China's Post-Deng Foreign Relations [Deng Xiaoping]
Roy, Denny, International Journal
The impact of Deng Xiaoping's leadership on Chinas foreign relations was as great as on its domestic politics. The exit of a ruler of Deng's stature potentially clears the way for the kinds of momentous changes that occurred in Chinese foreign policy after Deng succeeded Mao Zedong to the paramount leadership. But such fundamental change has not occurred in the immediate wake of Deng's death in February 1997. While Jiang Zemin's need to consolidate his position may exacerbate tensions on certain issues between China and some foreign powers, particularly the United States, the long-term trends in Chinas foreign relations are generally unaffected by the leadership transition. Even in maintaining its present course, however, post-Deng China will likely arrive at crossroads which have significant and uncertain consequences for its foreign relations, and indeed for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
It is useful at the outset to identify some of the important elements of Chinas foreign relations that have changed with Deng's passing and equally useful to point up those which have not.
Changes and Continuities
To be sure, Deng's death changes the environment of foreign policy making in the People's Republic of China (PRC). The era of ultra-paramount leaders such as Mao and Deng appears to be over. With Deng's
This article was written when the author was a Research Fellow at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra. efforts to systematize and decentralize the leadership structure and with the evolution of the Chinese Communist party (CCP) from a revolutionary to a conservative, managerial party, major foreign policy decisions are now the result of consensus-building among several top- ranking officials.
To oversimplify, PRC elites may be divided into two camps: conservatives and moderates. The conservatives favour limited and gradual economic liberalization. They believe reforming the Chinese economy too rapidly and allowing foreign economic interests to penetrate too deeply could cause unacceptable damage to the PRC's sociopolitical system and 'spiritual civilization.' They are also highly sensitive to what may be perceived as infringements upon Chinese 'sovereignty' and do not think such infringements should be overlooked out of fear of offending Chinas foreign trading partners. In contrast, moderate Chinese elites favour relatively swift and broad economic reforms because they believe that only fundamental changes will allow China to bridge the gulf with the developed countries and that the benefits of rapid growth are widespread enough to enable the country to endure some temporary pain and dislocation while laying the groundwork for higher overall living standards for the next generation. Moderates are also more inclined to accept political compromises with powerful countries such as the United States for the sake of harmonious relations and of Chinas economic development. Because Deng was a moderate and a powerful bulwark against a policy driven by hyper-nationalism, his death does not bode well for the important Sino-United States relationship. While Jiang is in many respects a protege of Deng, he does not yet appear to have a political vision or agenda of his own. Instead, he acts rather as a broker among other powerful groups and factions. He may be less committed to Deng's philosophy and less able than Deng to bend the system to his will. Through 1997, however, Deng's moderate agenda was still on track. Jiang and the president of the United States, Bill Clinton, met in Washington on 29 October to patch up their recently strained relations, and the CCP announced further market-oriented economic reforms during the 15th party congress in September.
Although he carries the titles of president of the PRC, chairman of the Central Military Commission, and general secretary of the CCP Central Committee, Jiang does not command the authority of his predecessor. Official titles once given may also be taken away, and in any case they do not necessarily reflect the influence wielded by individual leaders. In the last years of his life, for example, Deng held no official post but was still recognized as the most powerful political figure in China. As Jiang is well aware, after the death of the Great Helmsman, Mao Zedong's chosen successor, Hua Guofeng, lost the paramount leadership to Deng in a power struggle between 1976 and 1980. If Jiang appears unwilling to stand up to foreign pressure or is insufficiently tough on issues that involved Chinese prestige or sovereignty, his domestic opponents might use this as political ammunition against him, endangering his position at the top of the CCP hierarchy. Many analysts have therefore warned that Jiang might have to pursue an assertive foreign policy satisfactory to the CCP and the hardliners in the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in order to protect his domestic flank. While Jiang has had to curry favour with the PLA to ensure that the generals would support him as the new paramount leader, it should be noted that the PLA has never been strongly inclined to enter domestic political disputes, generally backs the strongest faction within the civilian leadership, and continues to evolve toward the ideal of a professional, apolitical military. Therefore, while the PEA high command retains an important advisory role, particularly in the making of defence policy, the prediction of some analysts that the generals will control Jiang should be viewed with caution.
