Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo

By Aboul-Enein, Youssef H. | Military Review, July/August 2003 | Go to article overview

Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo


Aboul-Enein, Youssef H., Military Review


MAKING WAR, THINKING HISTORY: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo, Jeffrey Record, Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, MD, 2002, 216 pages, $28.95.

Every U.S. president who has agonized over the application of force when making the final decision to go to war relies on history, precedent, and personal experience to help him reach the ultimate decision to send U.S. Armed Forces into harm's way.

Making War, Thinking History: Munich, Vietnam and Presidential Uses of Force from Korea to Kosovo by Jeffrey Record delves into the lives of seven U.S. presidents and their decisions to commit forces in Korea, Vietnam, the Persian Gulf, and other 20th-century conflicts. Record, a professor of strategy and international security at the U.S. Air Force Air War College, Montgomery, Alabama, has been a staff adviser on national security affairs for two senators and served as a staff member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

The 1938 Munich Agreement that sought to appease German Fuhrer Adolph Hitler has shaped the decision to go to war of every U.S. president from Harry S. Truman to William Clinton. Truman saw North Korean forces assaulting South Korea in 1950 as the first test of the United Nations (UN). Truman reasoned that if the United States did not respond to the North Korean invasion of South Korea, then the UN would dissolve.

Dwight D. Eisenhower saw similar threats in Indochina and believed that the Munich Agreement applied to the Soviets. Record argues that this belief blinded Elsenhower and kept him from seeing Vietnam for what it was-a colonial struggle. …

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