The Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from Religion Clause Jurisprudence
Cinotti, David N., Journal of Church and State
do opposite things."4 Religious neutrality suffers from both of these problems.
Both scholars and judges have noted the difficulty of defining neutrality,5 and some have criticized the commonly espoused idea that the First Amendment mandates such a position toward religion.6 However, these commentators have assumed that the concept of neutrality has substantive content and can be attained through legal reasoning.7 Instead, this essay contends that neutrality is an indeterminate and vacant idea because one may always counter neutrality-based arguments by refraining the definition of neutrality or by making counterarguments also from neutrality.8 Despite assertions to the contrary,9 ā¦
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Publication information:
Article title: The Incoherence of Neutrality: A Case for Eliminating Neutrality from Religion Clause Jurisprudence.
Contributors: Cinotti, David N. - Author.
Journal title: Journal of Church and State.
Volume: 45.
Issue: 3
Publication date: Summer 2003.
Page number: 499.
© 1999 J.M. Dawson Studies in Church and State.
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