Changes brought about by the close of the Deng era are outweighed by continuities. Chinas politico-economic system and outward-oriented developmental strategy remain unchanged. On the positive side, PRC elites are still committed to engagement with the world capitalist economy, which means that the Chinese have to respect the rules of international trade regimes and gives them a strong interest in keeping regional political tensions low. On the negative side, inherent friction between authoritarian China and the liberal democracies has not been resolved. Post-Tiananmen antipathy toward the CCP within the United States and especially in Congress carries over to the Jiang regime. Although Jiang was not a major CCP figure during the 1989 crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators, he is Deng's anointed successor, and he declined to express regrets about Tiananmen during his visit to the United States in October-November 1997.
Jiang's ascendancy to the paramount leadership does not signal a significant change in Beijing's position on Taiwan, which still includes a determination to prevent Taiwan from moving too close to independence. If it is necessary, military force is not ruled out. The CCP has backed itself into a corner with its promises not to allow a permanent political break between Taiwan and the mainland. And just as domestic politics strongly influence policies on this issue in Taiwan and in the United States, so do they influence PRC policies that lead to tensions over Taiwan. But in contrast to the Republic of China and the United States, the PRC's domestic political inputs into the question of Taiwan's international status are stable, consistent, and broadly consensual, producing a policy that has been predictable from year to year and from regime to regime.
China's national security, in the traditional sense of safety from military attack by foreign governments, is no more threatened in the 1990s than in any other period of modern Chinese history. Regime security, however, is a different matter. China has been a fractious empire for centuries. Every generation of Chinese leaders has had an obsession with preventing insurrection and 'splitism.' Another strong traditional impulse is the perception that internal and external threats are linked -- that is, that dissent and disorder at home soften up the country for invasion and exploitation by foreigners. Marxist philosophy reinforces this fear with its expectation that the capitalist powers will attempt to subvert socialism, an expectation which seems to be confirmed by the decades-old commitment of the United States government to 'peaceful evolution,' to the ouster of the ccP in favour of a democratic, pluralist regime. Furthermore, the party's legitimacy has been seriously reduced through leftist ideological disasters such as the Great Leap Forward in 1958 and the Cultural Revolution of 1966-76, the abandonment of Marxist ideology under Deng's market-oriented economic reforms, and the use of brute military force against peaceful student demonstrators in Tiananmen Square in 1989. What legitimacy remains is now based solely on the CCP's ability to raise living standards and keep order. Party authority would be under constant challenge from dissidents, organized labour, and ordinary people mistreated by the system were it not for suppression of these activities by the state's police organs. In sum, the ruling regime is struggling to remain a step ahead of forces of discontent at home by which it could be quickly overwhelmed (an economic downturn, for example, would be a mortal threat to party rule), while the United States government and many other foreign groups are actively promoting the overthrow of the party. The CCP's sense of insecurity heightens the party's perception of certain behaviour by other states as dangerous and offensive, making stable and cordial relations more problematic. This behaviour includes foreign criticism of Chinese internal policies, such as repression of dissent and ethnic separatism, which in Beijing's view are necessary to maintain stability; and what China sees as concerted efforts by foreigners to embarrass it (opposition to Beijing's bid to host the 2000 Olympic games or allegations of illegal Chinese arms sales) or even to weaken it (diplomatic and military support for Taiwan, tough conditions for Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization, challenges to Chinese ownership of islands in the South China Sea, calls for 'containment' of China).
Although China is highly sensitive to the policies of other states which it perceives as threatening or provocative, Beijing remains under-sensitive to the security concerns of Chinas neighbours. Chinas self-image is that of a benevolent, morally just actor that has been grievously victimized by other states. The most serious aspect of this problem is the possibility that Chinese actions might alarm Japan into moving toward military independence. There is still no agreement between Beijing and Tokyo on Japan's future role in Asia. The Chinese were not very happy with the 1996 United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, for example. They complained that the rejuvenated alliance contributed to the perilous prospect of increased Japanese military activity in the region, while officials in Washington and Tokyo argued that the revised agreement would enhance regional stability.
China is still on course to become an Asian superpower early next century, the implications of which began to be widely discussed in the early 1990s. This is perhaps the most important element in Chinas present and future foreign relations and the reason the key historical break-point in PRC foreign policy is not the post-Deng or the post-cold war era but the post-poor era -- when Beijing ceased to behave like a weak, beleaguered state as it realized rapid economic development was bringing China's aspirations within striking distance. While realist theory underwent yet another round of serious scholarly challenges during the 1990s, one of its strongest and most enduring propositions is that great powers are natural rivals that fall easily into a competitive, zero-sum relationship unless they are allied against another great power. The likelihood of tensions is even greater if the two powers aspire to leadership over the same geographic region and if they fit the 'power transition' scenario -- one state the established, aging hegemon, the other a potential challenger with rapidly growing economic, political, and military capabilities. All of these conditions apply to Sino-United States relations at the turn of the century. Chinas rise to great-power status, combined with its illiberal political system, is at the root of current tensions between China and Washington, which has openly stated that its grand strategy is to prevent the dominance of any region by a state that might threaten United States interests.
