign Policy (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), 166. David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York: Knopf Publishing, 1972), 361- Press Panel Oral History Interview with Mary McGrory, Peter Lisagor, and George Herman by Fred Holborn, 4 Aug. 1964, Washington, DC, JFKL.
115. Theodore Sorensen memorandum to Walter Lippmann, 5 Oct. 1961, Box 105, Walter Lippmann Papers, Yale University Library. 116. Ibid.
James T. Graham received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Connecticut in 1996. He is currently writing a book on President Kennedy's media strategy and developing commercial and educational web sites.…
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Publication information: Article title: Kennedy, Cuba, and the Press. Contributors: Graham, James T. - Author. Journal title: Journalism History. Volume: 24. Issue: 2 Publication date: Summer 1998. Page number: 60+. © Journalism History Winter 2009. Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.