A Democratic China?
Before Deng's death, there was a consensus among the Chinese leadership that while liberalization would be introduced into the economic system, it would not be extended to the political system. This has not changed. Most Chinese elites remain convinced that the CCP must retain its monopoly on political and legal authority in China, that a strong state is necessary to maintain order and stability during the transition from quasi-socialism to capitalism, and that opening the government to alternative political parties would lead to chaos and the loss of Chinas recent gains. In the short term, therefore, China will remain an authoritarian state.
The medium term, however, is not so clear. Changes are under way both without and within China that could transform Chinas political system within a generation. In the past, foreigners often overestimated their ability to mold China to their liking, and it is wise for today's governments to recognize the limitations of policies designed to steer the course of Chinese development. Nevertheless, liberalizing global forces are a large part of the explanation for the current changes in China that, in historical terms, are extraordinarily rapid and profound.(f.1) The return of Hong Kong to PRC administration may accelerate these changes. Reforms in Chinas legal system are bringing the country closer to the ideal of the rule of law. Although human rights monitors complain that the state of civil liberties in China remains almost medieval, there have been clear improvements. Some victims of unlawful detention by local police, for example, recently sued the government and won compensation. Thousands of local officials are being subjected to public approval with the introduction of elections at the village level.
It is commonly argued that as a society grows more wealthy, its citizens demand greater civil and political liberties. The experiences of Taiwan and South Korea, which have recently democratized, and of some Southeast Asian states, where authoritarian regimes are under pressure from growing middle classes to liberalize, have inspired the theorem that democracy occurs soon after a country's population reaches an annual per capita income level of $5,000 to $7,000. If China holds to this pattern and continues its present high rate of economic growth, it should have a democratic system by about 2015.(f.2) William Overholt argues that, with respect to democratization and movement toward the rule of law, 'things are changing at least as fast in China as they did in Taiwan and South Korea.'(f.3)
Of course, Chinas size and complexity puts it into a different category than Taiwan or South Korea, and democratization might face unprecedented obstacles in the PRC. Indeed, many observers wonder if the present system, with its harsh penalties for dissent and agitation and its extensive public security apparatus, is up to the challenge of maintaining stability and prosperity in the face of problems such as a still-growing population, a skyrocketing violent crime rate, a 'floating' population of some 100 million former peasants looking for work in the cities, the alarming loss of about half a million hectares of arable land annually to urban development, the gradual layoff of hundreds of thousands of workers in unprofitable state-owned industries, and serious environmental degradation that will be extremely costly to rectify.
The question of whether or not the PRC evolves into a democracy may have dramatic ramifications for future Chinese foreign relations. According to the 'peaceful democracies' theory, states with democratic systems resolve their disputes peacefully and rarely, if ever, go to war against each other (although they may, and do, fight wars against nondemocracies). The spread of democracy thus creates a 'zone of peace' within which war becomes unthinkable. At present, this zone includes North America, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand. A state that implements a democratic political system is not immediately or automatically drawn into the zone of peace. Recent scholarship distinguishes mature democracies from nascent democracies; the latter may actually be more war-prone than the authoritarian regimes they replace, at least in the short term.(f.4) The established democracies may therefore have to wait another generation after a new state is democratized before any pacifying effects are realized. Furthermore, the theory itself is contested by scholars who argue that democratic states are historically too few and too recent to test the theory and that there are alternative, realpolitik explanations for the rarity of war among democracies.(f.5)
One certain outcome of Chinas democratization would be that one of the basic sources of friction in Sino-United States relations today-American antipathy to the present authoritarian regime in Beijing-would be swept away. This alone would improve the relationship. At best, it might alter the relationship fundamentally from one between latent enemies to one between friends, even if other bilateral disputes such as Chinas huge trade surplus. with the United States persisted. Less optimistically, the disinclination to use force against fellow democrats might need time to take root in China. Similarly, democratization might not generate among the Chinese instant trust in their neighbours Japan, India, and Russia (assuming Russia is appropriately classed as a 'democracy' in the near future). Least optimistically, a democratic China might cast doubt on the democratic peace theory, with the traditional dynamics of hegemony and power-balancing continuing to dominate relations among the major northeast Asian states and the United States. Perhaps, as Paul Dibb asserts, balance-of-power politics 'remains the reality of international society for the foreseeable future.'(f.6)
Democratization of the PRC might alleviate tensions between Beijing and Taiwan, but this, too, is uncertain. One of the tenets of the theory of democratic peace is the development of 'mutual respect and understanding between democracies.'(f.7) Applied to the hypothetical relationship between a democratic China and a democratic Taiwan, this would mean the Chinese would come to respect and accept the wishes of the people living on Taiwan to choose their own political arrangement, even if this meant declaring independence from the mainland and renaming the country something like the 'Republic of Taiwan.' It should be noted, however, that while the foreign policy of an authoritarian state does not necessarily reflect the will of the citizenry, Beijing's policy toward Taiwan is already democratic in the sense that most mainland Chinese believe Taiwan should be prevented -- by force, if necessary -- from declaring independence from mainland China. It is also doubtful that democratization in the PRC would persuade Taiwan to accept political union voluntarily, even though this is implicit in Taipei's position on cross-Straits relations. It is only Beijing's threat of attack or coercion that has inhibited Taiwan's inhabitants, the majority of whom consider themselves 'Taiwanese' rather than 'Chinese,' from de jure independence. Voluntary reunification cannot occur under threat, but if a PRC mellowed by democracy removed that threat, the immediate result would be official Taiwanese independence rather than reunification. In the long run, however, the way would be cleared for greater economic integration and significant political co-operation, which could perhaps lead to a relationship similar to that between Australia and New Zealand.
A Chinese Hegemony?
During the Deng era, China was re-building. If the strategies Deng put in place continue to bear fruit through the turn of the century, China could become the dominant economic and diplomatic power in Pacific Asia shortly into the post-Deng era. Throughout this period of catching up with the developed nations, Chinese leaders have recognized and emphasized the importance of maintaining the most peaceful possible relations with the rest of the world to sustain an environment conducive to Chinas rapid economic development. Thus, through the 1980s and 1990s, China consistently sought to win recognition as a responsible and constructive global player and to reduce tensions with erstwhile rivals such as the United States, Russia, Japan, India, and Vietnam. The only serious problems in this extended peace offensive have involved what the Chinese see as major violations of PRC sovereignty, such as Taiwan, claims by others to the Spratly Islands, and foreign pressure over human rights. Even here, Beijing's interest in continuing the influx of global wealth and expertise has clearly had a moderating influence on Chinese behaviour.
It must be recognized that striving to maintain a peaceful international environment has not been for the Chinese an end in itself, but rather a means to the end of building a relatively wealthy and powerful country. As Beijing draws nearer to that goal, there is no guarantee that the strategy, and consequently Chinese behaviour, will not change. There is an ominous undercurrent in Beijing represented by General Mi Zhenyu of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, who wrote that 'For a relatively long time it will be absolutely necessary that we quietly nurse our sense of vengeance. We must conceal our abilities and bide our time.'(f.8)
There could scarcely be a regional issue more consequential than the question of whether a powerful Beijing would generally respect the norms and institutions in favour of which most of its neighbours have reached a consensus, or whether it would use its influence to force other governments to accept an agenda that serves narrowly conceived Chinese interests to the detriment of the international community. Chinese leaders generally still see international relations in hierarchical terms and believe that China is the natural leader of the region. Yet Chinese officials from Jiang on down have repeatedly assured apprehensive Asia that 'China will never seek hegemony' even if it attains superpower capabilities. Unfortunately, these assurances are not highly convincing.
PRC officials and scholars, along with some foreign analysts, have raised three main arguments in support of the claim that a powerful future China would be disinclined to pursue an assertive foreign policy. The first is that economic interdependence constrains China from behaviour that might offend the international community, which has the power to retaliate by restricting Chinas access to foreign markets, supplies, and technology. There is reason, however, for ample doubt about the general proposition that economic sanctions are an effective means of forcing a state to change its foreign policy.(f.9) In the case of China, there is even greater reason for scepticism.
Two forces have consistently undermined international support for economic sanctions designed to shape Chinese policies. The first is the profit motive. Deng believed China was 'too big a piece of meat' for foreign governments to maintain post-Tiananmen sanctions long enough to take serious effect, and he was proved correct. Through the 1990s, business interests have gradually pushed anti-China human rights activism to the sidelines in the United States and Europe. In Asia, there has never been much support for the idea of employing economic coercion to attempt to influence Chinese foreign policy. The Chinese now fully understand that economic interdependence entails mutual vulnerability that can be exploited to Chinas advantage. The People's Liberation Army has relied heavily on imported weapons systems in its push for modernization, but even in this area the Chinese have several potential suppliers to choose from should the United States cut off transfers of military equipment and technology. The second force that undermines support for sanctions is the fear of isolating China. Based on the experiences of the first few decades of the PRC's history, foreign governments perceived Beijing as an irresponsible and provocative actor when it was outside the United States-sponsored international system in the 1950s and 1960s, but noted a shift to the status quo as the Chinese joined and became more active in international organizations and regimes through the 1970s and 1980s. Hence, there is a strong aversion to collectively punishing China because it is believed that this might cause China to revert to its view of the international community as an enemy and to its role as saboteur of the system.
The second argument against a powerful China prosecuting an assertive foreign policy relies on historical precedent. Ancient China, the dominant regional power in its heyday, was a relatively benign hegemon; eschewing the territorial conquest or large-scale imperialistic exploitation of weaker states that typified the behaviour of the modern Western powers and Japan, the Middle Kingdom was largely content to accept tribute payments and impart Chinese culture and know-how to its neighbours. If China returned to a position of relative power, so the argument goes, it would exhibit the same kind of behaviour, acting in the main as a promoter of global peace and progress. Aside from the fact that this argument comes close to presuming cultural-historical determinism, ancient Chinese elites did not perceive serious potential strategic and political threats to their civilization from other countries, but modern Chinese elites do. Even as the world's strongest power, China would still be subject to harm from weapons of mass destruction, foreign-based political subversion, and a host of other dangers that did not worry the rulers of antiquity. Ancient China was economically self-sufficient, but modern China is increasingly dependent on foreign markets, energy supplies, and technology transfers. The Emperor Qianlong snubbed a British trade mission in 1793 with the remark: 'We have never valued ingenious articles, nor do we have the slightest need of your country's manufactures.'(f.10) It is inconceivable that Jiang or any other Chinese leader today could take this attitude toward foreign trade and expect to maintain the nation's prosperity.
In short, to a far greater degree than in ancient China, a modern China in the contemporary international states system perceives vulnerabilities and incentives for controlling the external political environment. The world has changed in such fundamental ways that it cannot be assumed that modern states will behave as their pre-modern predecessors did. Indeed, many observers would argue that such PRC policies as transfers of nuclear and chemical weapons technology, the punitive 1979 invasion of Vietnam; and the Mischief Reef incident of 1995 have already seriously undermined the 'benign hegemon' thesis.
The third argument against an assertive China is that the PRC is too poor to be bold. The Chinese government is under tremendous pressure at home to raise standards of living. It is therefore impossible for the leadership to consider an aggressive foreign policy because it would require a massive commitment of limited national resources that might otherwise be used to lift Chinas poorest tens of millions out of poverty. Even an authoritarian regime depends upon domestic support, and the Chinese populace would not accept an expensive build-up of the armed forces in the absence of a clear and grave foreign military threat. Such a threat does not now exist. The Chinese Communist party must certainly sustain a rising national standard of living to keep itself in power, but, contrary to what this argument implies, the eradication of poverty at home has never been a prerequisite for an imperialist or belligerent foreign policy. Indeed, the poor have the least influence over national policy and are least able to mount the kind of opposition that would deter the state from the leadership's desired course of action. Rather, Beijing would need the support of the elites and the rising middle class of newly rich to carry out an aggressive foreign policy. It is important to note that such a policy would not necessarily undermine economic development, but it could contribute to the goal of maintaining or raising living standards. Beijing might use pressure or coercion on regional neighbours to gain preferential trade and investment deals for Chinese firms. The desire to secure future food and energy resources has been the main impetus in Chinas assertive South China Sea policy. Many China-watchers have warned that the CCP is using nationalism to prevent social and regional fragmentation; the likely result is a more jingoistic foreign policy.
The point is that China has no particular reason not to seek Asia- Pacific hegemony. To put it bluntly, Chinas pretensions to being a uniquely moral and principled great power are a sham. China has the usual appetites of a great power, plus powerful impulses stemming from its historical experience which demand that it be treated by other countries with respect and deference. But this is not to predict that a Chinese hegemony will indeed occur. China's continued rapid economic growth, national unity, and sociopolitical stability are all uncertain. If its leadership successfully steers through these challenges and the country continues to increase its relative national power, Beijing may well conclude that it can pursue its objectives most effectively through the present system, especially since many Asian states, unlike the United States, are prepared to accept China's emergence as the dominant regional power. For the foreseeable future, China will lack the capability to force its will upon the rest of the region militarily.(f.11) Thus, it is not yet necessary to give serious consideration to the more alarmist scenarios of a Chinese version of the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere or a hegemonic war between China and the United States. The region can expect that China will strive, inasmuch as it is capable, to reinstitute the arrangement wherein other countries in the region consult Beijing on major policy decisions while the Chinese have relatively broad freedom of action. China will likely exercise its influence through economic rather than military power, which means the growth of relative Chinese power is tied directly to Chinese economic development. Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro seem to miss this point when they call for the United States to 'prevent' China from becoming a 'regional hegemon.' They cannot provide a plan of action beyond arming Taiwan, 'preventing China from expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal' (an impossible suggestion), and encouraging an accelerated military build-up in Japan (a dangerously ill-advised suggestion).(f.12) Even if there is little chance the PLA will occupy the capital cities of northeast and Southeast Asia, however, China retains the capacity to act as a systemic spoiler, while the United States and the other regional powers have few means of effective retaliation in the event of a crisis.
While Chinese commentators talk endlessly about Western plots to repress the PRC, the United States is in effect acquiescing in the rise of a strong China by abetting Chinese economic growth (as indicated, among other things, by a Chinese surplus in Sino-United States trade of some $40 billion per year). American efforts, rather, are geared toward pacifying and socializing the behemoth so that it accepts the rules, norms, and institutions favoured by Washington.
In the immediate aftermath of Deng's death, the possibility of tensions between China and the other Asia-Pacific nations is marginally increased. The moderate wing of the CCP was weakened by Deng's death, and conservative, ultra-nationalist groups may have inordinate influence until Jiang fully consolidates his power. At the same time, the more fundamental sources of friction between China and its neighbours, including an insecure CCP, the PRC's position on the Taiwan issue, and Chinas rising relative power, persist. As when Deng was alive, China appears willing to accommodate the present international system on most issues except Taiwan. Epochal and unpredictable changes in China's foreign relations may soon result, however, from the transformations within China that Deng helped set in motion.
(f.1) See Bruce Cumings, 'The world shakes China,' National Interest 43(spring 1996).
(f.2) Henry S. Rowen, 'The short march: China's road to democracy,' National Interest 45(autumn 1996).
(f.3) William H. Overholt, 'China after Deng,' Foreign Affairs 75(May/June 1996), 76.
(f.4) Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, 'Democratization and the danger of war,' International Security 20(summer 1995); Gerald Segal, 'How insecure is Pacific Asia?' International Affairs 73(April 1997).
(f.5) Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, 'Polities and peace,' International Security 20(autumn 1995); David E. Spiro, 'The insignificance of the democratic peace,' Inter national Security 19(summer 1994); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the future: instability in Europe after the cold war,' International Security 15 (summer 1990), 48-51.
(f.6) Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper 295 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies 1995), 7.
(f.7) Georg Sorensen, 'Kant and processes of democratization: consequences for neorealist thought,' Journal of Peace Research 29(November 1992), 398.
(f.8) Megatrends China (Beijing: Hualing 1996); Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, 'The coming conflict with America,' Foreign Affairs 76(March/April 1997), 20.
(f.9) In an important recent study, Robert A. Pape concludes that 'economic sanctions have little independent usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals.' Pape, 'Why economic sanctions do not work,' International Security 22(autumn 1997), 93.
(f.10) Quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W. W. Norton 1990), 122.
(f.11) On this point see David Shambaugh, 'Chinese hegemony over east Asia by 2015?' Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 9(summer 1997), esp. 24-5; and Robert S. Ross, 'Beijing as a conservative power,' Foreign Affairs 76(March/April 1997).
(f.12) Bernstein and Munro, 'The coming conflict with America,' Foreign Affairs 76(March/April 1997), 31-2.…
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Publication information: Article title: China's Post-Deng Foreign Relations [Deng Xiaoping]. Contributors: Roy, Denny - Author. Journal title: International Journal. Volume: 53. Issue: 1 Publication date: Winter 1998. Page number: 133. © Canadian Institute of International Affairs Fall 1997. Provided by ProQuest LLC. All Rights Reserved.
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